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ABSTRACT 
Several Islamic organizations have experience major changes in their 
theological frames and political identities away from fundamentalist and revivalist 
theological orientation to one that embraces a progressive Islamic theology that 
synthesizes these norms with classical Islamic teachings. What are the factors that 
explain these theological changes? What are the causal mechanisms that help to 
promote them? Using the moral authority leadership theory, I argue that Islamic 
groups would be able to change their theological frames and political identities if 
the changes are promoted by religious leaders with 'moral authority' status, who 
are using both ideational and instrumental strategies to reconstruct the theological 
frames of their organizations. In addition to moral authority leadership, 
intermediary variables that also affect the likelihood of a theological change 
within Islamic groups are the institutional culture of the organization – the degree 
of tolerance for non-Islamic theological teachings - and the relationship between 
the Islamic group and the state. 
This study is a comparative historical analysis of two Indonesian Islamic 
groups: the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah. It finds that the NU 
was able to successfully change its theological positions due to the presence of a 
charismatic moral authority leader, the tolerant institutional culture within the 
organization, and the ability of the organization to ally with the Suharto regime, 
allowing the reform to be institutionalized with little intervention from the regime. 
On the other hand, theological reform within the Muhammadiyah was not 
successful due to the lack of a leader with moral authority status who could have 
ii 
led the reforms within the organization, as well as to the dominance of a revivalist 
institutional culture that does not tolerate any challenges to their interpretation of 
Islamic theology. The analysis makes theoretical contributions on the role of 
religious leadership within Islamic movements and the likelihood of Islamic 
groups to adopt liberal political norms such as democracy, religion-state 
separation, and tolerance toward religious minorities. It identifies the mechanisms 
in which theological change within Islamic group become possible. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Could Islamic groups embrace liberal sociopolitical ideas such as 
democracy and religious pluralism? If so, under what conditions would this be 
possible? How does religious leadership, the institutional structure of the 
organization, and the interaction among them affect the likelihood of a religious 
organization to adapt and institutionalize these ideas?  
These puzzles have great implications for scholars who study religion and 
politics: Why do Islamic organizations change their theological frames and 
political identities from conservative/ revivalist Islamic theological interpretations 
to one that supports the compatibility between Islamic and modern liberal ideas 
such as democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance/pluralism? What exactly 
is the role of religious leadership in helping to bring about theological change 
within these groups? Under what conditions religious leaders are more likely to 
successfully change the theological orientations of their religious organization 
(e.g., from one that promotes a conservative revivalist interpretation of Islam to 
one that embraces more liberal/progressive theological interpretation) and under 
what conditions they are less likely to successfully accomplish such a change? 
These puzzles are important for scholars who are analyzing the political 
resurgence of Islam,
1
 a religion with a total of 1.5 billion adherents throughout the 
                                                             
1 The literature on global religious resurgence is extensive, but canonical works 
include Appleby, 2000, Casanova, 1994, Juergensmeyer, 1993 & 2008, Marty and 
Appleby, 1991, and Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011. 
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world. It is often perceived by some as a religion which promotes a conservative 
and revivalist-oriented theology, advocates for the establishment of a state based 
on the principles of Islamic law (shari’a), and the promotion of intolerance and 
violence against other religious groups. 
For some scholars (e.g., Huntington, 1996, Lewis, 1993, 2003), Islamic 
social movements are generally assumed to support the establishment of an 
Islamic state as well as the institution of social policies that are supported by 
Islamists. Such policies range from the implementation of the shari’a law as the 
constitutional foundation of the state, the exclusion and subjugation of women 
from the labor force and public sphere, to the persecution against religious 
minorities and smaller Islamic sects within that state.  
However, scholars tend to overlook the fact that Islamic groups do not 
always promote and support religious fundamentalism, intolerance, and shari’a-
based Islamic state. In some Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, Islamic 
groups have helped to promote democratic transitions after decades of 
authoritarian rule by secular military-backed regimes. Islamic groups in these 
countries have not only advanced democracy and civil society; in some cases, 
they have accepted and promoted new ideas that are identical with liberal political 
ideas. The synthesis between Islamic teachings and Western political thought that 
are supportive of democracy and other related liberal values result in the creation 
of what I called “progressive Islam” – Islam which supports, seeks to promote, 
and institutionalize modern sociopolitical values such as democracy, human 
3 
rights, religion-state separation, and tolerance toward religious minorities within 
their respective organizations and societies.
2
  
Why do these Islamic groups decide to alter their theological foundations 
from a theology that promotes fundamental Islamic values and a shari’a-based 
Islamic state into one that promotes the progressive ideas mentioned above? In 
this study, I argue that the role played by key religious leaders of these 
organizations and the institutional structure of the organizations are integral to the 
process of theological and political changes within these groups.  I refer to these 
religious leaders as moral authority leaders. This is because they are responsible 
for initiating and encouraging attitudes that reflect theologically and politically 
progressive interpretations of Islam. I further argue that these leaders play a very 
important role as innovators and promoters of new religious ideas/theology. After 
inventing these ideas, they attempt to implement and institutionalize them within 
their respective religious groups, using both ideational and instrumental strategies. 
Some of these leaders are successful in having their ideas institutionalized by their 
organizations, changing their organizations’ theology and political strategies in 
the process, while others have less success in their reform efforts.  
                                                             
2
 This definition builts on the term ‘liberal Islam’ defined in Kurzman (1998). 
However, it differs from Kurzman’s definition because it assumes that 
progressive Islamic thought studied in this dissertation are developed by reform 
leaders in their own terms rather than as in response to the incentives and/or 
pressures from their counterparts from the Western world. See chapter 2 (pp. 57-
58) of this study for further details.   
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Previous works in the field of religion and Islamic politics are guided by 
several theoretical approaches, including political culture/modernization theory 
and rational choice theory. However, the culturalist approach is limited from its 
fixed conception of ideology and culture, which tend to held religious groups, 
especially Islamic groups constant and incapable of changing their theological 
outlook. Rational choice scholars produce an elegant and parsimonious 
explanation on how structural constraints can shape religious actors’ costs and 
benefits calculations and in turn determine the political strategy that they are 
choosing. However, their explanation tend to (but not always) focus on the 
instrumental (e.g., power) or material-oriented goals over ideational goals. It 
needs to be merged with social constructivist theory in order to fully account for 
the instrumental and ideational goals and strategies of religious actors in politics.  
Culturalist/modernization theory scholars (e.g., Huntington, 1996, Lewis, 
1993 and 2003) tend to argue that the political action of religious (Islamic) groups 
can be predicted from ideologies and theological teachings that are shared by 
members of these groups. They tend to portray Islam as a fixed and static religion 
that seldom, if ever, changes its theological frames. They argue that Muslims tend 
to see Western intellectual ideas such as democracy, religion-state separation, and 
religious tolerance as threats to the fundamental teachings of Islam and thus, 
reject these ideas as incompatible with Islamic beliefs. As a result, Islamic groups 
are often portrayed as fundamentalist and radical groups, whose political goal is 
to impose a strict version Islamic law (shari’a) in all Muslim-majority societies, 
and to use non-democratic means such as authoritarianism and violence in order 
5 
to impose and enforce the shari’a to the rest of the population. Their portrayal of 
Islamic groups tends to reinforce the popular view that stereotypes them as 
fundamentalist, intolerant, and hostile toward liberal political values such as 
democracy, human rights, and religion-state separation. 
Today, most political scientists no longer subscribe to culturalist/ 
modernization-centered theories of culture analyzed above. Some have attempted 
to create a definition and assumption of culture that is more flexible, subject to 
contests by multiple actors, and more adaptable to structural as well as 
contextually based changes, including Wedeen (2002). One of them is social 
constructivist theory, which holds culture and ideologies as socially constructed 
variables subject to change and alteration based on the actions of human agents 
and how they handle structural constraints in the form of culture, ideology, or 
institutions, a process it calls mutual constitution. It is a theoretical approach that 
seeks to create a more nuanced treatment of culture as well as its products: ideas, 
norms, identities, and deeply held theological beliefs. It takes these variables 
seriously as independent variables that could influence political actions that are 
socially constructed, subject to political contestation, and are amendable to 
change over a period of time and space. At the same time, constructivism also 
develops clear concepts, hypothetical assumptions, and measurements about 
culture, ideas, and identities that could be turned into theoretical generalizations, 
unlike the more “uncertain, ambiguous, and messy” conceptualizations of these 
variables by interpretivists-oriented scholars (e.g., Wedeen, 2002, p. 726).  
6 
On the other hand, scholars using rational choice (rationalist) approach 
(e.g., Gill, 1998 & 2008; Kalyvas 1996) are able to provide an elegant and  
parsimonious explanation of the behavior of religious and political actors based 
on the preferences and goals of these actors and the constraints that they face in 
their attempts to achieve these preferences and goals. The specific contents of 
these preferences are undetermined, but they could be instrumental, ideational, 
and in most cases, both, depending on the assumption of individual scholars. (Gill 
2008, p. 28). However, there are divergent ways in which rational choice scholars 
treat religious ideas as a potentially causative variable within their own works. 
The first generation of rational choice scholars often dismissed ideas as  merely 
“hooks” used to justify or legitimize the actions of political groups that might 
have been grounded in instrumental (power-seeking) or materialist interests (e.g., 
Shepsle, 1985).  The next generation rational choice scholars offer more nuanced 
theoretical arguments which incorporate ideas as potential mechanisms that help 
to shape the groups’ preferences, incorporating both instrumental and ideational 
preferences in their theoretical explanations. Works by these scholars carefully 
mapped the sets of possible constraints facing religious groups in their efforts to 
implement their goals and preferences, in the forms of historical legacy, 
institutional structure, and leadership, which help to determine the strategic 
choices they made (e.g., Warner, 2000, Gill, 2008). The explanatory power of 
rational choice theorists tend to be more convincing and persuasive when it 
incorporates some, if not all of these constraints simultaneously. These works 
argue that both instrumental and ideational preferences are involved in the 
7 
decision-making process of each political actors, making the analyses of their 
decisions more credible, nuanced, and highly contextualized.  
However, most (but not all) works of rationalist scholars still privilege 
instrumental goals and preferences (e.g., maximizing their denominations’ 
memberships, seeking greater influence/power vis-à-vis other denominations) 
even when ideational or theological goals are also at play as well. The question 
that remains unanswered in much of these works is the balance between ideational 
and instrumental preferences of these actors. Many rational choice scholars still 
privilege instrumentalist and materialist preferences, over ideational ones in 
shaping the choices and actions of political actors (Checkel, 1998, p. 327).  This is 
a potentially serious limitation because sometimes, ideational variables such as 
theological frames can significantly influence the action of political actors. This is 
especially so in the case of religious groups. While a growing number of scholars 
of rational choice theory are trying to take ideas seriously in their theoretical 
explanation,
3
 more scholars need to fully take into account both instrumental and 
ideational preferences when we study the political actions of religious actors. 
Both factors need to be treated with equal consideration by scholars, regardless 
                                                             
3 The primary work utilizing this approach is Carolyn Warner’s Confessions of an 
Interest Group (2000). In this work, she shows how various constraints such as 
historical trajectory, institutional structure, and leadership help to shape the 
preferences and actions of the Catholic Church in three European countries: 
France, Italy, and Germany. It offers a nuanced and highly persuasive account on 
why the church chose to pursue different sets of alliances with Christian 
Democratic Parties in these three countries, fully supporting it in the case of Italy, 
partially in the case of Germany, but not supporting it in the case of France.  
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whether they are coming from rational choice, constructivist, or other theoretical 
perspectives.  
As an alternative to these theoretical frameworks, I have developed the 
moral authority leadership theory - a new theory based primarily on the social 
constructivist theory, but is also informed by the Weberian charismatic leadership 
theory as well as rational choice theory. This theory, grounded on constructivist 
principles, argues that ideas and other “social facts” (e.g., norms, identities), play 
an important role in politics by constituting, and sometimes primarily causing the 
transformative change in the political goals and strategies of religious groups. I 
argue that the primary preference of moral authority leaders in promoting their 
new theology is their desire to have their ideas implemented and institutionalized 
within their own organization, because they believe these ideas would have 
changed and strengthened their organization. By adopting this new theology, they 
are hoping that their organizations could be made more compatible with modern 
sociopolitical ideas such as democracy, religion-state separation, and religious 
tolerance.  Borrowing from Weberian charismatic leadership theory, I argue that 
the primary agents of theological change in these organizations are moral 
authority leaders, whose theological expertise and charismatic attributes give 
them strong leadership stature that enabled them to attract and convert potential 
supporters necessary to institutionalize their ideas. Lastly, from rational choice 
theory, I deduce moral authority leaders and their followers to have instrumental 
preferences and behave strategically to turn these preferences into political 
actions. They weight the cost and benefits of their reform efforts and use a variety 
9 
of means to increase support and minimize opposition against their reforms from 
within and outside of their organizations. However, while they are behaving 
strategically to promote their reforms and to ensure the survival of the reform 
efforts in the face of institutional and external opposition, their primary goals and 
preferences are primarily ideational, which is to promote and institutionalize their 
theological ideas within their respective organizations, because they believe that 
their ideas are normatively correct for the organization and its members to follow. 
They take theological ideas seriously and their primary goal is the 
institutionalization of these ideas within their respective religious group.
4
   
Constructivists believe that theological frames, political identities, and 
actions of religious groups are socially constructed. They will be constantly 
amended, reinterpreted, and renegotiated by members of religious groups, based 
on the historical, cultural, and institutional contexts facing them. Constructivists 
recognize that religious and political ideas often originate from influential 
religious leaders, whom they called ‘norm entrepreneurs.’ These leaders 
propagate their ideas because they believe such ideas would change and transform 
their groups by embracing new sets of political norms and values that once are 
                                                             
4
 This theoretical assumption is identical to the works of rational choice scholars 
in religion and politics such as Gill (2008) and Warner (2000). As a matter of fact, 
it is complementary to their theoretical assumptions, despite its primary focus on 
ideational and normative goals. My theory does not seek to replace or supplement 
the theoretical assumption of these rational choice works. Instead, it seeks to 
complement them by showing how ideational and instrumental preferences work 
together in constructing the preferences and political goals of religious actors, 
such as the two Islamic groups that are analyzed in this study.  
10 
successfully institutionalized, grounded their future political actions. Instead of 
portraying religious groups to have fixed and static theological frames like 
culturalists, constructivists tend to portray religious groups to have constantly 
changing theological and political preferences that are subject to social 
reconstruction. However, unlike rationalist-oriented scholars, who tend to 
attribute changes in theological and political preferences primarily to instrumental 
and material factors, constructivists tend to focus on the ideational and normative 
goals that proponents believe would have resulted in positive changes for the 
organization as a whole.  
I hypothesize that the ideational and political changes made by religious 
organizations are determined by the “moral authority” leaders who achieved this 
status through their theological expertise and charismatic attributes. This status 
enables them to gain credibility from their followers to implement and 
institutionalize their theological ideas within their organizations (hypothesis #1). 
Moral authority leaders and the reforms they promote are more likely to be 
successful in their effort to create theological and political changes if they meet 
most, if not all, of the following conditions:  
1. The presence of an institutional organizational culture that  
historically tolerates new religious ideas, customs, and traditions, 
which helps to justify support for reform among sympathetic 
members and  discourage the force of opposition against these 
reforms (hypothesis #2); and  
11 
2. A peaceful relations between the religious group and the state,  
which minimizes the likelihood of political  repression against the 
religious group and its members, allowing reformers to implement 
their reforms inside their own organization (hypothesis #3). 
Together, the combination of these hypotheses will construct the 
theoretical framework that explains how Islamic leaders and their theological 
ideas influence the process of change within their respective groups. My theory 
does not claim to explain the action of all religious leaders in all times and places. 
Rather, it is a middle-range theory that maps out the causal mechanisms in which 
new religious ideas could gain support within and outside Islamic groups and the 
conditions that give rise to their successful institutionalization within these 
groups.
5
 Lastly, it specifies the process how religious leaders who promote these 
ideas use a combination of ideational (e.g., speeches/sermons) and instrumental 
(e.g., coercion, material benefits) incentives in order to implement and 
institutionalize them within their organizations.  
I argue that there are two possible causal pathways in which the 
interaction between the primary independent variable of this study - moral 
authority leadership, and the two intervening variables - institutional culture of the 
                                                             
5
 Even though the theory could potentially be applied to explain the actions of all 
religious groups, in this study it is limited to the study of Islamic groups. The 
degree of success of progressive reform within each group are conditioned on the 
presence of independent and intermediary variables named above: moral authority 
leadership (independent variable), tolerant institutional culture (intermediary 
variable #1), and peaceful relations between religious group and the state 
(intermediary variable #2).  
12 
organization and the relationship between the state and the religious group, results 
in different outcome that determines the success or failure of a religious 
organization to institutionalize the reforms advocated by these moral authority 
leaders and their supporters. First, under the successful reform pathway, moral 
authority leadership works together with a tolerant institutional culture and a 
peaceful relation between religious group and the state to produce the successful 
institutionalization of progressive theological reforms. However, under the 
unsuccessful reform pathway, theological reform is unlikely to be successful due 
to the intolerant institutional culture within the religious organization. In this 
situation, the reformers encounter a strong opposition from the conservative-
leaning factions within their group. If reform opponents manage to develop a 
strong unsuccessful reform campaign against the reforms, they would be able to 
block the reforms and prevent them from being institutionalized within the 
organization.  
By detailing these mechanisms and explaining how they work, I seek to 
develop a new understanding on how interaction between human agents (moral 
authority leaders) and the institutional structure within a religious organization 
have resulted in causing significant theological changes within the organization. 
In turn, such changes have broader implications for the organization’s theological 
frame that guides its political identities and preferences. This frame helps to 
determine whether the religious group will adopt political strategies that could 
either be peaceful (e.g., participating in democratic institutions such as elections) 
13 
or conflictual (e.g., rejecting democratic institutions and supporting the shari’a 
law).  
In order to show how these mechanisms work empirically, I have chosen 
to conduct a comparative historical analysis of two Islamic movements, each 
representing the two possible causal pathways outlined in this study: the 
successful reform pathway (causal mechanism #1) is represented by the Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) movement, while the unsuccessful reform pathway (causal 
mechanism #2) is represented by the Muhammadiyah movement. These two 
movements are chosen because, as shown by Liddle and Mujani (2009), they have 
attracted a large number of followers within their respective countries, and all of 
them have historically played significant roles in the Indonesian public sphere. 
Both have been active participants in the national and local politics of Indonesia 
last several decades, and all have suffered from political repressions and 
persecutions. They have played a major role in the democratic transition and 
consolidation that has occurred in Indonesia during the last decade and a half.
6
  
The two different pathways explored in this study represent the different 
outcomes between the independent variable - moral authority leadership, with the 
two intervening variables of this study – organization’s institutional culture and 
the relationship between the state and the religious groups. Under the successful 
reform pathway, theological reform within the NU has been successful. Reform 
within the NU was headed by the charismatic moral authority leader 
                                                             
6
 See chapter 2 (pp. 82-85) for further justifications of my case selection method.  
14 
Abdurrahman Wahid, who led the organization from 1984 to 1999. Wahid had an 
established credential as an expert in both classical Islamic thought (fiqh) as well 
as in Western philosophical and sociopolitical thought. He developed his 
progressive theology as a synthesis of both intellectual streams, and sought to 
develop a liberal and pluralistic Indonesian Islam that tolerates localized Islamic 
customs and traditions and respects the rights of non-Muslim religious minorities. 
Lastly, Wahid’s status as a charismatic leader with a direct lineage to the NU’s 
founders and perceived supernatural abilities has helped his efforts to reform the 
organization. Wahid’s moral authority status has made the institutionalization of 
his reforms easier to be carried out.  
Wahid and other reformers within the NU were able to implement the 
theological reforms they propagated because of the tolerant institutional culture of 
the organization. The NU historically tolerates the practice of non-canonical 
Islamic customs and traditions that are not prescribed in the Qur’an and the 
Hadith as well as local religious customs and traditions that predated the arrival of 
Islam in Indonesia.
7
  Due to this institutional culture, it becomes easier for the NU 
to adopt Wahid’s progressive ideas which promotes the compatibility between 
Islam, democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance. Lastly, due to the more 
                                                             
7
 Examples of these non-canonical Islamic customs include the cult worship of 
major deceased ulama (saints), pilgrimage to religious shrines and tombs of 
saints, while example of localized religious customs include the use of shadow 
puppets (wayang) as a mean to spread Islamic teachings, previously practiced by 
the Hindu tradition that used to dominate Indonesia until the arrival of Islam in 
15th century CE.  
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peaceful relationship between the NU and the Indonesian state, the reforms were 
not blocked by the Suharto regime. The regime even welcomed Wahid’s agenda 
to promote democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance/pluralism within the 
NU, since his reform agenda was perceived by the regime as the moderate 
alternative to the ideas advocated by more conservative Islamic political groups 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. As a result, Wahid was able to promote and 
institutionalize his reforms within the NU during the late 1980s with little 
intervention from the regime. The regime only started to oppose Wahid and his 
reform around 1990, when it became clear that Wahid intended to spread his ideas 
outside of the organization. By this time, however, his reform had been 
successfully institutionalized within the organization.  
The clearest evidence that Wahid’s ideas were successfully instituted 
within the NU is the fact that under the leadership of Wahid and his successors, 
the organization has made a significant change from a conservative, pro-Islamic 
state organization from the 1950s until the 1970s, to one that has embraced 
progressive ideas such as democracy, human rights and religious 
tolerance/pluralism in Indonesia. The NU also distanced itself from the promotion 
of Islamic state and shari’a law advocated by revivalist Islamic group. Instead, 
since the mid-1980s NU accepted the secular nationalist state ideology Pancasila 
as the primary ideological foundation of the Indonesian state. Most of these ideas 
were advocated by Wahid, as well as other reform activists within the NU (Bush, 
2002; Kadir, 1999; Ramage, 1995). After Wahid stepped down from his 
leadership position in 1999, the NU did not reverse its support for democracy, 
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human rights and religious pluralism. Instead, these ideas have been further 
consolidated by several of Wahid’s close associates and confidants within the 
organization. This is a sign that these reforms have gained a strong constituency 
from within the NU (especially among the young generation of NU activists) and 
that they have been largely institutionalized within the organization. 
The unsuccessful reform pathway is illustrated by the case of the 
Muhammadiyah. In this case, progressive theological reforms have been hindered 
by a strong opposition from the intolerant institutional culture of the organization, 
which historically does not tolerate new theological teachings that differ from the 
revivalist Islamic theology long advocated by the organization. Because its 
founding mission was to purify Islam in Indonesia from any customs, rituals, and 
traditions that it perceived to be heretical innovations (bid’ah), it has historically 
expressed less tolerance for new, non-canonical Islamic teachings that are not 
prescribed in the Qur’an and the Hadith. It also was generally hostile against 
localized rituals and traditions that predated the Islamic period in Indonesia 
(unlike the NU).  
Within the Muhammadiyah, two moral authority leaders who attempted to 
introduce and institutionalize progressive theological reforms were Nurcolish 
Madjid and Ahmad Syafii Ma’arif. Nurcolish Madjid was the leading Indonesian 
Islamic theologian who initiated much of the progressive Islamic thoughts that 
was propagated within the Muhammadiyah. However, he introduced these 
reforms outside of the Muhammadiyah and did not consider them as a vehicle to 
reform and rejuvenate the organization. As a result, his ideas did not gain popular 
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following within the Muhammadiyah. Instead, the organization embraced 
increasingly conservative and revivalist theological positions. Although his ideas 
were influential within a small group of progressive-minded intellectuals within 
the Muhammadiyah, they never gained the same level of support enjoyed by the 
reforms proposed by Abdurrahman Wahid within the NU. Attempts to promote 
and institutionalize Madjid’s theological ideas within the Muhammadiyah only 
came during the late 1990s and early 2000s, when Syafii Ma’arif took over the 
position of Muhammadiyah chairman in 1998. However, Ma’arif’s reforms were 
challenged by a strong unsuccessful reform faction within the Muhammadiyah, 
which was led by other Muhammadiyah leaders such as Din Syamsuddin. This 
revivalist faction embraces a conservative interpretation of Islam and considers 
any form of deviations from their literal interpretation of Islam as a heresy 
(bid’ah). This faction has a stronger following within the Muhammadiyah. Its 
members are very critical of the progressive activists’ efforts to promote religious 
tolerance and pluralism from within the organization. In the end, the revivalists 
managed to prevent much of these reforms from being implemented within the 
Muhammadiyah and expel reform activists from key leadership positions within 
the Muhammadiyah, immediately after Ma’arif had stepped down from his 
position in 2005. The organization’s current views on human rights, citizenship, 
and religious tolerance/pluralism tend to be much more conservative and resemble 
fundamentalist Islamic theology compared to its counterparts, the NU. 
As predicted by the successful reform pathway, the NU made a complete 
transformation from a conservative ulama-dominated movement that until two 
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decades ago supported a shari’a based Islamic state into a progressive Islamic 
group it is known for today. These reforms were initiated beginning in the mid-
1980s by its charismatic former chairman Abdurrahman Wahid. However, as 
predicted by the unsuccessful reform pathway, reform efforts within the 
Muhammadiyah were not successful because the progressive reformers were not 
able to overcome a strong revivalist counter-movement, which was also supported 
by many of the leaders of the organization. Supporters of the revivalist faction 
managed to prevent the reform ideas from being institutionalized within the 
Muhammadiyah, despite the strong support of two religious leaders who initiated 
and supported the reforms, Nurcolish Madjid and Syafi’i Maarif, and the 
generally peaceful relationship between the Indonesian government and the 
organization.  
The moral authority leadership theoretical framework makes the following 
theoretical contributions. First, it seeks to better understand the role of theological 
ideas and moral authority leaders who support these ideas to promote ideational 
change within Islamic groups. It questions alternative theoretical perspectives 
offered by the culturalist approach, which portray these groups as theologically 
fixed and static fundamentalist groups who are unwilling to move from the 
conservative interpretation of the Islamic doctrine, or as groups largely (but 
entirely) motivated by instrumental instead of ideational considerations. Instead, I 
show that it is possible for Islamic groups to change their theological frames, 
political identities, and preferences. These changes take place due to the process 
of mutual constitution through a combination of agency-based and structural 
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variables that together help to shape the conditions that make the reform promoted 
by these religious leaders to either be successful or not successful.   
Second, the theory highlights the importance of the role of theological 
ideas in shaping Islamic groups’ initial political preferences as well as the degree 
in which new theological ideas could be introduced and institutionalized within 
the group. Islamic groups led by charismatic moral authority figures, which also 
have an institutional culture that tolerates new or unorthodox theological ideas 
and have peaceful and co-operative relations with the state, are more likely to be 
successful in institutionalizing the reforms these leaders are advocating. Once the 
reforms have been fully institutionalized, these groups are more likely to adopt 
democratic norms and institutions, acknowledge separation between religion and 
the state, and respect human rights, especially the rights of non-Muslims 
minorities. Knowing the difference between groups that are theologically 
progressive versus those that are theologically more fundamentalist/revivalist in 
orientation could help scholars and policymakers to determine which Islamic 
groups are more likely to embrace genuine democracy and human rights versus 
those that are genuinely hostile toward these ideas or are adapting them only for 
strategic and opportunistic purposes. 
Third, this study makes a new contribution to the Islamic politics literature 
by outlining the possible pathways for institutionalizing progressive theological 
ideas to promote theological and political change within an Islamic group and 
how reform leaders and activists within these groups could promote this change 
and implement them within their respective organizations. Lastly, the project will 
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contribute to the literature on political leadership, by outlining how moral 
authority leadership could influence theological and political changes both within 
their own organizations and their respective societies.  
The following is the overview of the next chapters in the study. Chapter 2 
outlines the research questions, a review of literature of previous works in the 
study of religion and politics, the theoretical framework, and its methodology. In 
this chapter, first I present an overview of the competing theories: political culture 
(culturalist) approach and rational choice (rationalist) approach, social 
constructivist theory and Weberian charismatic leadership theory. Next, I develop 
the concept of moral authority leadership, outlining the theoretical argument for 
the theory, and the independent, intervening, and dependent variables. Then I 
detail the causal mechanisms and pathways that make the reforms advocated by 
moral authority leaders and their supporters to become successfully or 
unsuccessfully institutionalized, detailing the interactions between the variables 
that resulted in these mechanisms. I then outline the two case studies which 
illustrates the two potential pathways that could have been taken by the reformers 
in their reform efforts. Lastly, I describe the data sources and the method I employ 
to analyze and verify this data.  
The next two chapters are the empirical analysis of the two case studies. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the successful reform pathway within the NU. It analyzes the 
theological reform within the NU under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid. It 
shows how the combination of Wahid’s moral authority, the tolerant institutional 
culture within the NU, and the relatively peaceful relations between the NU and 
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the Indonesian state contributed to the successful reform outcome and 
transformation of the NU. In less than three decades, the organization changed its 
theological frame, political identity, and preferences, from an Islamic group with 
conservative theological frame as reflected in its support for the implementation 
of the shari’a law and other Islamic-related to one that today has adopted the 
progressive Islamic ideas promoted by Wahid, namely its supports for democracy, 
human rights for all Indonesians, religion-state separation, and religious 
tolerance/pluralism.  
Chapter 4 discusses the unsuccessful reform pathway represented by 
Muhammadiyah.  It shows how progressive theological reforms within 
Muhammadiyah that are carried out by Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii Ma’arif ran 
into strong resistance from the revivalist/conservative wing of the organization, 
which has dominated the organization’s leadership for the past several decades. 
Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarizing the findings of this study and 
show how these findings lend support to the theoretical framework introduced in 
this study. I also discuss the theoretical contributions of this study and outline a 
future research agenda. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY, AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter contains the theoretical framework and research design of 
this study. It is divided into the literature review, theoretical overview,  
methodology, and data sources sections. The literature review section assesses 
and critiques the main theoretical approaches that are widely used in the 
scholarship on religion and politics within the last few decades, namely the 
political culture/modernization theory, rational choice theory, social constructivist 
theory, and Weberian charismatic leadership theory. It will then propose an 
alternative theoretical framework: moral authority leadership theory, which 
combines the perspectives of social constructivist theory, charismatic leadership 
theory of Max Weber, and rational choice theory. It then makes an argument on 
why this theoretical framework could better explain the behavior of Islamic moral 
authority leaders and social movements studied in this study than the other 
theoretical approaches above.  
After the literature review, the next section contains the outline of this 
study’s theoretical framework on moral authority leadership, along with a list of 
theoretical hypotheses that guides this research. The last section of this chapter 
outlines the research methodology used in this study and explains why the case 
study method utilizing comparative historical analysis is the most appropriate 
method for this research project. It also outlines the two case studies of Islamic 
social movements that will be analyzed in this study and why they are chosen for 
this study. Lastly, the methodology section details the justification of these case 
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studies, the data sources collected during the fieldwork for this study and steps 
that are taken to increase the reliability and validity of these data sources and 
means to prevent the possibility of selection bias in the analysis of these data.  
Review of Competing Explanations 
This section presents an overview of the competing theories that have 
been commonly used in the field of religion and politics and Islamic politics over 
the last three decades: political culture (culturalist) approach, rational choice 
theory, social constructivist theory, and Weberian leadership theory. 
Political culture (culturalist) approach. The political culture (culturalist) 
approach has its roots in modernization theory that dominated the field of 
comparative politics from the 1950s to the early 1970s (e.g., Deutsch, 1961; 
Lerner, 1958), although some scholars continued to use this framework until the 
mid-1990s (Huntington, 1996). It assumes that the culture of a given society 
predetermines the political behavior of its citizens. Further, culture is assumed to 
be a fixed and static variable for the most part and is not assumed to be receptive 
to political change at least in the short or medium term.  Lastly, culture is 
perceived as a variable that gives each society its own “primordial cultural 
identity” and helps determine “major differences in political and economic 
development among civilizations” (Huntington, 1993, pp. 22).  
A branch of the political culture tradition that is commonly used to explain 
political Islam and Islamic social movement is civilizationist/modernization 
theory. The theory assumes that different societies could be classified based on 
the unique ways their members view state-society relations, commitment to 
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particular religious or ideological beliefs, view on social order and dislocation, 
and so forth (Wilson, 2000, p. 255). Civilizationist theory uses religion as a proxy 
for culture of a given civilization (Huntington, 1996, p. 59; Wilson, 2000, pp. 
255-256). The primary methodology of the civilization approach is based on the 
literal reading of religious texts to explain a religious group's impact in the 
sociopolitical life in a given society (Kuru, 2009, pp. 16-17). In the case of Islam, 
for instance, it is viewed as the “blueprint of a social order, which holds a set of 
rules that exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of 
men......These rules are to be implemented throughout social life” (Gellner, 1983, 
p. 1, cited in Kuru, 2009, p. 17).  
Civilization/modernization theory portrays Islam as a fixed, static, and 
backward religious tradition that seeks to reassert its dominant role in Muslim 
societies and is hostile toward Western intellectual ideas such as modernization, 
liberalism, and democracy. Thus, Islam is perceived as “an integrated totality that 
offers a solution to all of the problems of life” and “has to be accepted in its 
entirety and to be applied to the family, the economy, and to politics” (Ayubi, 
1991, p. 63). Civilization theorists therefore tend to be skeptical about the 
compatibility of Islam with Western political ideas such as democracy and 
liberalism. They argue that efforts to introduce democracy to the Islamic world 
would merely be a futile exercise (Huntington, 1996; Lewis, 1993 & 2003). 
Indeed, civilization theorists tend to alarmingly view political Islam as a potential 
threat not just to the development of democracy in the Muslim world, but also to 
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the liberal democratic order in the Western world (e.g., Gellner, 1983; Lewis, 
1993 & 2003; Huntington, 1993 & 1996).  
Civilization theorists tend to portray extremist Islamic groups such as the 
Wahabbi of Saudi Arabia and Hamas and Hezbollah of Palestine as the primary 
(and often the only) representatives of political Islam in the Muslim world. They 
ignore “other Islamic groups that have pursued more moderate political goals and 
used peaceful political strategies (e.g., participating in elections) to achieve their 
goals” (Chernov-Hwang, 2007, p. 17). They tend to view Islamic movements, 
regardless of their theological outlook, political orientation, and geographical 
location, as those advocating for a political agenda that calls for “the complete 
and holistic nature of revealed Islam, so that, according to them, it encompasses 
the three famous ‘Ds’ (din, religion; dunya, life; and dawla, state)” (Ayubi, 1991, 
p. 63). Specifically, these movements believe that 
Islam is an integrated totality that offers a solution to all problems of life. 
It has to be accepted in its entirety, and to be applied to the family, to the 
economy, and to politics….the realization of an Islamic society is 
predicated on the establishment of an Islamic state, that is, an ‘ideological 
state’ based on the comprehensive precepts of Islam (Ayubi, 1991, pp. 63-
64).  
In sum, culturalist/modernization theory tends to view political Islam as a 
single unilateral group that promotes extremist and revivalist religious ideas that 
run counter to Western political values, such as democracy, human rights, and 
religious freedom. Furthermore, it is willing to use violent means if necessary, in 
order to establish an Islamic state based on the shari’a law, while ignoring the 
ideological, theological, as well as geographical diversity of Islamic movements 
within the Muslim world (Sadowski, 2006, pp. 216-219, Wilson, 2000, p. 256). 
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The culturalist approach suffers from its fixed assumption of ideas and culture 
that ignores the possible ideological or theological differences among members of 
the same religious group as well as its deterministic predictions that assign blame 
for a society's predicaments (e.g., prevalence of authoritarianism in Muslim-
majority countries) by attributing them to cultural factors.   
Today, most political scientists no longer subscribe to culturalist or 
modernization theory. Some scholars have attempted to create a definition and 
assumption of culture that is more flexible, subject to contests by multiple actors, 
and more adaptable to structural, historical, and socio-cultural changes, including 
Wedeen (2002). Social constructivist theory, which held culture and ideologies as 
socially constructed, subject to reinterpretation and reinvention based on the 
actions of human agents, is another theoretical approach working in the same 
spirit with these scholars. It is an effort to create a more nuanced treatment of 
culture, ideas, identities, and deeply held theological beliefs. It takes these 
variables seriously as potential causal variables that could influence political 
actions that are socially constructed, subject to political contestation, and are 
amendable to change over a period of time and space. At the same time, 
constructivism also try to develop clear concepts, assumptions, and measurements 
about culture, ideas, and identities that could be turned into theoretical 
generalizations, unlike the more “uncertain, ambiguous, and messy” 
conceptualizations of these variables by interpretivists-oriented scholars (e.g., 
Wedeen, 2002, p. 726).  
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Rational choice (rationalist) approach. Another theory commonly used 
in political science literature to explain the actions of religious groups is the 
rational choice theory. Rational choice theory assumes that all humans form their 
preferences based on how they weight their varying needs and desires. The 
content of these preferences are undetermined and the theory itself has little to say 
about it (Gill, 2008, p. 28). It is up to the scholars who are doing the investigation 
to make an assumption on whether these preferences are instrumental or 
ideational in nature, and in most cases, both types of preferences could be utilized 
at the same time.  
Rational choice theory does assume that  
….given those preferences, people will try to achieve their goals (i.e., their 
preferential needs and desires) in the least costly manner possible, given 
the various environmental and strategic constraints that they face….As 
these constraints change, so do the cost-benefit incentives faced by 
different individuals, and hence the strategic choices they make (Gill, 
2008, p. 28).  
Since the basic premise of rational choice theory stated above is simple 
and parsimonious, it emerges as a leading theory in the social sciences over the 
last three decades or so. During this period, it has evolved greatly in order to 
develop a more nuanced explanation about political behavior that assumes 
rational behavior of human actors that is also contextualized in a given history, 
culture, institution, or other structural and historical contexts.  Its view on the role 
of ideas in influencing the behavior of political actors has also evolved as well. 
The first generation of rational choice scholars rejected cultural and ideational-
based explanations of group behavior altogether. They argued that fulfilling 
instrumental interests is the primary, if not the only, rationale for a group’s 
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political behavior, often defined as the desire to gain material wealth and/or 
political power.  These interests were shaped by structural factors (i.e., social 
class, international system, etc.) that dominated these groups’ political behavior 
and squeezed out any ideational considerations that these groups might have held 
(Philpott, 2001, p. 59). For many first-generation rational choice scholars, ideas 
and culture were at best secondary causes of social phenomenon. Often, they only 
served as the ex post facto justifications (or ‘hooks’) that are used by these groups 
to cover up their real instrumental interests (Gill, 2008, p. 57, also see Shepsle, 
1985, cited in Philpott 2000, p. 217, fn. 34). In the view of first generation 
rationalists, political and religious actors are cloaking their power-seeking or 
material interests with ideational rhetorics and narratives – for instance, the 
Protestant rulers’ support for Protestant Reformation during the 16th century 
could be interpreted by these scholars as a ploy to seize the power and the wealth 
of the Catholic within their respective territories (Philpott, 2001, p. 137). 
The first generation of rational choice scholarship immediately faced 
strong criticisms from scholars who were advocating for ideational based 
explanations of political behavior. One major criticism was its instrumentalist 
assumption. Because often it proposed a priori assumption privileging the 
instrumental and material considerations as determining factors for a political 
actor’s interests, it had difficulties accounting for non-instrumental/ideational 
factors such as norms, values, and identities that might also shape the preferences 
of this actors as well. Critics argued that while many political actors were using 
ideas merely as a cloak to mask their real instrumental or political interests, not all 
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of them were using them in these manners. Other actors, religiously-inspired ones 
in particular, might have adopted ideas and norms as their genuine preferences to 
pursue their political goals (e.g., to change/reform their religious groups). 
However, hard-core rationalists usually assumed away this possibility in order to 
retain the theoretical parsimony of their theories (Philpott, 2001, pp. 86-87).
8
   
 The next generation of rational choice scholarship attempts to answer 
these criticisms by incorporating ideas as potential mechanisms that help to 
determine the choices of political actors or as potential preferences that can 
complement the instrumental preferences of these actors. For instance, Judith 
Goldstein and Robert Keohane argue that ideas could serve as “road maps” that 
help determine actors’ preferences or to help them understand the relationship 
between their goals and alternative strategies to reach them (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993, pp. 12-13).  Under this framework, ideas serve as a causal 
mechanism that helps political actors to channel their action into specific 
choices/tracks and to exclude other policy choices and options (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993, p. 12).   
Contemporary rational choice scholars also offer a more nuanced 
theoretical argument which incorporates ideas as potential mechanisms that help 
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 One example of such criticism is Daniel Philpott’s criticism Anthony Gill's 
theory on the origins of religious liberty in the United States for excluding the 
impacts of ideologies such as Protestant Reformation and secular Enlightenment 
philosophy as motivators for the enactment of religious liberty clauses in the 
United States Constitution (Philpott, 2009, pp. 194-195). Anthony Gill’s analysis 
of this case could be found in Gill, 2008, ch, 3 (pp. 60-114).  
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shape the groups’ preferences. Works by these scholars carefully specify the 
possible constraints, such as historical legacy, institutional structure, and religious 
leadership, which together determine the choices religious groups made in 
different cultural and societal settings. Unlike the first generation of rationalist 
scholars, they no longer simply reduce the primary preference of these actors as 
the pursuit of power or material interests. Instead, they simplify it as a mechanism 
to maximize a certain goal, which are agnostic in nature and are determined by 
the scholar who conducts the investigation. For instance, Anthony Gill assumes 
that the preferences of religious leaders in his work include maximizing the 
market share of their denomination’s converts/followers and maximizing the 
advantage of their status under the law, dependening on whether they are a 
hegemonic religious majority or a religious minority (Gill 2008, p. 44-45). This 
assumption is more nuanced and sophisticated compare to those made by first 
generation rational choice scholars, who simply assumed that all political actors 
were having the same sets of preferences (e.g., gaining political power or 
collecting material benefits).  
Contemporary rational choice scholars tend to examine in detail the 
complex causal mechanisms and scope conditions which explain why religious 
actors under different historical political settings are pursuing different sets of 
strategies in order to achieve their political goals. Examples of work using this 
approach include Anthony Gill's comparative studies of relations between the 
Catholic Church and the state in Latin America. Gill finds that the church is more 
likely to have a more distant relationship with the state and support democracy in 
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countries where it faces a higher degree of competition from Evangelical 
Protestant denominations (e.g., in Chile and Brazil). On the other hand, the church 
is more supportive and is closer to the authoritarian regime where it does not face 
Protestant competition (e.g., in Argentina) (Gill, 1998). In another study 
comparing the development of regulations promoting religious liberty in colonial 
America, Mexico, Russia, and the Baltic states, Gill finds that religious liberty is 
more likely to be promoted in countries with a higher level of religious pluralism 
and a government that wishes to generate higher economic growth and trade 
openness (Gill, 2008).  
Another study that uses this approach in the field of religion and politics is 
Carolyn Warner (2000), which examines how did the Catholic Church hierarchies 
in three European countries – France, Italy, and Germany – chose whether to ally 
with emerging Christian Democratic parties at the end of the Second World War 
II. She argues that the church’s hierarchy made its decisions through cost-benefit 
calculations based on the hierarchy’s perception of which political parties could 
best deliver the church’s preferred policies within each of these countries. 
However, the costs and benefits calculations of the church were also shaped by 
the history of the church’s political engagements and alliances within a specific 
country, the structures of the church hierarchy, as well as the leadership of the 
church hierarchy (Warner, 2000, pp. 35-38). The differing historical relationships, 
institutional structures, and leadership within the three national churches resulted 
in a varying sets of alliances with Christian Democratic parties in each countries 
in post World War II: developed close alliance with the Italian Christian 
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Democrats, developed co-alliance with the Protestants in the Christian 
Democratic Party of Germany, but abandoned the alliance with the Popular 
Democratic Front (MRP) in France. Through this highly contingent and 
contextualized research design, Warner is able to develop an explanation for the 
diverging forms of support of the Catholic Church for Christian Democratic 
parties in Western Europe that is nuanced and persuasive, as it incorporates all the 
historical and institutional constraints that affected how these preferences were 
formed in the first place. It certainly serves as a model on how future works on 
religion and politics utilizing a combination of rational choice theory and 
comparative historical analysis should be conducted.   
The sophisticated theoretical explanation developed by rational choice 
scholars in the above works has certainly given us a better explanation on how 
political groups, specifically religious groups, developed their political 
preferences based on highly contextualized costs and benefits calculations. Ideas, 
conceptualized for instance as “world views” (e.g., religious beliefs) and 
principled beliefs (e.g., normative beliefs such as human rights) (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993), certainly could influence the preferences and goals of political 
actors. In addition, the highly contextualized sets of preferences in recent rational 
choice works on religion and politics means that it is highly likely that both 
instrumental and ideational preferences are involved in the decision-making 
process of each political actors, making the analyses of how these preferences are 
established and their sociopolitical implications more complex, nuanced, and 
highly sophisticated.  
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The question that remains unanswered is how to strike the proper balance 
between ideational and instrumental preferences in future rational choice works. 
While the works reviewed above shows that a growing number of scholars of 
rational choice theory are trying to take ideas seriously in their theoretical 
explanation, more scholars need to fully take into account both instrumental and 
ideational preferences when we study the political actions of religious actors. 
Most importantly, the role of ideas, culture, and identities of the religious group 
being studied, while are incorporated by contemporary rationalists in their works,  
are generally still underplayed and under-valued, in contrast to instrumental or 
material-based preferences based on the strategic calculation of members of these 
movements.
9
 For instance, Philpott argues that the lack of ideational variables in 
rational choice theory makes it difficult for the theory to explain the formation of 
state policy towards religion, where ideologies play a major role in the political 
actors' decision either to promote religion (e.g., post-1979 Iranian government) or 
to severely restrict it (e.g., Turkey under Kemal Ataturk) (Philpott, 2009, p. 
195).
10
  Timothy Shah criticizes Gill’s 2008 study for its exclusive focus on the 
role of government regulation in determining the level of religious freedom within 
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 This does not imply that all rational choice works always underplay ideational-
based preferences in favor of instrumental-based ones. Work by Warner (2000) is 
an example that gives an equal weight for the two types of preferences. Stark 
(2003) is another.  
10
 Gill’s interpretation on the Protestant Reformation could be found on Gill, 
2008, pp. 76-91. He argues that expansion of religious freedom in Britain post-
Reformation has more to do with the desire to expand trade and economic 
prosperity  of the country rather than ideational concerns for equality for all 
Christian denominations (Gill, 2008, pp. 90-91).  
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a specific society, while ignoring the role of societal regulations, which are likely 
to be shaped by “an accumulated stock of socially embedded religious ideas and 
mores” in shaping the level of religious freedom within the same society as well 
(Shah, 2009, p. 329).
11
 Thus, critics of the rational choice theory, while praising 
recent works that included ideas, norms, and other ideational variables their work, 
also argue that more needs to be done in order fully incorporate these factors into 
the analysis of religious groups’ political actions and behavior. They assert that in 
order to be able to properly explain these, rationalists as well as scholars from 
other theoretical perspectives, need to gain a better understanding of the theology, 
institutional organization, history, cultural dynamic, and as the institutional 
dynamics and changes within these religious groups (Philpott, 2009, p. 198). Both 
instrumentalist and ideationalist factors need to be equally considered by scholars, 
regardless whether they identify themselves with rational choice theory or not.  
In sum, rational choice theory tends to emphasize the role of cost-benefit 
calculations, structural incentives, and strategic choices of religious groups at the 
expense of their ideational or theological rationales. It portrays political actors 
(including religious ones) as strategically calculating actors with undefined sets of 
preferences. While most rational choice scholars emphasize instrumental and 
                                                             
11
 However, rational choice scholars are beginning to study the impacts of societal 
regulations on religion. This research finds that social regulation of religion does 
play a significant role in increasing religious persecution, because societal 
pressure/restrictions against religious minorities are often formalized to become 
government regulations against these minorities. This is especially so in Muslim-
majority societies (Grim and Finke, 2007; see also Grim and Finke 2010).  
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material interests in their research, some also acknowledges the role of ideas. This 
is especially so for contemporary rationalist scholars who are taking religious 
ideas, culture, and leadership of religious groups as important intermediate 
variables in their works (e.g., Gill, 2008, Warner, 2000). However, other 
rationalists are still underplaying the potential role of ideas, culture, and identities 
as potentially constitutive, if not causative, variables that help to explain such 
actions. In doing so, rational choice scholars risk the possibility of ignoring the 
detailed analyses of doctrine, theology, rituals, and institutional structure of 
religious groups that might play a factor in explaining their political behavior 
(Philpott, 2009, p. 193). While it is important for scholars to understand the 
instrumental preferences of religious groups that serve as the basis for their 
political actions, a full theoretical understanding of these groups need to take into 
account for both the ideational and theological preferences that have inspired 
these groups’ preferences and actions in the first place.  
Social constructivist theory. In response to the rational choice theoretical 
arguments outlined above, some scholars have responded that political scientists 
need to have a better understanding of the role of ideas, norms, and identities, in 
generating political actors’ preferences and actions, and how they adapt to the 
changing sociopolitical structures and conditions. They made a counter-argument 
that rational choice theory tends to simplify religious actors’ interests by 
assuming that they primarily originate from instrumentalist/materialist 
preferences. By making such an assumption, rationalists often (but not always) 
overlook the normative social fabric of politics that might also serve as potential 
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sources of these actors’ interests and preferences as well (Checkel, 1998, p. 324). 
As an alternative to rational choice theory, constructivists propose that by 
studying social fabrics such as ideas and norms, and explain how they help to 
constitute actors’ political identities and interests, they could “develop new and 
meaningful interpretations of international politics” (Checkel, 1998, p. 325).  
Social constructivist theory attempts to explain “how does the interplay of 
actors, social structures, as well as material and ideational factors constitute, 
inform, and explain our social life” (Burch, 2002, p. 61). While constructivists are 
far from being a coherent group of scholars,
12
 there are three main ontological 
propositions that are broadly shared by them: 1) an emphasis on “social facts” 
(i.e., ideas, norms, and identities) as major, if not the primary, determinants of 
identity formation and political action of actors, 2) an agreement that such actions 
are based on the interpretation of social meanings that are shared intersubjectively 
by a group of sociopolitical actors, and 3) an agreement on the mutual 
constitutionality of social structure and human agents in helping to constitute (or 
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 Substantial disagreements exist between mainstream and critical/postmodernist 
constructivists.  While mainstream constructivists question the material 
epistemological assumption of their rational choice counterparts, they remain 
committed to the idea of a positivist social science inquiry and believe that 
science should be a value-neutral enterprise. On the other hand, critical 
constructivist question both the ontological and epistemological foundations of 
positivist social science, advocating a pluralistic and interpretive approaches to 
generate knowledge, reject value neutral theorizing, and question the role of 
science in helping to promote the domination of powerful groups against the rest 
of the humanity. For further details on the similarities and differences between 
mainstream and critical constructivists, see Guzzini (2000), Hopf (1998), and 
Price and Reus-Smit (1998).  
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cause) a given political outcome (Price and Reus-Smith, 1998, pp. 268-269; Klotz 
and Lynch, 2007, ch. 1). In short, constructivists believe that any meaningful 
human action (including political action) is only possible within an intersubjective 
social context, in which actors develop their interests, preferences and goals based 
on their relationship with other actors. Together, they are social facts that have 
specific meanings to their respective organization or society (Hopf, 1998, p. 173).  
 Social facts are norms, rules, identities, languages, cultures, and 
ideologies that help to create actors’ identities, shape their interests, and guide 
their actions as well (Checkel, 1998, p. 325; Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 7). 
Constructivists argue that rationalists often do not consider social facts that are 
highly complex and contextualized to be the primary explanatory variables for 
their theoretical assumptions, in order to achieve theoretical parsimony. They 
argue that complex social facts are difficult to be explained using unidirectional 
causal chains, but instead should be understood as social construction, in which 
human actions are at once constrained and enabled by a complex mix of social 
facts, such as norms, culture, language, and ideologies (McCann, 1996, p. 463). In 
turn, these social facts become part of an intersubjective understanding by a 
collective of actors that go beyond simple aggregate beliefs of individuals (Klotz 
and Lynch, 2007, p. 8).   
Constructivists also believe that complex social structures (e.g., culture, 
institutions, the state) and human agents mutually constitute their actions, each are 
shaped and being shaped by the other. Unlike culturalists, who favor structure 
over agency, or rationalists, who favor agency over structure, constructivists 
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argue that complex social phenomena are difficult to explain with  unidirectional 
causal chains, but that they instead should be understood as “constitutive” social 
construction, in which human actions are at once constrained and enabled by a 
complex mix of social facts (e.g., norms, culture, language, and ideologies) that 
should be understood as constitutive, rather than independent and exogeneous, 
determinants of political action (McCann, 1996, p. 463).  
According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, social facts such as 
ideas, norms, and identities do not emerge on their own, but are “actively built by 
agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their 
community” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 896). They put a significant role 
on what they called 'norm entrepreneurs' - a person or an organization that 
promoted the norm in the first place, using both persuasive and coercive tactics to 
convince the majority of states in the international system to accept the norm and 
institutionalize it into their domestic legal and constitutional frameworks 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, pp. 896-901). States decided to adapt and 
institutionalize these norms within their territory due to a combination of factors 
such as: pressures from 'norm leaders' states, the desire to enhance their 
international legitimacy, and the desire of state leaders to improve their self 
esteem (i.e., their political image/ legitimacy) in front of their domestic 
constituency (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 895).  
One of the main research interests of constructivist scholars is on the role 
of identity and how it influences domestic and international politics. 
Constructivists believe that the identity of a political unit helps to shape its 
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interests, preferences, and political actions. They believe that identities are a type 
of “social relationship between agents and structures that change over time and 
across contexts” (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 65). Because they are conceptualized 
as continuously evolving relationship between agents and structures, 
constructivists believe that “identities are not immutable characteristics of 
individuals or groups,” but they are instead constantly being produced and 
reproduced in their interactions with other individuals, groups, or states (Klotz 
and Lynch, 2007, p. 65). Thus, constructivists recognize that new identities could 
emerge to reframe and reconstruct any pre-existing ones. Such identities are 
perpetuated through the active interactions between agents and structures who 
managed to promote and institutionalize these ideas within their political 
organizations. 
There are some important criticisms against social constructivist theory. 
First, some have argued that constructivism has focused too much attention on the 
role of structure rather than that of agency. Since constructivists put a priority on 
how collective and intersubjective norms influence the behavior of states and 
other political institutions, they often neglect the role of individual agency, which 
might have been very important, especially at the beginning stage when these 
institutions were first founded. Thus, constructivists should be attentive to the 
process of social construction both at the individual and at the collective/ 
institutional level (Checkel, 1998, p. 340). / 
Next, critics of constructivism also argue that it is more of a meta-
theoretical framework than a middle-range theory that could be applied and tested 
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for a variety of sociopolitical problems. Constructivist arguments often do not 
detail the causal mechanisms and scope conditions that explore the causal link 
between ideas and political actions being investigated (Checkel, 1998, pp. 342 & 
346). Rationalist critiques of constructivism argue that while ideas might have 
some influence on the actions of political actors, ideas are also vulnerable from 
the manipulation and selective uses of these actors, which justify their political 
actions. Thus, while ideas might have initially inspired these political actors, often 
“it is the rational calculation of these actors that plays the leading role to motivate 
actions taken by these actors” (Checkel, 1998, p. 346). To strengthen this 
component, constructivists should specify “the processes and mechanisms in 
which actors are more likely to adapt rationalist calculations in their preferences 
and under which conditions they are more likely to be influenced by ideational 
concerns and use these ideas to either constitute or shape the preferences of these 
actors” (Checkel, 1998, pp. 345-346).  
Finally, another major criticism of constructivism lies on its emphasis on 
studying certain norms or over others. While constructivists have used the theory 
to analyze numerous topics and problems in political science,
13
 there is only a 
small number of constructivist scholars who are studying religiously-inspired 
norms and how they have impacted domestic and international politics. 
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 These work range from the creation and institutionalization of human rights 
norms (e.g., Keck and Sikkink, 1998), the cultural foundations of national security 
policy (e.g., Katzenstein, 1996), the social construction of democracy in non-
Western societies (e.g., Schaffer, 1998), and the role of neoliberal ideology in 
shaping the policies of international financial institutions (e.g., Weaver, 2008). 
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Nevertheless, the number of constructivist scholars working in this field is 
certainly growing. This includes the works by Ferrari (1998), Hassner (2007 & 
2009), Hurd (2008), Juergensmeyer (1993 & 2008), Philpott (2001 & 2009), and 
Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011). The lack of constructivists (as well as by other 
political scientists) work in religion and politics/international relations could have 
been attributed to the prevalence of secularist, “Westphalian presumption,” that 
was commonly shared among social scientists, which presumes religion as a set of 
privately held doctrines or beliefs, rather than as a community of believers that 
could potentially be active in the public sphere. As a result, many international 
relations scholars have failed to grasp the nature of religion as a potential social 
order in international relations (Thomas, 2000, pp. 820-821).  
In conclusion, constructivism has its strength and weaknesses. While its 
focus on ideational variables such as ideas, norms, and identities enables scholars 
to investigate the origins of ideational preferences that specific political actors or 
groups might have held. It gives equal attention to the roles on human agency and 
social structure, and how the two could work together to either cause or prevent 
an idea or a norm from being institutionalized within a political group. At the 
same time, it also has several key limitations: it tends to privilege ideational over 
instrumental interests, it tends to prioritize structure over agency, and it tends to 
study certain (often “good”) norms over others. However, despite these 
limitations, constructivism has a great potential to make significant new 
contribution in the study of religion and politics, due to its focus on studying 
social facts, which also includes religiously-based ideas, doctrine, and theology. 
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In addition, its intersubjective ontology and its emphasis on the mutual 
constitution between structures and agents also has the potential to better account 
the role of religious ideas and norms in motivating political actions, compared to 
culturalists who tend to assign fixed primordialist identities against religious 
groups and rationalists who tend to ignore the ethical motivation of religious 
actors in favor of instrumentalist/materialist motivations (Lynch, 2009, p. 388). 
Thus, while it is relatively under-utilized in the study of religion and politics, 
constructivism has the potential to develop a more nuanced understanding on how 
theological ideas are being reframed and/or reconstructed by religious leaders 
who serve as norm entrepreneurs within these religious groups and how their 
structures and agencies help to influence the likelihood of these ideas from being 
implemented. Furthermore, its weakness in under-theorizing the instrumental 
preferences of a political group as well as its lack of attention on the role of 
leadership and agency can be remedied by incorporating elements of rational 
choice theory and Weberian charismatic leadership theory, which will be 
analyzed below.  
Weberian charismatic leadership theory. The last theory reviewed in 
this study is the charismatic leadership theory developed by German sociologist 
Max Weber (1864-1920). In his landmark work, Economy and Society (1978 
[1922]), Weber asserts that there are three types of authority that political leaders 
use to gain support and legitimacy among prospective followers: charismatic, 
traditional, and rational-legal (bureaucratic) authorities. Charismatic authority is 
based on “the quality of an individual personality” that makes him/her to be 
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considered to have “supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities” (Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 241). Traditional authority is based 
on “the established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the 
legitimacy of those exercising authority under them” (Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 
215), while rational-legal authority is based on “the belief in the legality of 
enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands (legal authority)” (Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 215).  
What makes charismatic authority unique compared to the other two types 
of authorities is the fact that it is based not on the power of the office that the 
individual leader holds or on the status that s/he has, but instead comes from the 
ability of the leader to “arouse and maintain belief in himself or herself as the 
source of legitimacy” (Willner, 1984, p. 4). According to Weber, charismatic 
leadership comes solely from the personal attributes of the leader, not from the 
virtue of holding a political office or from formal legal rules. Instead, Weber 
asserts that the only basis of legitimacy for a charismatic leader is “personal 
charisma so long as it is proved, that is, as long as it receives recognition from 
their followers and as long as [they] proved their usefulness charismatically” 
(Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 244). Due to this charisma, charismatic leaders have the 
capacity to generate personal loyalty toward themselves among their followers, 
which sets apart from any other potential leaders within their organizations 
(Willner and Willner, 1965, p. 77).   
The authority of charismatic leaders is accepted by their followers based 
on their ability to “believe in the statements made and ideas advanced by their 
44 
leader simply because it is [the leader] who has made the statement or advanced 
the idea” (Willner, 1984, p. 6). This is because the leader is perceived by his/her 
followers to have special or extraordinary powers that most other persons do not 
have. The followers’ faith on their leaders’ special powers is the primary source 
of the leader’s charismatic authority. Due to this perception, the charismatic 
leader has the capacity to build and sustain unconditional loyalty and support 
from his/her followers on the basis of his/her personality, apart from any offices 
or status s/he might have held (Willner and Willner, 1965, p. 79).  
Scholars who have extended Weber’s charismatic leadership theory have 
mapped out the causal mechanisms that contribute to the emergence of a 
charismatic leader, which are the following: 1) the emergence of a crisis 
situation
14
, 2) increasing social distress among the population/potential followers, 
and 3) the emergence of a new leader with a given doctrine or idea, who promises 
to resolve the crisis and restore order and prosperity to his/her society (Willner, 
1984, p. 43). Because of the tendency for charismatic leaders to emerge during the 
time of a crisis, they have the potential to become a powerful revolutionary leader 
within their group or society. They could then lead their followers to “transform 
all values and breaks all traditional and rational norms” (Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 
1115). The ideas that are proposed by these charismatic leaders could transform 
an organization or a society if they managed to prevail against any opposing 
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 What Weber calls a “crisis situation” is similar to the concept of “critical 
juncture” used by institutionalists within the field of comparative politics. For 
further details on critical juncture, see Collier and Collier (1991) and Capoccia 
and Kelemen (2007).  
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forces in the struggle to resolve the crisis. They are more likely to be more 
influential when they lead newly founded or newly reformed/reconfigured 
institutions that have weak or nonexistent countervailing power structures that 
could have challenged their power and authority (Grindle, 2007, pp. 87, 92-93, 
cited in Van Cott 2008: 59).  
Charismatic leadership plays a significant role to motivate the action of 
religious groups. In the literature on Islamic social movements, scholars have 
argued that charismatic leadership plays an important role to legitimate the 
political actions of Islamic groups. For instance, Ashour (2009) finds that efforts 
to de-radicalize Islamic groups in Egypt and Algeria from pursuing violent 
actions and instead favoring non-violent political engagement are more effective 
if the charismatic leaders are brought on board to lend their support toward the de-
radicalization efforts. In Ashour’s study, support from charismatic leadership, 
combined with other incentives such as material (jobs/employment) and non-
material inducements (pardon/early release from imprisonment), helped to ensure 
that radical Islamic activists were no longer pursuing violent political actions in 
these countries. Thus, the charismatic leadership of religious leaders seems to 
have played an important role in helping to change the political discourse of 
religious leaders from one direction to another (e.g., from radical to more 
moderate/peaceful political engagement). Further research needs to be done to 
confirm this proposition.  
However, scholars who study charismatic leadership using Weberian 
charismatic leadership theory also tend to under-emphasize the role of ideas and 
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doctrine as a primary catalyst responsible for the emergence of a new charismatic 
leader. They tend to put more emphasis on the personal characteristics of the 
leader themselves (e.g., physical appearances, gestures and mannerisms, 
speech/rhetorical styles, etc.) as the primary reason for gaining a mass following 
rather than to the ideology or doctrine that are promoted by that particular leader 
(Willner, 1984, pp. 58-59 & 63). They do not theorize whether the ideology or 
doctrine plays any role in generating the popular support that the leader receives 
from his/her supporters.  
In contrast to the arguments presented by Weberian charismatic leadership 
theory, I argue that while the moral authority leaders’ personal attributes and 
charisma may have enhanced their reputation among their followers and might 
have propelled them into prominence, it is the ideas or theology that they are 
promoting that serves as the primary base of the popular following. This is 
because moral authority leaders’ primary mean to transform themselves as 
advocates for their moral ideas is the wide recognition of their status as experts of 
theological norms, along with the ability to synthesize pre-existing theological 
ideas within their religious groups (e.g., Islamic theology) with other ideas 
coming from the outside (e.g., Western sociopolitical thought). In addition to this 
theological expertise, they also have charismatic attributes that further enhances 
their credibility as moral authority leaders among their followers.  
Lastly, Weberian scholars do not theorize whether these charismatic 
leaders serve as actors who can behave strategically and use the power of their 
charisma for instrumentalist reasons.  There is a need to theorize charismatic 
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leaders as strategic actors who use their charismatic power and influence to 
promote their instrumental and ideational goals. By incorporating elements of 
both constructivism and rational choice theory, Weberian charismatic leadership 
theory can be updated so that it can incorporate all potential preferences and goals 
of any political or religious leaders. Together, the syntheses of these theories help 
to form the moral authority leadership theory, the theoretical framework I shall 
use in this study. I shall elaborate on how I define the concepts outlined in this 
theory, the hypotheses, and the causal mechanisms predicted by this theory in the 
following section.  
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses  
This study is an effort to develop an understanding of the social conditions 
that make Islamic organizations embrace progressive theological frames and 
political identities This study asks the following research questions: Why do 
Islamic organizations change their theological frames and political identities from 
formerly revivalist Islamic theological interpretations to one that supports the 
compatibility between Islamic and modern liberal ideas such as democracy, 
human rights, and religious tolerance/pluralism? What is the role of religious 
leaders to help bringing about theological change within these groups? Under 
what conditions religious leaders are more likely to successfully change the 
theological orientations of their religious organization (e.g., from one that 
promotes a conservative revivalist interpretation of Islam to one that embraces 
more liberal/progressive theological interpretation) and under what conditions 
they are less likely to successfully accomplish such a change? 
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The theoretical framework of this study is eclectic and is influenced by the 
three theoretical approaches that were analyzed at great length in the previous 
section: social constructivist theory, rational choice theory, and Weberian 
charismatic leadership theory. Social constructivist theory influences this 
theoretical framework through its emphasis on the potentially causative role of 
theological ideas in constituting, if not causing, theological and political changes 
within Islamic groups. Through the perspective of social constructivism, I argue 
that the primary preference of moral authority leaders in promoting their theology 
is their ideational preference. In this study, this preference is to have their 
theological ideas successfully implemented and institutionalized within their own 
organization, because they believe they are normatively the most appropriate 
ideas for their organization to address the contemporary sociopolitical problems 
the organization are currently facing. The new ideas could also potentially 
transform the theological frames and political identities of the organization from 
one theological and political position to another. When the new ideas are 
articulated by moral authority leaders to amend or replace the older theological 
frames, the process of social reconstruction is taking place within the 
organization. The outcome of this process is determined by the interaction 
between agency (moral authority leadership) and structure (institutional culture 
and relationship between religious groups and the state) that together mutually 
constitute the outcome of the reforms, whether it is successful or unsuccessful.  
Using the premise of rational choice theory, I argue that moral authority 
leaders and their followers are also behaving strategically and have instrumental 
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goals in addition to ideational ones. They weight the cost and benefits of their 
reform efforts and use a variety of means to increase support and minimize 
opposition against their reforms both within and outside of their organizations. 
This is achieved through alliances with friendly state actors in order to promote 
their reforms and protect it against opposition from both inside and outside of the 
organization. Sometimes, they could also resort in coercive means (e.g., purging 
their opponents from the leadership positions of the organization and the use of 
material incentives to increase support for and reduce opposition against their 
reform efforts). Lastly, using the Weberian charismatic leadership theory, I argue 
that the primary agents of theological change within these organizations are moral 
authority leaders, who used their theological expertise and charismatic leadership 
status to convert potential supporters and convince them to support the theological 
reforms they promote within their respective organizations. 
In short, moral authority leaders and their supporters are behaving 
strategically in the short and intermediate run to deal with any opposition against 
their reforms and ensure their organization’s survival (as well as their own) from 
the forces of these opposing powers. However, they have a long-term goal for 
their reforms that is ideational in nature – to see that their proposed theological 
ideas are implemented by the organization because it would enable the 
organization to meet the changing sociopolitical problems it is currently facing. 
Moral authority leaders and their supporters take their theological ideas very 
seriously and that they use the institutionalization of these ideas within their 
groups as well as societies as the primary political goals that they seek to have.  
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However, while moral authority leadership is a necessary condition for a 
major theoretical reform to occur, it is not a sufficient condition, since these 
leaders are facing constraints  against their reform efforts, both from other 
factions within the organization as well as from outside of it, primarily from the 
state authorities. The opposition against the reforms comes from rival factions 
from within the organization who challenges the compatibility of progressive 
political ideas that are promoted by moral authority leaders and their supporters 
with the conservative Islamic theological frame that have guided their 
organization for a long period of time. In addition, the opposition from state 
authorities could come from two possible rationales: 1) opposition against the 
liberal ideas promoted by the moral authority leaders because it threatens the 
authoritarian rule of the regime who run the state, or 2) opposition against a more 
active role for religious groups to actively participate in the political life of their 
respective societies, because it threatens the tradition of separation between 
religion and the state that are promoted by the state.  
In order to overcome both the institutional and external (state) opposition 
against these reforms, The success of moral authority leaders and their supporters 
also depends on their ability to : 1) rely on a tolerant institutional culture that 
historically tolerates new religious ideas, customs, and traditions and helps to 
encourage or discourage opposition from the status theology against the reforms, 
and 2)  establish a peaceful and cooperative relationship between the religious 
group and the state, within that particular society, that would enable the reformers 
51 
to carry on with their reforms without facing any repressive intervention from the 
state.  
Conceptualizing political Islam. This study rejects the argument made by 
culturalist/modernization theorists, who made a generalization about political 
Islam and Islamic social movements from the perspective of  radical/extremist 
Islamic movements, such as the Wahhabi from Saudi Arabia or Hamas from the 
Palestinian Territory. It does not assume that all Islamic movements have a 
singular agenda to promote a revivalist/fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, 
demand the establishment of a shari’a based Islamic state, and aim to achieve 
political power through violent means. Instead, the theoretical framework that I 
propose accounts for the diverse theological basis, political goals, and cultural 
differences of different Islamic movements. It also recognizes the domestic as 
well as international economic and sociopolitical conditions that might have given 
rise to these movements in their particular geographic location.  
I reject the assumption of first generation rational choice scholars that 
religious, particularly Islamic, ideas and identities, are merely masks used by 
religious actors to cover up their instrumental or material interests. However, I 
acknowledge the theoretical argument made by contemporary rational choice 
scholars. I share their assumption that rationalist logic is applicable in explaining 
the political behavior of Islamic groups. Even though the primary theoretical 
foundation of my theory is social constructivism, which argues that ideas, culture, 
and identities help to shape the interests of these political actors, I also recognize 
that in order to be effective as variables that help to change the previous 
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ideological and cultural preferences within these Islamic groups, these ideas will 
need to be used strategically by their promoters in their effort to replace the 
previous preferences within these groups and institute a new sets of preferences 
based on these new ideas. However, what differentiates my framework from the 
standard rational choice framework is that I argue that we cannot reduce the 
preferences and goals of the reform leaders within these groups to their 
instrumental interests and strategic calculations alone. Instead, these promoters 
(‘moral authority’ leaders) form their preferences primarily based on the virtue of 
their ideas and because they believe these ideas will transform their groups to 
become more compatible with the needs of modern and democratic societies, 
which increasingly are the societies in which these groups are based upon.  
I also argue that the theological ideas and religious identity of these groups 
serve as the primary motivators for their political actions. This is especially true 
for actions that do not produce immediate political payoffs and at least in the short 
run, enormous material costs and personal risks to the group and its members. 
These include opposition to the legitimacy of a well-entrenched authoritarian state 
or suppot for a new regime that better promotes and respects democracy and 
human rights in a society where these ideas have not historically taken significant 
roots. I argue that the actions of religious actors can be better explained through 
social constructivist theory rather than by rationalist paradigm alone, although the 
latter can be useful in specifying the strategies of the actors whom have ideational 
preferences as conceived by constructivists.  
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I assert that Islamic social movements do not necessarily have similar 
theological foundations and political goals. Furthermore, their members do not 
necessarily agree to similar means on achieving them. While some Islamic 
activists and movements do seek an Islamic state based on the shari’a law and do 
not tolerate the religious freedom of non-Muslim citizens, others might only wish 
to promote a greater role for Islam in the political life of Muslim society. Islamic 
groups that seek to establish an Islamic state do not necessarily endorse violent 
means to achieve this goal and instead are working to achieve them via peaceful 
and democratic means. In fact, there are some Islamic groups who reject the 
creation of a shari’a-based Islamic state in favor of a state that is politically 
secular and respects the rights of its citizens to practice their own religious beliefs, 
whether it is based on Islamic principles or not. They also support the largely 
liberal interpretation that all citizens are entitled to have universal human rights 
and have freedom to practice and choose their own religious beliefs. These two 
Islamic groups are totally distinct from each other, each have their own different 
interpretation of Islamic theology and legal jurisprudence. In turn, these 
interpretations result in two separate identities for these Islamic groups, which are 
outlined below.  
Muslims who subscribe to the more liberal interpretation of Islam are 
followers of progressive Islam. I define it as an interpretation Islam which 
synthesizes the basic Islamic theological and legal foundations specified in the 
Qur’an, the Hadith, and classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)) with intellectual 
ideas derived from Western social theory (e.g., democracy, human rights, and 
54 
religious liberty/pluralism). In contrast, other Muslims embrace a different path of 
reform by following revivalist/conservative Islamic perspective. Revivalist or 
fundamentalist Islam is an interpretation of Islam that promotes reform by 
returning to the living example and the formal/scripturalist rules formulated by 
Prophet Mohammed and his companions. Both progressive and revivalist 
Muslims are not theologically static. Both use the process of innovation, 
reframing, reinterpretation, and renegotiation to create what in their view is the 
ideal version of Islam that fit into their respective organization and society.  After 
these ideas have been invented, it frames the strategy of these Muslims actors as 
they try to promote these ideas among their followers and institutionalize them 
within their respective groups.  
In many ways, the values reflected by the concept of progressive Islam are 
similar to those expressed by the concept of liberal Islam (Kurzman 1998).
15
 
However, I choose to use the term ‘progressive’ instead of ‘liberal’ Islam 
because: 1) Most Islamic thinkers who advocate  ideas and values widely 
considered as ‘liberal’ do not identify themselves as such (at least in similar ways 
with their Western counterparts) and do not wish to be labeled as liberal 
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 Liberal Islam is defined as “Islamic thinkers and organizations that has publicly 
endorsed and lent support to liberal ideas and values such as opposition to a 
shari’a-based Islamic state, support for democracy, protection of human rights, 
especially for women and ethnic/religious minorities, freedom of thought and 
expression, recognition of religious liberty or at least, religious tolerance, and 
belief in the potential for human progress” (Kurzman, 1998, p. 4). 
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Muslims.
16
 2) Most importantly, even though these Islamic thinkers are 
advocating similar values that are commonly shared by liberal thinkers from the 
West and their works are often influenced by Western social theory, their version 
of progressive Islam is constructed and promoted in their own terms, in order to 
address timely domestic sociopolitical conditions, rather than to please any 
potential constituencies or supporters from the Western world. I argue that the 
term ‘progressive Islam’ better reflects the efforts of these moral authority leaders 
to introduce ideas/values adopted from the Western liberal tradition such from 
democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance, while doing so in their own 
time and terms.  
Theorizing moral authority. The primary explanatory (independent) 
variable for spreading these ideas is the moral authority leadership of religious 
leaders. Hypothesis No. 1 makes the following assumption.  
Theological and political changes within religious groups (e.g., from 
conservative into more progressive/liberal direction) are primarily 
attributed to the words, actions, and other deeds of religious leaders, who 
through their theological expertise and charismatic attributes, are able to 
persuade, coerce, and convert other members of their group to support the 
theological ideas they are advocating. These ideas shape their preferences 
                                                             
16
 This is due to the negative connotation of the term “liberal” in much of the 
Islamic world, where the term refers to Muslims who are either being suspected as 
collaborators of foreign (Western) powers or have endorsed secularism or atheism 
(Kurzman, 1998, p. 4), 
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and help inform the strategies that they choose in order to implement and 
institutionalize their ideas successfully. 
Lisa Ferrari defines moral authority as “the ability to speak authoritatively 
on matters of right and wrong behavior” (Ferrari, 1998, p. 84).  Moral authority 
leaders are well-recognized experts of a specific system of moral norms. They 
also have charismatic attributes which help to enhance their theological expertise 
among their prospective followers as well as outsiders. The theological expertise 
and charismatic attributes of moral authority leaders serve as their primary assets 
as they promote and implement their ideas within their respective organizations. 
They are the primary tools these leaders deploy in order to overcome any 
opposition against their ideas both within their respective organizations as well as 
from outside actors (e.g., the state). 
I argue that there are two ways to measure whether a religious leader 
could be considered as a moral authority leader or not. First, moral authority 
leaders should receive popular recognition within their group and society as 
leading experts of theological and moral norms of a religious group (in this study 
Islam). This recognition as a religious expert is achieved after years of training as 
a religious scholar (ulama) through a specialized institution that trained members 
of the religious tradition to become religious scholars - e.g., a graduate of Islamic 
theological school (madrasah)
17
 that trained young Muslims to become an ulama. 
                                                             
17
 The madrasah is the name in which these ulama training institutions are 
commonly known in most English-speaking countries. Within their respective 
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Alternatively, they have successfully obtained a Ph.D. in theology, religious, or 
Islamic studies. In any case, the recognition must be given both by the ulama 
community from their religious group, as well as from followers within their 
group who consider them to have extraordinary knowledge of Islamic theological 
and legal jurisprudence. These followers believe in their ideas because they 
believe these ideas provide answers to the problems facing their respective 
societies.  
Second, in order to win recognition as a moral authority leader, the 
religious leader should have charismatic leadership attributes that are assigned to 
them by their followers. This attributes are achieved because the followers believe 
that their leaders have extraordinary powers, talents, or abilities, which are far 
beyond what other religious leaders (ulama) could normally offer to the followers. 
These charismatic attributes are measured by the combination of two or more of 
the following: 1) an attractive appearance or public personality,  2) an ability to 
communicate their ideas in a way that generates support, loyalty, and trust from 
their followers, 3) the ability to listen to different factions and constituencies 
within their groups and to empathize with the different perspective and needs 
represented by these different factions,  and 4) an intensity or energy that motivate 
their followers to  implement their theological reforms and overcome any 
                                                                                                                                                                      
societies, they are known by their local names such as pesantren in Indonesia, or 
pondok in Malaysia.  
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potential opposition to their efforts to promote these reforms.
18
 In addition to 
these attributes, these leaders could be considered by their followers as 
charismatic leaders because they are descendant - either directly (family) lineage 
or indirectly (intellectual) lineage- of previous generation moral authority leaders 
that are widely recognized from within their religious communities. By having 
these charismatic attributes and genealogical lineages, these religious leaders are 
able to be recognized as charismatic leaders that enable these leaders to command 
strong loyalty and obedience from their followers that enable them to win the 
power struggle over their proposed theological reforms and successfully institute 
their reforms within their respective organizations.  
I argue that moral authority leaders are able to get their theological ideas 
implemented by their groups when they promote their ideas using both ideational 
and instrumental strategies. They accomplish this by engaging in the process of 
ideational promotion in order to convert potential followers – through making 
sermons and speeches, authorship of books and op-ed articles, as well other 
activities designed to spread their theological ideas. The followers trust the 
theological ideas propagated by moral authority leaders because they are 
perceived as talented and credible religious leaders, due to their theological 
expertise and charismatic attributes.  
                                                             
18
 This operationalization of charismatic attributes come largely from the 
operationalization made by Donna Lee Van Cott in her work on the role of local 
mayors to promote “radical democracy” in Ecuador and Bolivia (Van Cott, 2008, 
p. 65).  
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In addition, moral authority leaders are acting instrumentally when they 
use their followers to implement and institutionalize the theological ideas within 
their organizations. They will use any economic and political resources at their 
disposal in order to ensure that their theological reforms will be successfully 
implemented by their religious groups.  By engaging in alliances with the state, 
buying off opponents, and other strategic activities, moral authority leaders and 
their followers are hoping to change the existing theological frame and political 
identity of organization in favor of  new theological ideas they are advocating 
(e.g., democratization, rejection of shari’a-based Islamic state, tolerance toward 
religious minorities, etc). However, what differentiates this explanation from the 
standard rational choice explanation is that they are being used by leaders who are 
primarily motivated by the desire to promote their ideas among their followers to 
transform their religious groups by incorporating these ideas into the prevailing 
ideological frames within their respective groups (Philpott, 2001, p. 58).  
I propose the following primary causal mechanism (Figure 2.1) to explain 
the process of how moral authority leaders are able to use the invention or 
reinterpretation of theological ideas to win converts and then use these converts to 
further promote theological and political change within their respective religious 
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organizations. 
 
Figure 2.1. Basic causal mechanism on moral authority leadership and successful 
theological reform  
Table #2.1 below is the detailed summary of the moral authority 
leadership theory that I have outlined above. It also fully describes the criterias 
and conditions I use to measure the presence (or absence) of moral authority 
leadership as well as how I operationalize each of these measurements.  
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Table 2.1 
Measurement and Operationalization of Moral Authority Leadership 
IndependentVariable Measurement Operationalization 
Moral Authority 
Leadership 
I. Theological Expertise 
Widely recognized status as a 
leading expert of Islamic 
theology and jurisprudence 
(law) 
a. Oral and written statements recognizing 
the theological expertise of a religious 
scholar (ulama) by other ulama as well as 
his followers (for traditionalist scholars) 
b. The attainment of a doctoral (PhD) 
degree or an equivalent in Islamic 
theology, philosophy, or legal 
jurisprudence (for modernist scholars) 
IIa. Charismatic Attributes  
#1Combination of attractive 
appearance andpersonality, 
effective communication 
andlistening skills w/different 
factions withintheir group, and 
extra intensity and 
energywhich motivates 
potential supportersto follow 
and enact their reform ideas 
a. Oral and written statements from 
members of thereligious group testifying 
that their leaderpossesses a combination 
of these attributes andskills, which 
inspires them to follow and implement the 
reforms sought by the leader  
IIb. Charismatic Attributes  
#2Family and/or 
Intellectualgenealogy with 
leading ulamafrom previous 
generations 
a. Oral and written statements establishing 
family relationship with leading 
ulamafrom the previous generationb. Oral 
and written statements from moral 
authority leader paying tribute and 
recognizing the influence of leading 
ulama from the previous generation 
Sources: Author’s conceptualizations based on Ferrari (1998) on theological 
expertise; Van Cott (2008) and Weber (1978) on charismatic leadership authority. 
Intervening variables. The presence of a widely respected, charismatic 
moral authority leader is a necessary condition for a successful change in the 
theological and political orientation of religious groups, from a theologically 
conservative group into one that is more progressive both theologically and 
politically. However, by itself it is not a sufficient condition to fully explain the 
change. Moral authority leaders and their followers are facing some constraints 
that work against their ideas to change and transform the existing theological 
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frames within their religious organization. There are factions within their religious 
groups who oppose the reforms both for ideological as well as instrumental and 
material reasons. In addition, the ideas promoted by the reforms (e.g., democracy, 
human rights, religious tolerance, etc) might also be opposed by the political 
regime which runs the state in which these religious groups are located. This is 
either because these ideas are challenging the authoritarian rule promoted by these 
regimes or because they are challenging the policy of strict separation between 
religion and the state that are promoted by these regimes. The ideas promoted by 
these moral authority leaders would be successfully institutionalized within their 
respective groups only after they have overcome these oppositional constraints.  
In order to overcome these oppositions and successfully implement their 
reform ideas, the presence of the following intervening variables, combines with 
the presence of a moral authority leader, would have lead a religious group to 
embrace a major theological and political change. There are two intervening 
variables that would have increased the likelihood of successful reforms within 
these groups: 1) the presence of an inclusive institutional culture within the 
religious group that promotes the integration or at least tolerates new theological 
ideas, customs, and rituals, rather than rejecting them as forbidden heresies for 
members of the religious group, and 2) the presence of a positive and  conducive 
relationship between the religious group and the state, achieved through strategic 
alliances between the moral authority leaders and members of the ruling political 
regime which help to diminish the likelihood of state-sponsored 
crackdown/repression against the moral authority leaders and their followers. I 
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will elaborate on the rationale for these two intervening variables and how they 
help to increase the chance of the reform proposed by the moral authority leader 
from being successfully institutionalized. 
The institutional culture of the organization. Hypothesis No. 2 purports 
that 
moral authority leaders are more likely to successfully institute theological 
reforms within their religious organization if the organization has an 
inclusive institutional culture that tolerates new, innovative, and 
unorthodox theological ideas. Their effort is less likely to be successful if 
the organization has an exclusivist and intolerant institutional culture that 
rejects the ideas propagated by these leaders as heretical innovations that 
should be rejected by the organization.  
The first structural feature that constraints moral authority leaders and 
their efforts to reform their respective religious groups is the “institutional 
culture” of the organization. In this study, culture is conceptualized as “an 
interconnected set of collective, intersubjective understandings such as ideologies, 
rules, rituals, and paradigms” (Autesserre, 2010, p. 24).  It is a form of shared 
knowledge commonly held by members of a community or an institution that 
reflects their understanding of generally accepted ideas, rules, and norms within 
that entity (Bukovansky, 2002, p. 2).  The institutional culture of a religious 
organization is the prevailing ideological frame within a religious group which 
helps to shape the collective understanding of its members. In turn, it helps to 
establish the parameters of acceptable behaviors as well as possible reforms and 
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changes that are considered to be possible within the organization (Autesserre, 
2010, p. 11). It is important for us to understand the institutional culture of a 
religious organization, because it helps us to determine the likelihood whether 
newly articulated theological ideas introduced by the moral authority leaders are 
going to be accepted by other followers of their organizations. This determines 
the likelihood that the organization would accept and incorporate these ideas into 
the official theology of the organization or reject them as heretical innovations.  
Different religious organizations have different levels of tolerance and 
acceptance toward new theological innovations, localized rituals and customs, and 
other forms of practices that might have contradicted the basic theological beliefs 
of that organization.  Some religious organizations have a history of tolerating 
new theological ideas, even those that are considered to be “syncretic” and 
“unorthodox” for the organization, while other groups consider most if not all 
new theological ideas to be heresies that need to be rejected by members of the 
religious organization. The institutional culture of the organization helps to 
determine the likelihood of the theological reform proposed by the moral 
authority leader to be successfully instituted within their religious group. It also 
helps us to predict the strength of any opposition to the reforms advocated by the 
moral authority leader within his or her group. This opposition needs to be 
overcome by the moral authority leader and his/her supporters before they could 
successfully implement and institutionalize their reform.  
  In this study, I predict that religious groups that have a more inclusive 
and tolerant institutional culture towards new and “unorthodox” theological 
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innovations are more likely to implement reforms propagated by a reformist 
moral authority leader than those who have less tolerant and more fundamentalist 
institutional culture. The degree of tolerance is measured via an ordinal variable 
that ranges from ‘fully tolerant’ towards new theological innovations or “fully 
hostile/intolerant towards them. Within the Islamic tradition, theological reforms 
are more likely to occur within Islamic groups/sects that have a higher degree of 
tolerance toward syncretic/unorthodox customs and rituals versus. This is in 
contrast to Islamic groups that have a more conservative or revivalist-oriented 
theological orientation that considers every religious rituals, customs, and 
traditions that are not prescribed by the Qur’an and the Hadith as heresies (bid’ah) 
that should be eradicated from Islam, by the use of force if necessary.  
Understanding the institutional culture of a religious organization will help 
us to predict the level of support for pre-existing theological traditions that would 
oppose the reform proposals advocated by the “moral authority” leader and 
his/her supporters. If the religious organization has an institutional culture that 
historically tolerates new theological ideas, its members are more likely to accept 
the ideas proposed by the reformers, even if it is perceived to be unusual, 
unorthodox, or even contradictory to the prevailing theology within the 
organization. Consequently, the introduction of new theological ideas would not 
generate much opposition from other members of the organization. However, if 
the organization has an institutional culture that historically has resisted the 
introduction of new theological ideas, condemned them as heresies, and  
effectively sanctioned or punished anyone who propagates such reforms, then the 
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ideas would have encountered strong opposition from members of the 
organization and would be difficult, if not impossible, to be enacted by the 
organization.  
Moral authority leaders’ effort to implement new theological ideas within 
their respective organization will be strengthed if they fully understand the 
institutional culture of their respective organization. By understanding it, they are 
able to strategically frame the arguments and discourses for their reform ideas as a 
continuation of the prevailing theological frames/culture of their respective 
organizations instead of promoting them as ideas that are unfamiliar or alien to 
these prevailing theological and cultural frames. Doing so enhances the likelihood 
that their reform ideas would be successfully implemented within the organization 
and quell the opposition challenges and counter-narratives that these ideas are 
contradicting the institutional culture of the organizations. 
Table #2.2 below summarizes how I measure and operationalize the 
institutional culture of religious groups in this study.  
Table 2.2 
Measurement of the Institutional Culture  
Intervening Variable #1 Measurement Operationalization 
Institutional Culture of 
the religious group 
An ordinal indicator of whether 
religious group tolerates new 
religious ideas or does not tolerate 
them at all (ranging from "fully 
tolerant" to "fully intolerant" 
against these new ideas) 
Narrative accounts and statements 
from primary and secondary 
sources remarking on whether the 
organization members accept the 
new theological idea  or resist it 
and how this change over time 
Sources: Author’s conceptualization based on definitions of culture by Autessere 
(2011) and Bukovansky (2002). 
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Relations between the state and the religious organization. Hypothesis 
No. 3 make the following assumption. 
The degree of success of “moral authority” religious leaders and their 
supporters in promoting and instituting their reforms is also determined by 
the relationship between the state and the religious organization in the 
society where the reforms are taking place. The reform is more likely to be 
successfully institutionalized if the state refuses to intervene against the 
reform due to the historically peaceful and co-operative relationship 
between the two entities. On the other hand, reform is less likely to occur 
if the state frequently intervenes within the religious organization due to 
the historically conflictual relationship between the two entities. 
The success of the reform efforts by moral authority leaders is also 
dependent on the historical relationship between the religious group where the 
reform is taking place and the state. Religious group needs to develop peaceful 
relationship with the state in order to ensure that the latter would not intervene 
against their efforts and repress the reforms and their supporters (e.g., arrest and 
imprison the leader and his supporters, intimidation and other repressive actions 
against them, etc.). State intervention against reform supporters could have 
produced negative implications against the reform and at worst, could have 
extinguished it before it even started.  
The state opposes efforts to promote theological reforms promoted by 
moral authority leaders because of two possibilities. An authoritarian regime 
considers the progressive ideas promoted by the reform (e.g., support for liberal 
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democratic ideas, human rights, religious tolerance, etc.) as potential sources for 
opposition against its rule. Thus, the regime seeks to repress the ideas and the 
reformers who advocate them in order to minimize the potential threat against 
itself. Second, the state could oppose the reform efforts within these groups 
because the ideas propagated by the reform would have challenged the strict 
separation religion-state separation policy that has been institutionalized by the 
state for some period of time. In some societies, the state restricts any expressions 
of religion in the public sphere, imposes penalties, and persecutes any religious 
groups who are trying to express themselves in the public sphere of these 
countries.  In states with a strict policy of religion-state separation, religious 
groups have few avenues to openly express their political opinions in the public 
sphere, as any actions they took to express and promote themselves publicly 
might risk potential state reprisal against them in the forms of new restrictions 
against the religious group and potential arrests and imprisonment of these 
leaders.  
However, if the religious group and the state could successfully negotiate 
a truce or an alliance between themselves, there will be more opportunities for 
moral authority leaders and their supporters to successfully implement their 
reforms. This is because there is more room for the reformers to develop a 
strategy to ease state repression against them if the opposition is based on just one 
of the above rationales rather than if it is based on both. This strategy is based in 
the formation of temporary alliance (or truce) between the religious group and 
members of the ruling regime. If such an alliance is successfully established 
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between the two parties, state repression against the religious group, and against 
the reformers would have ceased, opening a pathway for the reforms to go ahead 
and increase the likelihood that it will be successfully implemented. In order to 
successfully negotiate this truce/alliance, the reformers develop a short-term goal 
that is instrumentalist in order to gain the best deal with the state so that the latter 
would have ceased its intervention against the religious group as well as its 
repression against its leaders. However, the long-term goal of the reformers 
remained ideational in orientation, since their main preference is the 
implementation of the ideas that they have sought to propagate and 
institutionalize within their own groups.  
In this study, the relationship between religion and the state is measured as 
an ordinal variable measuring the nature of state-religion relations within a 
particular society, which is defined on a scale between ‘fully peaceful/ 
cooperative’ and ‘fully conflictual’ relations between religion and the state.  More 
peaceful relationship between the state and the religious group enhances the 
likelihood of reformers to promote theological reforms within their respective 
group. Under this condition, the state apparatus is less likely to intervene and 
repress the reformers, thereby increasing the likelihood of that the reform could 
be successfully implemented by the moral authority leader and their supporters.  
On the other hand, more conflictual relationship between religious group and the 
state increases the likelihood of state intervention and the likelihood of state 
reprisal against the religious group and their leaders as well. Under this condition, 
the state is more likely to intervene and take repressive actions against moral 
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authority leaders and their followers. If these reformers are repressed, the reforms 
can be squashed before they can take hold within their respective religious 
groups. Consequently, state intervention and repression against the leader and 
his/her followers could derail the prospect of reforms within these groups.  
Table #2.3 below summarizes how I measure and operationalize the 
relationsip between religious group and the state in this study. 
 
Table 2.3 
Measurement of Relationship between Religious Group and the State 
Intervening 
Variable #2 
Measurement Operationalization 
Relationship 
between religious 
group and the 
state 
An ordinal indicator that 
indicates whether a particular 
state has a peaceful 
coexistence with religious 
groups or has a 
hostile/conflictual relations 
with them (ranging 
from"fully 
peaceful/cooperative 
relations" to "fully conflictual 
relations") 
Narrative accounts and statements from 
primary and secondary sources indicating 
the nature between the relationship between 
the religious group being studied and the 
state, with an emphasis of the history of 
state intervention/repression against 
religious group and the alliances/truces 
negotiated between the two entities over the 
time period being studied  
Sources: Author’s conceptualization based on definitions of state-religious group 
relations by Kuru (2009).  
Dependent variable. The dependent variable of this study is the 
theological and political changes of the religious group in which the moral 
authority leader promotes his/her reform. A successful reform outcome occurs 
when moral authority leaders and their supporters are able to gain significant 
support that enables them to implement and institutionalize the reforms they are 
advocating. Thus, they are able to replace the theological frames and political 
identities of their group from the old position to the new one advocated by the 
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reformers. We can observe this when the group we are studying has made a 
decision to abandon their previously conservative/revivalist theological positions 
such as the rejection of democracy and democratic political institutions, support 
for a shari’a-based Islamic state, the adoption of Islam as the primary official 
religion of the country, and religious intolerance toward non-Muslim religious 
minorities and other Islamic sects. The group will then begin to adopt more 
progressive theological and political positions, such as the acceptance or tolerance 
of liberal political ideas such as democracy, human rights, religion-state 
separation, and religious tolerance/pluralism. In addition, the reform should be 
considered to be successful if the group that in the past – before the reforms were 
introduced - had advocated conservative/revivalist theological positions are now – 
after the reforms have been successfully institutionalized - accept and support 
progressive theological ideas that were introduced by the moral authority leader 
into the group. These ideas include democratic political norms and institutions, 
human rights, religion-state separation, and tolerance toward religious minorities. 
The reforms would indicate major theological and political changes for the 
organization from a previously conservative position (e.g., support for a shari’a-
based Islamic state or the requirement that the head of state must be a Muslim) to 
a new position that are more progressive theologically, such as genuine 
acceptance of democracy and democratic political institutions, and the rejection of 
an Islamic state. These changes would not have been achieved without the strong 
effort from moral authority leaders and their supporters to change the theological 
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direction of the organization over a period of time and would reflect genuine 
ideological and theological changes in the official ideology of the organization.
19
  
On the other hand, the reform efforts should be considered to be 
unsuccessful if the organization rejects the reforms proposed by moral authority 
leaders and their supporters, therefore its theological and political positions does 
not change. The organization remains committed to the ideas associated with 
conservative/revivalist Islamic theology, such as support for a state that is largely 
run on based on the shari’a law, the promotion of special rights for Muslims over 
non-Muslims (e.g., only Muslims could become the head of state) , and 
exclusionary attitudes toward non-Muslim religious minorities and Muslim 
minority sects. In addition, the group would continue to either reject or seriously 
question liberal ideas such as democracy, human rights, and religious 
liberty/pluralism, on the ground that these values are not compatible with Islamic 
theological and legal principles. Some groups might offer limited acceptance to 
some of these ideas, but only for as long as they do not contradict these principles. 
Among these groups, suspicions against these ideas are strong because they are 
being perceived to be originated from the West, thus are not compatible with the 
ideas and principles contained in the Islamic theological and political tradition.  
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 It is assumed here that the shift indicates a genuine ideological moderation for 
the organization rather than tactical moderation, which only entails the 
organization’s support of democratic rules and institutions, but little or no actual 
change in the ideological and theological orientation of the organization 
(Schwedler, 2007).  
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I expect to see an empirical confirmation on the validity of the theoretical 
framework I have outlined above  through a close examination of  the following 
data: 1) oral and written statements from the religious followers stating that their 
political actions they have conducted were done to fulfill the commands, orders, 
wishes of the religious leader that they have considered as a moral authority 
leader and 2) evidence of a change in the theological identities and political 
positions of the religious groups to reflect the theological ideas advocated by the 
moral authority leader that is sustained over the course of several years or 
decades, without shifting back into more conservative theological direction. This 
indicates the existence of genuine ideational change and theological moderation 
predicted by my theory.  
On the other hand, alternative theoretical explanations (political 
culture/modernization theory and rational choice theory would find support 
instead if the following can be observed from the data: 1) oral and written 
statements from religious followers stating that their political actions were done to 
gain more political power or material benefits both for their group as well as for 
themselves, 2) evidence of a shift in the theological and political positions of the 
group during certain political events (e.g., nearing an election) from conservative 
to progressive direction, but this shift either stopped  or shifted back into the more 
conservative direction after the event has passed. This indicates that the reform 
was conducted as a form of tactical and more opportunistic moderation instead of 
a genuine ideological and theological moderation predicted by my theory.  
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Table #2.4 below contains the detailed summary of how I measure and 
operationalize the theological and political change of Islamic groups, the 
dependent variable of this study.  
 
Table 2.4 
Measurement and Operationalization of Theological/Political Change of Islamic 
Groups 
Dependent Variable Measurement Operationalization 
 Change in the  
Theological and 
Political Orientation of 
Islamic Groups 
I. Changes of theological and 
political orientation from 
conservative/revivalist theological 
position to progressive 
theological orientation (indicating 
successful institutionalization of 
the new theological ideas) 
II. Maintenance of conservative/ 
revivalist theological ideas and/or 
the increasing orientation toward 
religious fundamentalism within 
the Islamic group (Indicating 
unsuccessful institutionalization 
of the newtheological ideas) 
Narrative accounts and statements 
from primary and secondary 
sources regarding the acceptance of 
progressive ideas such as 
democracy, human rights, and 
religious tolerance and the 
rejection of conservative ideas such 
as shari'a-based Islamic state, 
religious exclusivism intolerance 
and political violence.  
Narrative accounts and statements 
from primary and secondary 
sources regarding the rejection of 
progressive ideas such as 
democracy, human rights, and 
religious tolerance and the 
increasing support toward 
conservative theological ideas such 
as shari'a-based Islamic state, and 
exclusivism/intolerance toward 
religious minorities 
Sources: Author’s own conceptualizations. 
Causal mechanisms for successful and unsuccessful theological 
change. To map out all the potential causal mechanisms involving the likely 
outcome of the reform introduced by moral authority leadership, I have developed 
two possible causal mechanisms/pathways of theological changes promoted by 
moral authority leadership and is either helped or hindered by the internal culture 
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of the religious organization and/or the relationship between the religious 
organization and the state. Under the first pathway, the moral authority leader 
manages to lead his/her group into a clearly successful reform outcome in which 
all the independent and intervening variables work positively together to make the 
reform efforts successful. However, under the second pathway called the 
unsuccessful reform pathway, the reformers are facing an even bigger hurdle 
because they are working against the internal culture that historically does not 
tolerate the emergence of new theological ideas. This results in the emergence of 
a strong opposition against the reformers, making these changes less likely to 
occur in a positive direction.  Under this pathway, the reformers could have faced 
two challenges at the same time: a strong theological opposition against their 
reforms and a hostile state that is trying to repress them and their reform efforts at 
the same time. The reformers would not be able to successfully change the 
theological outlook and political positions of their groups.  
Under the successful reform pathway, the interaction between moral 
authority leadership, tolerant internal culture, as well as peaceful/cooperative 
religion-state relations, created a successful pathway for theological change. Since 
under this pathway, the independent variable (the presence of moral authority 
leadership) and the two intervening variables (tolerant internal culture and 
peaceful/cooperative state-religious group relations) are going in the same 
positive direction, the reformers are able to promote their reforms publicly. As a 
result, the reform is successfully implemented and institutionalized with the 
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organization. Under this pathway, these variables form the successful reform 
causal mechanism, which is summarized in the following figure (Figure 2.2): 
Figure 2.2. Causal mechanism 1: Successful reform pathway 
However, under the unsuccessful reform pathway, theological reform is 
unlikely to be successful due to the intolerant internal culture of the religious 
organization. Under this pathway, the proponents of progressive theological 
reform within Islamic groups are encountering strong opposition against their 
reforms from other factions within their group who opposed the 
institutionalization of the reform on ideological and theological grounds. Due to 
the prevailing institutional culture of the organization which favors reform 
opponents, they are able to block the reforms proposed by the reformers and 
successfully prevent the reforms from being institutionalized within the 
organization, despite the presence of other positive variables that are conducive 
toward the reforms such as the presence of a religious (but not a moral authority) 
leader within the group whom supported the reform and peaceful relations 
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between the state and the religious group. Under this pathway (Figure 2.3), the 
causal mechanism that works against reform is the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Causal mechanism 2: Unsuccessful reform pathway 
The two case studies in this study represent each of these two possible 
pathways: the Nahdlatul Ulama (causal mechanism #1 - successful reform), and 
Muhammadiyah (causal mechanism #2 – unsuccessful reform). Further details on 
the three movements and why they were selected as case studies in this study is 
elaborated in the following section. 
Research Methodology 
The primary method that will be used in this research is the case study 
method. Case study is defined as “an intensive study of a single unit for the 
purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). 
It is a form of qualitative research methodology, with the ultimate goal of 
establishing causality between the explanatory and study (dependent) variables, 
unlike quantitative methodology, which seeks to establish correlation between 
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these variables, but not necessarily their causes (Gerring, 2004, p. 348). There are 
several justifications for this study to use qualitative case study methodology.  
First, the primary focus of this study is to trace the institutional dynamics and 
processes operating within Islamic groups that could help us discover causal 
mechanisms that link together the political theology of an Islamic group with its 
mobilization strategy and political action. Case study method is most useful for 
this study in comparison to other research methods such as large-n statistical 
analysis or quasi-experimental research method. This is especially so because for 
case study research, the investigator's primary goal is “to discover a set of causal 
mechanisms that help link a set of variables that establish causality between these 
variables within a specific context or condition” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 
137). Second, case study method is also very useful when the researcher’s 
primary purpose of conducting the investigation is for theory development, “about 
which little is previously known or about which existing knowledge is 
fundamentally flawed” (Gerring, 2004, p. 345). In the study of Islamic politics, 
currently we know very little about the institutional dynamics of Islamic social 
movements, the leadership structure of these movements, and the specific role of 
moral authority leaders in shaping and influencing such dynamics. With these 
considerations in mind, I believe case study method is the most useful and 
appropriate research methodology for this study.  
Case selection and justifications. In this study, I conduct a comparative 
historical analysis of two Islamic movements, each of them represents the two 
possible causal mechanisms/pathways I outlined in the previous section. The 
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successful reform pathway (causal mechanism #1) is represented by the Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) movement from Indonesia, and the unsuccessful reform pathway 
(causal mechanism #2) is represented by the Muhammadiyah movement from 
Indonesia.  The two movements have been chosen because they represent the 
differing outcomes of the theological reforms by moral authority leaders that are 
predicted by each of the pathways. As predicted by the successful reform 
pathway, the NU makes a full transformation from a conservative ulama-centered 
movement that supported a shari’a-based Islamic state until the early 1980 into a 
progressive Islamic group today, thanks to the reforms initiated by its charismatic 
former chairman Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009). However, as predicted by the 
counter-reform pathway, reform efforts within the Muhammadiyah failed because 
the progressive reformers were matched by a strong revivalist counter-movement 
that dominated the leadership of the organization. Supporters of the revivalist 
unsuccessful reform within the organization managed to prevent the reforms from 
being institutionalized, despite the strong support of two moral authority leaders, 
Nurcolish Madjid (1939-2005) and Syafi’i Maarif (b. 1935) who managed to get a 
strong and popular following among reformist activists within the organization 
and the generally peaceful relationship between the Indonesian government and 
Muhammadiyah.  
Each of these movements has also been chosen because they are major 
Islamic movements with significant number of followers, and both of them have 
played significant roles as political and civil society organizations within 
Indonesia. The NU and Muhammadiyah both command a large number of 
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memberships among the Muslim population in Indonesia. The NU is estimated to 
have 40 million affiliated members and Muhammadiyah has approximately 30 
million affiliated members. Due to their size, some scholars have considered the 
two organizations as the two largest Muslim organizations in the world (Mujani 
and Liddle, 2009, p. 6).
20
 In addition, the two movements are active participants 
in the politics of their respective societies for last several decades. Both have 
suffered from political reprisals and repressions (albeit in varying degrees of 
severity) at the hand of the state within the last few decades as well. Lastly, both 
movements have played a major role in the democratic transition and 
consolidation that occurred in Indonesia during the last decade and a half.  
Table #2.5 summarizes the theological and institutional differences 
between the NU and Muhammadiyah, the different type of leadership exercised 
by the reform leaders within each of the groups, the institutional culture and state 
relations with the religious group that each of them have within their respective 
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 However, these numbers only reflects the potential influence that the two 
organizations could command in Indonesian politics, since neither the NU nor the 
Muhammadiyah keeps an accurate record of their actual membership rolls 
(Mujani and Liddle, 2009, p. 6, fn. 5 & 6). A statistical analysis of Indonesian 
Islamic voter preferences estimates that 48% of practicing (santri) Indonesian 
Muslims identify themselves with NU and 18% considered themselves as 
Muhammadiyah followers (Mujani, 2003, cited in Asyari, 2007, p. 21). An 
affiliation does not automatically mean that they are registered, due-paying 
members of these organizations. It is estimated that only about 1 million 
Muhammadiyah members are officially registered with the organization. Only 
registered members could be nominated as a candidate for a leadership positions 
with the organization and participate in policy-making meetings within the 
organization (Asyari, 2007, p. 21). Given its similar size, NU is likely to have the 
same number of registered members as Muhammadiyah.  
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societies, and summarizes the outcomes of the reforms that each of them 
undertook within the past three decades:  
Table 2.5 
Comparison Between the NU and the Muhammadiyah  
Organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Muhammadiyah 
Year Active  1926-present  1912-present  
Moral Authority 
Leadership  
(Independent 
Variable)  
Present. Theological expertise and 
charismatic attributes of Abdurrahman 
Wahid manage to dominate the 
organization  
Absent. Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii 
Ma'arif were recognized for their 
theological expertise, but not for their 
charismatic attributes and authority 
Institutional Culture 
(Intervening Variable 
#1)  
Tolerant culture/ Weak opposition 
from within the organization 
Intolerant culture/ Strong 
opposition/counter-reformation from 
within the organization  
Relations between the 
state and religious 
group 
(Intervening Variable 
#2) 
Conflictual (1966-1984), temporary 
truce (1984-1990), conflictual (1990-
1998), peaceful relations (1998-
present) 
Peaceful relations throughout the 
Suharto period (1966-98) and post-
democratic transition (1998-present) 
Change in 
Theological/ Political 
Orientation of the 
Organization 
(Dependent Variable) 
Successful Unsuccessful 
Data sources. Because this study is a comparative historical analysis of 
three Islamic social movements, the data for this study consists of historical 
materials, both primary, and secondary historical documents. The primary sources 
include: Islamic religious texts (the Qur’an, the Sunna, and Islamic legal 
jurisprudences (fiqh)); scholarly interpretations about these texts written by moral 
authority leaders:  books, essays, and other articles written by these leaders to 
promote their theological viewpoints; policy statements and other official 
documents issued by their organizations;  and other primary documents (e.g., 
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speeches and sermons by moral authority leaders, along with other religious 
scholars and activists).  
Many of these data sources are also available at Arizona State University 
(ASU) library. This is because until 2006, the ASU library was designated as a 
National Resource Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Consequently, the library 
holds an extensive collection of original publications on Indonesian politics and 
Islam in Indonesia that have served as substantial data resources for this study.
21
 
Even after the library lost its National Resource Center status in 2006, it continues 
to receive numerous books and other publications on Islam in Indonesia, collected 
primarily by Professor Mark Woodward of the Religious Studies Program from 
the university, who lived in Indonesia and has extensive contacts with scholars 
and activists from both the NU and Muhammadiyah. Other articles and 
documents about the two religious organizations and their leaders were also 
obtainable via the Internet, both in English as well as in the Indonesian language. 
The secondary materials on the two Islamic movements in Indonesia 
include previous in-depth studies done about the NU and the Muhammadiyah that 
were conducted by political scientists, historians, anthropologists, and religious 
studies scholars, both Indonesian as well as Western scholars. There have been a 
number of English-language studies done by political scientists and other scholars 
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 A search on the ASU’s online library catalog using the words “Indonesia” and 
“Islam” reveals 2,042 titles available at ASU library, dating back from the 1950s 
to the present.  
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on both NU and Muhammadiyah movements in Indonesia.
22
 While most of these 
works only studied a single Islamic movement within a single country and only a 
small number of them directly compared two or more of these movements,
23
 they 
also provided rich amount of data and information about these movements and an 
extensive list of bibliographical sources that can be consulted by other 
researchers.  
In addition to the data sources gathered from the ASU library and the 
Internet, I also conducted field research in Indonesia during the summer (May – 
August) of 2010 to gather additional materials about the NU and the 
Muhammadiyah that were not obtainable through any other means. These 
included official documents from these organizations as well as rare books and 
articles written by religious leaders from both organizations that were not easily 
obtainable on the public domain.  Several organizations that were established by 
the moral authority leaders studied in this study were especially helpful in 
providing access to these documents. They were the Institute for the Study of 
Islam and Society (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial – LKiS), the Wahid 
Institute established by Abdurrahman Wahid (NU), and the Ma’arif Institute 
established by Syafii Ma’arif (Muhammadiyah).  
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 For Nahdlatul Ulama, see Bush, 2009; Fealy, 1998; Jung, 2009; Kadir, 1999; 
Leong, 2008; and Ramage, 1995. For Muhammadiyah, see Alfian, 1989; Jung, 
2009; Leong, 2008; Noer, 1973; Peacock, 1978; and Syamsuddin, 1991.  
23
 Exceptions include Hefner, 2000; Jung, 2009; and Leong, 2008. 
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In order to link together the insights provided from these sources to 
become analytic narratives that serves as empirical data for this study, I use the 
process tracing method in order to shape the narratives that frame the causal 
linkages of the variables analyzed in this study.  Process tracing (also called 
“narrative appraisal” by some methodologists, such as Mahoney, 1999) is a 
method of inquiry in case study analysis where the researcher “examines the data 
collected to analyze the studied case in order to see whether the causal process 
hypothesized by his/her theory is in fact evident in the actual data being 
examined” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 6). It works by generating numerous 
observations within a case that are linked together to constitute an explanation for 
the case (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 207). Process tracing helps “to strengthen 
comparative historical analysis by helping the researcher to assess whether 
differences other than those in the variables being investigated might account for 
the differences in outcomes”(George and Bennett, 2005, p. 81).  
Since the data for this study are based on primary and secondary historical 
sources, care was taken to avoid the possibility of selection bias in the reading and 
interpretation of historical sources.  Political scientists who rely on historiography 
as their primary research method should be mindful that “our theories and their 
conclusions….can only be as good as the rules to which [we] adhere for 
distinguishing ‘accurate’ from ‘inaccurate’ historical monographs” (Lustick, 
1996, p. 605). Accordingly, we should avoid selecting sources that shows how 
events and actors’ behavior largely confirm to the implicit theories we have 
adopted (Lustick, 1996, p. 607). To avoid such selection bias, I triangulate my 
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data by using sources from the supporters of moral authority leaders as well as 
from their opponents. Both groups have put down their arguments for and against 
the reforms on numerous books, publications, and opinion pieces, so getting the 
perspectives representing both sides of the conflict is not a difficult task to 
accomplish. By using triangulation method, an accurate historiography of the 
reform movements that is theoretically informing and analytically informative can 
be constructed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SUCCESSFUL REFORM PATHWAY: THE CASE OF THE 
NAHDLATUL ULAMA 
This chapter analyzes the successful institutionalization of progressive 
Islamic ideas within the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Islamic 
organization with traditionalist and formerly conservative theological outlook, 
which now has embrace liberal ideas such as democracy, human rights, religion-
state separation, and religious tolerance/pluralism toward non-Muslim population 
in Indonesia. The NU case is an illustration of the successful reform pathway. 
Under this pathway, moral authority leadership interacts with tolerant institutional 
culture and manages to develop peaceful relations with the state relations. 
Together, they create the successful reform pathway in which progressive 
theological reform could take place within a religious organization. This theory is 
primarily based on social constructivist theory. It argues that the human agents 
(“moral authority” leaders) play an important role in changing the shared ideas 
(the theology) of Islamic groups. This helps to change the group’s political 
preferences to become supportive of democracy and democratic political 
institutions, respect the principle of religion-state separation, and recognize the 
rights of religious minorities to exercise religious freedom within their society. 
While the theory is primarily inspired by social constructivist theory, it is also 
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influenced by the works of rational choice theory and the Weberian charismatic 
leadership theory.
24
  
We can find evidence which shows the NU has followed the successful 
reform pathway when we observe the history of the NU over the past three 
decades and the theological changes within the organization that have occurred 
during this period. Before 1984, the NU was widely known as an Islamic 
organization which supported the theological positions commonly associated with 
conservative and fundamentalist Islam, such as support for a shari’a-based Islamic 
state and citizenship rights that privilege Muslims over non-Muslim minorities in 
from participating in Indonesia’s public sphere.25 However, by the late 1980s and 
the 1990s, the organization has reversed its theological position from a 
conservative theological position into a progressive one. Not only did it abandon 
its call for a shari’a-based Islamic state, but it also asserts the compatibility 
between Islam and the secularist Indonesian state ideology Pancasila by arguing 
that the latter is not a secular ideology because it recognized the rights of all 
monotheistic religions (including Islam) as a fundamental human rights.  The NU 
also becomes known for its advocacy for liberal principles such as democracy, 
human rights, and religious tolerance, principles that are often challenged and 
rejected, by many other Islamic groups.  
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 See chapter 2 for my discussion and analyses on these theories.  
25
 This includes the requirement that any Indonesian presidents and key 
government ministers should come from the Islamic faith. See Fealy 1992, p. 6, 
cited in Feillard 1994, p. 11 for details.  
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In this chapter, I argue that the changing theological frames and political 
preferences of the NU is the result of a reform effort within the organization that 
began after the organization’s national congress (Muktamar) in 1984. The primary 
instigators of the reform were a group of reformers led by an ulama named 
Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009), who was elected as chairman of the NU in 
1984 and who led the organization for the next fifteen years (1984-1999). Wahid 
was a well-recognized expert in classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). However, 
he also acquired an in-depth knowledge of Western sociopolitical philosophy. He 
was a grandson of the late imam Hasjim Asj’ari, who founded the NU in 1926. 
This family lineage provided a status which brought a wide recognition for Wahid 
as a charismatic leader among the supporters of reform he had advocated. This 
status bolstered the reform agenda that he and his reformers promoted within the 
NU. More importantly, his moral authority status lent weight to his effort to 
implement and institutionalize his theological ideas within the NU and transform 
the organization into the progressive Islamic organization it is known as today. 
Wahid’s moral authority leadership, the tolerant institutional culture of the NU, 
and its improved relations with the Indonesian state during the time the reforms 
were implemented in the mid-1980s, worked together to ensure the successful 
theological reform within the NU. It illustrates how the combination of human 
agency and structure (culture and state institutions) works together to explain the 
changes in NU’s theological frames and political preferences, as predicted by 
social constructivist theory.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized into the following sections. The 
first section outlines the historical background of the theological reform within 
the NU that took place under Abdurrahman Wahid’s tenure within the 
organization from 1984 to 1999, the sociopolitical context behind the reforms, 
and how Wahid emerged to become the leader of the NU during this period.
26
 The 
second section explains Wahid’s reforms through the lenses of the moral authority 
leadership theory developed in this study through the empirical evidences to 
support this theory. It details how Wahid’s moral authority, combined with the 
two intervening variables of this study (institutional culture and state-religion 
relations) provides a better theoretical explanation for the NU case compared to 
the two alternative explanations detailed earlier. The third section analyzes the 
alternative explanations given by previous scholars to explain this reform, through 
culturalist and rationalist theoretical perspectives. I reject the culturalist 
theoretical explanation due to its treatment of culture and ideas as completely 
fixed and difficult, if not impossible to change variables, therefore denying the 
possibility that the theological change under Wahid could have occurred in the 
first place.  I also argue that while rational choice theory can explain the 
instrumental and strategic rationales behind the theological reforms within the 
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 This study only analyses Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership role as the chairman 
of the NU from 1984 to 1999. It does not address his political career after his NU 
chairmanship as the founding chairman of the National Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa – PKB) or his stint as Indonesia’s first democratically 
elected president from 1999 to 2001.  Readers should consult works such as 
Barton (2002) and Bush (2009) if they are interested to learn more about Wahid’s 
post-NU political career.  
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NU, it needs to be complemented with the moral authority leadership theory 
introduced in this study in order to reach a more satisfactory explanation on how 
both ideational and instrumental factors have shaped the reformers’preferences 
and their political implications. The final section concludes the chapter with an 
assessment the moral authority leadership theory along with these alternative 
explanations, based on the evidences that are presented in the previous section. 
Historical Background of the Theological Reforms within the NU  
The NU is an organization of Islamic ulama and their followers based in 
Indonesia. It has a membership of approximately 40 million Indonesians,
27
 most 
of them living in the island of Java. It is considered as a traditionalist Islamic 
organization because they believe in the special authority of religious scholars 
(ulama), who received absolute obedience from their followers (taqlid). The NU 
ulama are experts of classical Islamic legal jurisprudence (fiqh), particularly the 
Shafi’i school of jurisprudence (mazhab).  It was founded as a reaction against the 
reformist Islamist movement that called for the rejection of the ulama’s authority 
in favor of independent reasoning (ijtihad) by individual Muslim believers. In 
Indonesia, Islamic reform was promoted by several modernist and revivalist-
oriented organizations, including the Muhammadiyah, which was founded in 
1912.  The traditionalist ulama founded the NU in 1926 as a way to promote the 
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 However, these numbers only reflects the potential influence that the two 
organizations could command in Indonesian politics, since both NU and 
Muhammadiyah do not keep accurate and reliable records of their actual 
membership rolls (Mujani and Liddle, 2009, p. 6, fn. 5 & 6). 
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need for the ordinary umma to listen to and obey their teachings. In the process, 
the organization was also established to protect their authority against the 
criticisms from modernist and revivalist groups such as the Muhammadiyah.
28
  
Besides their expertise of this legal jurisprudence, many NU ulama and 
their followers also practice numerous customs and rituals that are not considered 
as fundamental Islamic teachings prescribed in the Qur’an and the Hadith (the 
sayings and deeds of the Prophet).
29 
Scholars who have studied the NU have taken 
the existence of these customs and rituals as evidence that the organization has an 
institutional culture that tolerates new or syncretic teachings and customs, as long 
as they do not directly contradict fundamental Islamic teachings. As we will see in 
the next section, this tolerant institutional culture helped the reformers to find 
significant support for progressive-leaning theological reform from within the NU 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  
From the 1950s to the early 1980s, the NU was known as a conservative 
Islamic movement which supported a political agenda that reflected the 
theological frame commonly expressed by other conservative and revivalist 
Islamic organizations in Indonesia, such as the Muhammadiyah. During this 
period, many NU ulama wanted that the shari’a law to be recognized as the 
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 For an analysis of Muhammadiyah’s theology and how it reacted to liberal 
political ideas, please see chapter 4.  
29
 This include customs and rituals such as visitations of holy shrines and graves 
of famous ulama, feasts and offerings in memory of deceased family members 
(selametan/kenduri) and the use of charms/amulets (azimat) that are believed to 
protect their bearers from evil spirits (Noer, 1973, pp. 300-301; Kadir, 1999, pp. 
91-92; Van Bruinessen, 1994, p. 37) 
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primary source of the Indonesian Constitution. They endorsed the Jakarta Charter, 
a proposed amendment to the 1945 Indonesian Constitution (later scrapped by 
secular nationalists), which would require all Indonesian Muslims to observe the 
shari’a law in their daily lives (Fealy, 1996, p. 19). The NU’s platform in 1952 
called for the state to “institute the shari’a law and giving clerics (ulama) a 
privileged role in the highest level of [Indonesian] government” (Leong, 2008, p. 
181). This position was further strengthened in its 1954 platform, which explicitly 
stated that the organization was founded to “firmly establish the shari’a law 
according to the one of the four [Islamic] schools of law” (Madinier and Feillard, 
1999, p.  15). It also declared that the position of Indonesian president and most 
cabinet ministers should only be occupied by Muslims (Madinier and Feillard, 
1999, p. 16). In 1968, the NU renewed its support for the Jakarta Charter. It 
argued that while the enactment of the Jakarta Charter would not automatically 
resulted in the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, it would “require the 
state to enforce shari’a law among Indonesia’s Muslims and ensure no legislation 
contravened Islamic law” (Leong, 2008, p. 276). From this evidence, we can 
establish the conservative theological frame the NU used to subscribe to during 
the 1950s to the 1970s.  
Nevertheless, the NU’s conservative theological frame was tempered by 
its pragmatic political strategy. It was willing to work with secularist-oriented 
political parties, which dominated Indonesian politics during the 1950s and 1960s. 
For instance, the NU developed a close alliance with the secularist Indonesian 
National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia – PNI) led by Indonesia’s first 
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president, Sukarno, throughout much of the 1950s and the 1960s (Bush, 2009, pp. 
50-51).
30
 In addition, the NU leadership supported Sukarno as he assumed 
authoritarian rule between 1959 and 1966, arguing that “all-out opposition 
[against Sukarno] would merely result in NU being excluded completely from the 
structures of political power” (Bush, 2009, p. 52). The need for patronage 
opportunities was widely atrributed as the rationale for NU’s support for the 
Sukarno regime. Through its control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, it 
managed to provide extensive financial support for its religious schools 
(pesantren), and provided employment for many of its followers in both 
government-sponsored Islamic schools (madrasahs) and in the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (Van Bruinessen, 1994, p. 71).
31
  
However, NU’s pragmatism during this period should not be interpreted as 
a sign that the organization was inconsistent in its theological commitment to 
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 As a result of this alliance, the NU was given control of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, which gave the organization control over the Indonesian 
government’s policy on religious affairs and served as a resource for financial 
patronage and government contracts for NU supporters (Bush, 2009, pp. 46-47; 
Fealy, 1998, p. 85).  
31
 NU’s control over the Religious Affairs Ministry ended in 1972, when Suharto 
appointed a modernist Muslim without any organizational or political affiliations 
as the new Minister of Religious Affairs, ending a two-decade tradition to award 
the ministership position to NU ulama. With this appointment, NU also lost its 
control over the administration of the ministry. Most importantly, it also lost its 
most important patronage funding resources. NU pesantren schools and 
universities no longer received significant subsidies from the government. With 
the loss of these subsidies, NU-affiliated ulama also lost most of their sources of 
power and legitimacy within their respective communities, a problem that became 
one of the catalyst for the theological reform within the NU in the 1980s and 
1990s (Kadir, 1999, pp. 184-186). 
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conservative Islamic principles it had promised to promote and upheld. After 
General Suharto ousted Sukarno in a military coup in 1966 and began his 32-year 
authoritarian rule in Indonesia, the organization established a reputation as a 
leading opposition group and a primary defender of conservative Islamic theology 
against Suharto’s rule (Bush, 2009, p. 67). The NU and the Suharto regime were 
involved in several major political clashes during the 1970s. In 1973, it was able 
to block a secularist-oriented marriage bill that sought to limit polygamy as well 
as the authority of Islamic courts to legalize marriage (Bush, 2009, p. 68). In 1978 
it led opposition to the government’s legislation that would have declared the 
Javanese animistic religion (aliran kepercayaan) as a new official religion of the 
Indonesian state. In both instances, the organization argued that these legislations 
violated the Islamic teaching that Muslims should only worship a monotheistic 
God instead of man-made entities (Kadir, 1999, pp. 180-182; Van Bruinessen, 
1994, pp. 95-96). Lastly, during the 1970s NU ulama and activists frequently 
argued that the secularist national ideology Pancasila was a man-made ideology, 
and that it contradicted the Islamic belief in a monotheistic God (tauhid). Thus, 
they asserted that the Suharto regime’s effort to propagate Pancasila to the entire 
Indonesian population instead of Islamic teachings was a case of apostasy 
(murtad) against the Islamic belief (Kadir, 1999, p. 181).  
The conflict between the NU and the Suharto regime reached its climax in 
1982, when Suharto issued a decree that required all sociopolitical groups and 
civil society organizations to adapt the secularist national ideology Pancasila as 
their sole ideological foundation. The decree also declared any organizations that 
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opposed the implementation of the decree would lose their legal status and be 
classified as illegal organizations (Kadir, 1999, p. 198). It was clearly aimed to 
discipline Islamic organizations such as the NU and threatened them with the 
possibility of losing their legal recognition if they failed to comply with the 
decree (Kadir, 1999, p. 198).  
At about the same time, the NU faced a fierce internal struggle over 
whether its conservative theological frames, political identities, and preferences 
remained relevant for the majority of its members and whether a different 
theological frame is needed so that the NU could become an organization that is 
more receptive toward democracy, religion-state separation, and tolerance toward 
non-Muslim minorities. A new generation of NU activists emerged during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. They raised questions about the organization’s insistence 
to promote conservative Islamic agenda, such to the establishment of a shari’a-
based Islamic state, which it had promoted ever since its founding in 1926. These 
activists also argued that that NU’s involvement as a leading opposition 
organization against the Suharto regime had brought few actual benefits to the 
members of the organization and only benefited a small number of NU leaders 
and politicians living in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta (Bush, 2009, p. 70).  
Many of these young NU activists came from prominent NU families and 
were either the sons or grandsons of leading NU ulama. Most, but not all of them, 
tend to be come from professional backgrounds such as doctors, lawyers, or social 
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activists rather than from ulama background (Bush, 2009, p. 69).
32
 However, 
these activists were not complete strangers to the organization either, because 
many of them were the children, grandchildren, or other close relatives of leading 
NU ulama.  As these young activists began to voice their criticisms against the 
organization’s conservative theology, they outlined a reform agenda that would 
have transformed NU into a different direction both theologically and politically.  
Specifically, the activists advocated several reform proposals for their 
organization. First, they recommended that the NU withdrew from formal politics 
and from its affiliation with the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan–PPP)33 to become a civil society organization that focuses on the 
provision of religious propagation, social services to the needy, and social justice 
advocacy. In addition, the reformers accused the NU leadership of focusing too 
much attention in opposition politics against the Suharto regime and that the 
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 Members of the pro-reform faction within the NU included Abdurrahman 
Wahid, Masdar Masudi, Mahbub Djunaidi, Fahmi Saifuddin, Slamet Effendy 
Yusuf, Ghaffar Rahman, and Rozy Munir (Ida, 1996, p. 90, cited in Bush, 2009, 
pp. 69-70). Later on they were joined by reform-minded NU ulama such as Sahal 
Mahfudz and Mustofa Bisri, who became important allies in Wahid’s effort to 
promote his theological reform within the NU (Bush, 2009, p. 73).  
 
33
 In 1973 NU was forced to merge with three smaller modernist Islamist parties 
to form the PPP, under heavy pressure from the Suharto regime. While arguably it 
had gathered the largest number of popular votes among all Islamic parties in the 
last election (18.64% in 1971), the NU had occupied a smaller proportion of key 
leadership positions within the PPP, most of which were occupied by members of 
the government-backed Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia – 
Parmusi) (Kadir, 1999, p. 177; Bush, 2009, p. 66). By the early 1980s, young NU 
activists started to question the organization’s continued involvement in the PPP, 
arguing that the relations between NU and PPP had become so dysfunctional that 
they did not produce any tangible benefits for the rank-and-file NU members 
(Haidar, 1998, p. 195, cited in Bush, 2009, p. 72).  
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leadership had based most of its policy decisions based on their narrow political 
interests rather than the interests of the organization’s rank-and-file members 
(Bush, 2009, p. 72).  
Most significantly, the activists called for the reframing and reconstruction 
of NU’s long-standing theological frame and political identity, from one that 
advocated the implementation of a shari’a-based Islamic state and the rejection of 
secularist ideologies such as the Pancasila to one which recognizes the 
compatibility of the Pancasila with Islamic principles and abandons its call for 
Indonesian Muslims to establish an Islamic state (Barton, 1996a, pp. 123-125). By 
adopting this new theological frame, the activists argued that the NU would have 
acquired a new political identity as an organization which encouraged liberal 
political values such as democracy, human rights, and tolerance against non-
Muslim minorities. In the process, the NU would be known as an organization 
that is willing to promote progressive democratic values as opposed to the Suharto 
regime, which had rejected them (Hikam, 1994 [2010], pp. 136-137).  
In order to successfully implement these reforms, the NU activists also 
demanded a change of leadership within the organization, from an older 
generation of leaders whom had led it since the 1950s to a new generation that 
would be more receptive toward their reform demands. The older generation NU 
leaders, while committed to a conservative theological position, also tended to 
practice political pragmatism in their dealings with both the Sukarno and the 
Suharto regimes, both of them were problematic in the eyes of the younger 
reformers. Conservative NU leaders such as its long-term chairman Idham Chalid 
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(1922-2010), developed cooperative relationship between with both the Sukarno 
and Suharto regimes, much to the chagrin of many rank-and-file NU members.
34
 
The activists concluded that in order to move forward, the NU needed a new 
leadership that would be more receptive toward their theological and political 
reforms and shares their long-term vision for the organization (van Bruinessen, 
1994, p. 106).  
The young activists received the support of some senior NU ulama who 
were dissatisfied with how the NU leadership ran the organization during the 
period. These included senior NU ulama such as As’ad Syamsul Arifin (1897-
1990), Ali Ma’shum (1915-1989), and Achmad Siddiq (1926-1991). The activists 
formed an alliance with these older ulama since they did not have enough 
influence within the NU to implement the reforms they advocated on their own 
(Kadir, 1999, p. 195). The alliance was also necessary to address the fact that only 
a small number of these young activists had background and training as ulama. 
The NU remained a traditionalist-oriented organization dominated by its ulama 
and the reformers did not wish to change this organizational orientation. They 
were aware that only an ulama with strong charismatic appeals could have 
                                                             
34
 For instance, in 1964, Chalid founded the Fire of Islam Foundation  (Yayasan 
Api Islam), a NU-linked organization which publicly endorsed and legitimized 
Sukarno’s authoritarian rule and policies by stating that his actions and deeds 
were “fully inspired by God” (Federspiel, 1976, pp. 99-100). In 1973, Chalid 
approved the “shotgun marriage” between NU and three other modernist Islamic 
political parties to form the Suharto-sanctioned PPP party without consulting any 
other members of NU leadership board (Van Bruinessen, 1994, p. 104). 
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commanded significant influence and support among the approximately 35 to 40 
million NU members.
35
 
 Thus, the reformers concluded that whomever they nominated as the new 
leader of the NU needed to have sufficient moral authority within the organization 
so that their reform ideas would have the best chance to be implemented and 
institutionalized within the NU. In order to do so, the new leader needed to have 
the theological expertise informed by classical Islamic jusrisprudence (fiqh) and 
Western sociopolitical thought. He also needed to have strong personal 
charismatic appeals to be able to unite the largely fragmented and decentralized 
NU ulama.
36
 Finally, since the possession of intellectual and family genealogies 
are important variables that help to determine whether the leader and the ideas he 
promoted would gain widespread popularity among members of the organization, 
the leader must also be related to the family of imam Hasjim Asj’ari, the ulama 
                                                             
35
  It was fresh in the reformers’ mind that when a previous leader of the reform 
faction, Subchan, Z.E. (1930-1973) tried to challenge the leadership of Idham 
Chalid during the early 1970s, despite his reputation as a bold and unorthodox NU 
activist with a pro-reform mindset, he was not able to replace Chalid and was later 
ousted from the NU leadership board. Subchan’s inability to win the NU 
chairmanship was attributed from the fact that he was not able to attract enough 
supporters from most NU ulama and activists due to his lack of direct familial and 
genealogical relationship with imam Asj’ari or other senior NU ulama (Kadir, 
1999, pp. 166-167). 
36
 Charismatic authority is important within the NU because it is well established 
within the organization that “the supremacy of ulama (kyai) authority serves as 
the example for all his students (santri) and, accompanied by the respect that his 
reputed magical powers…makes the kyai’s omnipotence impregnable and his 
authority indisputable” (Ward, 1974, p. 92, cited in Kadir, 1999, p. 96).  
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who helped to found the organization in 1926.
37
 Traditionally within the NU, only 
members of the Imam Asj’ari family (indicated by having the title “Gus” added 
before his first name) were considered to have these characteristics. NU activists 
whom do not have familial or intellectual genealogical relations with imam 
Asj’ari’s family or his descendants would not have much of a chance to raise unto 
the leadership rank within the organization.
38
  
In the end, they found their candidate in the person of Abdurrahman 
Wahid (commonly known among the NU ulama as “Gus Dur”). Wahid was born 
on September 7, 1940 in Jombang, East Java.  He was the grandson of two senior 
traditionalist ulama who founded the NU in 1926 HeHasjim Asj’ari (1871-1947), 
and Bisri Syansuri (1886-1980). He was the son of Wahid Hasjim (1914-1953), a 
leading NU ulama who served as Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs during 
the early 1950s. In 1957, Wahid started his study of classical Islamic 
jurisprudence in a NU Islamic school (pesantren). He quickly won the recognition 
                                                             
37
 Not even pro-reform senior NU ulama such as Ali Ma’shum and Achmad 
Siddiq, widely respected ulama who were also students of Imam Asj’ari, were 
considered to possess the moral authority characteristics acceptable to the NU 
community. 
 
38
 Within the NU, this familial relationship is established if an ulama has the title 
“Gus,” which signifies that he is the son of a prominent NU ulama (Kadir, 1996, 
p. 96, fn. 49). Prominent NU ulama includes imam Hasjim Asj’ari and his sons, 
and other ulama whom helped to found the organization in 1926, such as Wahab 
Chasbullah (1883-1971), Bisri Syansuri (1886-1980) and others. Abdurrahman 
Wahid, the grandson of imam Asj’ari, held the honorific title “Gus Dur,” which 
became his nickname both within the NU community and later with the general 
Indonesian public as well (Kadir, 1996, p. 96, fn. 49).  
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from other NU ulama and activists as a leading classical Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh) expert in his own right. However, during his childhood Wahid also received 
instructions in classical and modern Western literature, history, and philosophy.
39
 
Thus, he grew up with a strong curiosity to learn about Western science and 
sociopolitical thought, in addition to classical Islamic jurisprudence (Barton, 
2002, pp. 48-49).
40
  
After finishing his pesantren education in 1963, Wahid pursued his 
advanced study of fiqh at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. 
After returning to Indonesia from his studies in the Middle East, Wahid began his 
rise in the leadership ranks of the NU. From 1974 to 1980 he served as the 
Secretary General of the Tebuireng pesantren in Jombang, the largest and most 
prestigious NU pesantren, which was founded by his grandfather imam Asj’ari 
(Barton, 1996b, p. 193). In 1979, Wahid was appointed as the Secretary General 
                                                             
39
 Wahid’s biographer Greg Barton credits his exposure to Western literature and 
political thought to the efforts of his father Wahid Hasjim. Hasjim’s mother was 
the daughter of a Javanese aristocratic family (priyayi) who wanted her son to 
become a member of the Javanese elite aristocracy rather than an NU ulama. 
Thus, she hired a Dutch tutor who taught her son Western literature and 
philosophy, as well as Dutch and English languages. In turn, Wahid Hasjim 
exposed his children to a similar Western-style education in addition to giving 
them traditionalist Islamic education (Barton, 2002, pp. 42; 48-49).  
40
 At the pesantren, Wahid also read the works of revivalist Islamic reformers 
such as Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna, and Said Ramadan. However, Wahid 
decided to reject revivalist and literalist Islamic Wahid soon decided to reject 
revivalist and literalist Islamic thought, arguing that they were “contrary to the 
true spirit of Islam.” Instead, he believes in Islam that promotes freedom of 
thought, pluralism, and tolerance for non-Islamic religious practices, customs, and 
traditions, as long as they are not directly contradicting the basic tenets of Islamic 
belief in the oneness of God (tauhid) (Barton, 2002, p. 60).  
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(chatib aam) of NU’s ulama council (syuriah). This was a very strategic position 
within the NU, since it allowed him to develop relationships and contacts with 
key NU ulama who sat on the syuriah board, many of whom later supported his 
candidacy as NU chairman in 1984.  
Beginning in the 1970s, Wahid began to establish a reputation as a ‘norm 
entrepreneur’ for progressive Islamic ideas within the NU. During this period, he 
was a prolific writer who wrote frequently in various newspapers and popular 
journals on a variety of sociopolitical issues. The issues included Islamic 
theological reform, democracy,  human rights, tolerance for religious minorities, 
and the role of Islam in Indonesian politics (Barton, 1996b, p. 198).
41
 In his 
writings, Wahid sought to bridge the long-standing divisions between secular 
nationalists and Islamists in Indonesian political discourses. He argued that Islam 
could make a positive contribution to Indonesian politics and accept elements of 
liberalism and secularism. Scholars whom have extensively analyzed Wahid’s 
writings were impressed by his frequent references to both the classical Islamic 
and Western political philosophers as well as the consistency of his ideas on 
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 During the 1970s, Wahid began to write extensively, first in leading 
Indonesian academic journal Prisma, and later on in leading Indonesian 
newspapers and news magazines such as Kompas and Tempo about the virtue of 
pesantren education (Barton, 1996b, pp. 195-196; Barton, 2002, p.103). Later 
on, Wahid’s writings branched out to include a variety of sociopolitical issues 
ranging from Islamic theological and legal reform, democracy and human rights 
(especially for religious minorities), religious tolerance, and the role of Islam in 
Indonesian politics (Barton, 1996b, p.  198).  
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democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance in the numerous articles he 
wrote between the early 1970s and the late-2000s.
42
  
There was a consensus among members of the pro-reform faction within 
the NU that Abdurrahman Wahid was their best candidate for the new NU 
chairman. They felt that Wahid was someone who could bridge the gap between 
the young NU reformers who wanted to promote a fundamental change in NU’s 
theological and political orientations and the older ulama who were either 
cautious against these proposed reforms or openly resisted them. Based on his 
writings, Wahid was considered as a reform proponent with an in-depth 
knowledge of classical Islamic jurisprudence and Western social theory. He also 
had developed close relationships with other pro-reform NU activists, secular 
civil society activists, as well as government officials who supported the 
leadership change within the NU (Ramage, 1995, p. 51). On the other hand, as the 
grandson of NU’s founding father imam Hasjim Asj’ari, signified by his title 
“Gus Dur,” Wahid possessed a strong family genealogy that enable him to have 
the “blue blood” within the NU. This status enabled him to become an effective 
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 For instance, Wahid asserts that the secularist Indonesian government gives a 
guarantee to the Muslim community to protect their religious freedom by 
incorporating Islamic monotheism (tauhid) as the first principle of Pancasila – 
Belief in the One Supreme God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) when Indonesia 
declared its independence in 1945. In Wahid’s view, this has made the 
Indonesian government fully legitimate. Unless the government decides to turn 
Pancasila into an alternative religion that seeks to replace the basic tenets of 
Islam, all Indonesian Muslims are obliged to honor and obey its authority and 
must reject any other forms of alternative governments that sought to replace it, 
including an Islamic state (Wahid, 2010, pp. 157-159).  
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moral authority leader within the NU (Kadir 1999, p. 96). Lastly, Wahid had close 
relationship with senior NU ulama such as As’ad Syamsul Arifin and Ali 
Ma’shum, whom supported the young activist’s demand for leadership change 
within the NU but were cautious, even opposed, the theological ideas proposed by 
the young reformers (Ida, 2004, p. 111-112). In the end, Wahid was considered 
among the reformers as someone with a strong “moral authority” claims that few 
others within the NU could have claimed. The reform activists were nearly 
unanimous in their support for Wahid to become the new NU chairman to replace 
the conservative Idham Chalid.   
The 1984 NU national congress handed out a landslide victory to members 
of the pro-reform action. The delegates endorsed the resolution that accepted 
Pancasila as the NU’s sole ideological foundation, making it as the first major 
Indonesian Islamic organization that had agreed to implement it.
43
 They endorsed 
the reforms advocated by the reformist faction to end NU’s participation in formal 
politics and to return to its function as a religious organization not affiliated with 
any political parties. Lastly, the delegates elected Abdurrahman Wahid as the new 
chairman of the organization’s central leadership (tanfidzyah) board (Van 
Bruinessen, 1994, pp. 114-116 & 120-125; Bush, 2009, pp. 74-78). At the same 
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 The 1984 amendment to the NU’s bylaws signifying this change was actually 
very short. The amended bylaws included a new short clause that declared 
Pancasila as NU’s sole ideological principle. However, NU retained another 
clause that has been included in its bylaws since its founding in 1926: that it is an 
Islamic organization that operates based on ulama’s consensus (“ahli sunnah wal 
jama’ah”) and requires its members to follow one of the four mazhabs of Islamic 
religious jurisprudence (fiqh) (Van Bruinessen, 1994, pp. 122 & 289-292). 
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time, former chairman Idham Chalid and other members of the conservative 
faction were expelled from the NU new leadership board (Van Bruinessen, 1994, 
p. 125).  
After assuming the NU chairmanship, Wahid started to implement the 
reforms he had proposed. He instituted reforms that were intended to change the 
NU’s theological frame and political identity, from one that has historically 
promoted conservative theological positions (e.g., supporting the shari’a law) into 
an Islamic organization which saw the compatibility between Islam and liberal 
values such as democracy, human rights, and social justice within the Indonesian 
society as a whole. From the time Wahid assumed office in 1984, the NU begun 
to move away from its conservative theological orientations that called for the 
implementation of a shari’a-based Islamic state in Indonesia.  Instead, he began to 
publicly expressed support for the secularist national ideology Pancasila as well 
as support for ideas such as democracy, human rights, social justice, and the 
protection of disadvantaged economic groups in the Indonesian society. Lastly, 
Wahid developed alliances and cooperation between the NU, the Suharto regime, 
and secularist-oriented Muslims to keep the influence of revivalist-oriented 
Muslim groups in check (Ida, 2004, pp. 89-90).  
Wahid believes that Muslims should adopt democratic political principles 
because despite revivalist Muslims’ claim that God mandates the creation of an 
Islamic state in lieu of a democratic one, he could find no textual support both 
within the Qur’an and the fiqh texts that could support this claim. While Islam 
calls for Muslims to obey and follow the shari’a, it does not have any formal 
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teachings about the nature of the state and whether the state should be based on 
Islam. Wahid argues that: 
Islam does not specifically call for an Islamic state, but only calls for the 
improvement of human society. A society that already practices Islam 
wholeheartedly and thus, already follows the rules specified by the shari’a, 
does not need to establish an Islamic state (Wahid 2006a: 102-103).  
Wahid asserts that “because there is no scriptural texts that call for the 
establishment of an Islamic state, Muslims are not required to establish one. 
Instead, they are called to build a society that promotes democratic values that 
are compatible with Islam. However, this could be done without establishing an 
Islamic state” (Ridwan 2010: 63).  
Wahid also resolves the long-standing contention between the NU and 
secular nationalists in the Suharto regime over the nature of the Indonesian state, 
whether it should be a secularist nation-state based on the Indonesian national 
ideology Pancasila or should be a shari’a-based Islamic state. He argues that the 
resolution to this contention could be found in the classical fiqh teaching on the 
relationship between Muslims and the state. According to Wahid’s interpretation 
of the fiqh, “Muslims must submit to all forms of authority that has given them a 
guarantee to protect their rights to worship the one true monotheistic God 
(tauhid)” (Ridwan 2010: 38). He asserts that the secularist Indonesian state has 
given this guarantee to the Indonesian Muslim community by incorporating 
tauhid as the first principle of the Pancasila – Belief in the One Supreme God 
(Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) when Indonesia declared its independence in 1945. 
In Wahid’s view, this has made the Indonesian government fully legitimate:  
107 
Unless the [Indonesian] government decides to turn the Pancasila into an 
alternative religion that seeks to replace the basic Islamic principles, all 
Indonesian Muslims are obliged to honor and obey the government’s 
authority and must reject any other forms of alternative political regimes 
that sought to replace it, including an Islamic state (Wahid 1985 [2010]: 
157-159).  
Lastly, Wahid recognizes the reality that Indonesia is so religiously diverse 
that the country could only survive if no single religion is privileged over the 
others.
44
 In his mind, this demographic reality serves as the basis for the NU 
community to reject an Islamic state in Indonesia, since:  
Indonesians who are non-Muslims as well as those who are only nominally 
Muslims have shown their strong objections against the establishment of an 
Islamic state [in Indonesia]…Instead, they want to establish a state that is 
not based on any specific religious confession (Wahid, 2006a, p. 104).  
 
In short, Wahid believes in a cultural and ethical interpretation of Islam, 
but not a political one. In his view, 
There is nothing written in the Islamic tradition which mandates the 
establishment of an Islamic state. Even though I am a Muslim and the 
majority of Indonesians are also Muslims, there is no desire in my part to 
dominate Indonesia in the name of Islam…What I am trying to establish 
[in the Indonesian society] is a cultural Islam, not a political one 
(Islamlib.com, 03/10/2006).  
                                                             
44 While 88 percent of Indonesian population are Muslims, there are a number of 
sizable religious minorities living in Indonesia as well: Christians (9 percent of 
the population), Hindus (1 percent), Buddhists (1 percent), and Confucians (1 
percent). The Indonesian Muslim community is also divided among traditionalist 
NU, modernist Muhammadiyah, several revivalist groups, and numerous small 
syncretic Islamic sects (e.g, the Ahmadiyah). In Wahid’s view, this extraordinary 
religious diversity “necessitates the need for a secular state, since it is the only 
one that would unite all members of these religious traditions under a single 
state” (Wahid 2006a: 104).  
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Wahid opposes the implementation of the shari’a law in Indonesia because 
he believes that it will result in religious segmentation that will privileges 
Muslims (especially revivalist Muslims) over other religious groups in Indonesia. 
Thus, Wahid rejects the Islamic state because: 
Our nation is very heterogeneous in its way of life, thus the state should 
not only serve the interests of the Muslims alone. Many Indonesian 
Muslims, myself included, have rejected the Islamic state in Indonesia. 
Their beliefs and opinions, along with those of Indonesians who are not 
Muslims (represents more than 10 percent of Indonesia’s population), 
should be respected. It is foolish to assume that the concept of an Islamic 
state is accepted by all Muslims in this country, just because Islam is the 
majority religion in Indonesia (Wahid 2006b, p. 50).  
To preserve the climate that supports inter-religious tolerance and 
pluralism, Wahid argues that Muslims should engage in continuous dialogue 
among themselves, with non-Islamic religions, and with the greater human 
community. He cites a teaching issued by his mentor Achmad Siddiq, arguing that 
NU members should practice three forms of ‘ecumenic dialogues’ (ukhuwwah) 
with other religious and civil society groups: 1) dialogue with fellow Muslims, 
especially with Muhammadiyah members (ukhuwwah Islamiyah); 2) dialogue 
with all Indonesians, especially with non-Muslims (ukhuwwah wathaniyah); and 
3) dialogue with the rest of humanity (ukhuwwah basyariyyah). He believes that 
practicing ukhuwah is necessary because “while different religious and civil 
society groups have their own distinct theological and cultural perspectives that 
differ from one another, this does not mean that they could not live in harmony 
with one another” (Wahid, 2003, also see Van Bruinessen 1996, p. 187). 
Nevertheless, the theological ideas proposed by Wahid and other reform 
supporters above encountered a strong opposition from within the NU from 
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several different factions within the organization. Some NU ulama opposed the 
reforms due the diverging theological interpretations. However, others opposed 
them on instrumental ground, because the reforms reduced the power and special 
status of the ulama in comparison to the lay NU activists. Senior NU ulama, such 
as Kyai As’ad Syamsul Arifin, whom at first supported Wahid’s campaign for the 
NU chairmanship, also began to oppose him because they disagreed with his 
reforms (Kadir, 1999, pp. 224-225). In addition, NU politicians such as Wahid’s 
uncle Yusuf Hasjim, who lost their parliamentary seats thanks to Wahid’s 
decision for the NU to stay away from partisan politics also opposed his reforms 
(Barton, 2002, p. 152). Lastly, a number of NU businesspeople who were closed 
to Suharto and other key Indonesian government officials also opposed Wahid. 
They argued that Wahid’s frequent criticisms against the Suharto regime were 
hurting their chances of obtaining lucrative government contracts for their 
businesses (Hefner, 2000, pp. 171-172).  
Opposition to Wahid’s reforms was especially strong during the first term 
of his chairmanship (1984-1989). However, by the time Wahid won his third term 
as the leader of the NU in 1994, he had managed to overcome this opposition and 
successfully institutionalized most of his reform proposals. Thus, Wahid was able 
to change the theological frame and political identity of the NU from a formerly 
conservative theological position into one that fully reflected his progressive 
theological ideas. The success of the reforms is attributed to these factors: 1) 
Wahid’s moral authority leadership and charismatic attributes, 2) the tolerant 
institutional culture of the NU which was conducive toward new theological 
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ideas, particularly those which were promoted by Wahid and his supporters, and 
3) the relatively peaceful relationship between the NU and the Suharto regime, 
which helped Wahid to enact his reforms during the mid to late 1980s with fewer 
threats of reprisal and persecution from the regime. All of these are analyzed in 
the following section.  
Analysis of Theological Change within the NU 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s moral authority leadership. The highly 
decentralized structure of the NU means that individual NU ulama has a high 
amount of personal autonomy within the organization. He could run his own 
Islamic school (pesantren) like a mini-kingdom, with little or no accountability to 
the senior NU leadership above him (Kadir, 1999, p. 95). As a result, rank-and-
file NU ulama had a wide discretion to either comply or ignore the decisions 
made the NU leadership board (Kadir, 1999, p. 99). In order to overcome the 
ulama’s autonomy and their resistance against the NU leadership board, they 
needed to be persuaded by a moral authority leader with a combination of deep 
knowledge of Islamic theology, charismatic attributes, and genealogical linkages 
with the families of the leading ulama who first founded the organization. If this 
leader, through a combination of persuasive and coercive powers, succeeds in 
convincing other members of the NU about the necessity for the organization to 
adopt new theological ideas and political identities, supporters are more likely to 
follow and implement the reform ideas promoted by this leader.  
Since Abdurrahman Wahid has both the theological expertise as well as 
perceived charismatic attributes and familial link with the family of NU’s 
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founding father, he was judged by other ulama within the NU as a moral authority 
leader for their organization. This could be seen from the deep reverence of senior 
NU ulama who were much older than Wahid, such as As’ad Syamsul Arifin, 
Achmad Siddiq, and Ali Mahshum, to Wahid, in which they cited their support 
for his leadership within the NU due to the fact that Wahid was the grandson of 
their former teacher imam Hasjim Asj’ari (Kadir, 1999, pp. 96-97).45  The support 
of these senior NU ulama was crucial in Wahid’s success to be chosen as the 
chairman of the NU in 1984 and was instrumental in his efforts to promote the 
reform causes he advocated within the NU (Kadir, 1999, p. 98; van Bruinessen, 
1994, pp. 130-131).
46
   
In this section, I argue that Wahid’s moral authority and charismatic 
attributes helped to change the theological frame of the organization from a 
previously conservative Islamic theological frame. They helped to socially 
reconstruct the frame of the organization through the institutionalization of the 
progressive theological ideas he had advocated within the NU community. On an 
instrumental level, it helped to solidify the support of other NU ulama and 
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 The late Kyai As’ad Syamsul Arifin even stated in an interview that despite his 
personal opposition to many of the reforms that Wahid had proposed within the 
NU, he refused to publicly admonished and criticized Wahid, because he knew 
that “Wahid was the grandson of his teacher, Kyai Hasyim Asj’ari. Thus, he had 
to defer to Wahid as he would defer out of respect to his teacher” (Kadir, 1999, p. 
96). Arifin deferred to Wahid this despite the strong popular following he used to 
have among his followers, which made him as a likely contender against Wahid in 
NU national congress during the 1980s.  
46
 See p. 126, fn. 52, of this study for an example of Siddiq’s actions which helped 
Wahid to win his first election as NU’s general chairman in 1984.  
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grassroots followers for the reforms he had advocated, and created significant 
disincentives for reform opponents to publicly air their opposition against the 
reform. On an ideational level, it inspired the actions of a new generation of NU 
activists whom lent their support to these ideas and helped to construct a new 
theological and political identity within the NU that are conducive toward 
democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance. They propagated these ideas 
further through their own writings and through the founding of new non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that help to these ideas both within the NU 
community and within the Indonesian community as well.  
Wahid’s moral authority status among the NU community helped to 
solidify the support of other senior NU ulama. Many of these ulama were linked 
intellectually with his family since they were either former students of his 
grandfather Hasjim As’jari or close associates of his father Wahid Hasjim. The 
most important support Wahid’s received from senior NU ulama were from 
Ahmad Siddiq and Ali Ma’shum. During the 1980s, when Wahid and his 
supporters began their campaign to reform the NU, the two ulama served as the 
chief spiritual leader (rais aam) of the organization. Thus, they were considered 
as the most senior ulama within the NU community.
47
 Both of them were students 
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 The spiritual leader (rais aam) position within the NU is traditionally given to 
the most senior ulama within the NU. In the past, the position was the most 
powerful position within the organization, especially during the tenure of the first 
rais aam, Hasjim Asj’ari (1871-1947) and his successor Wahab Chasbullah 
(1883-1972). However, today the position is mostly symbolic, given to the senior 
NU ulama whom had served the NU community for so many decades.  
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of Imam Asj’ari and Siddiq served as Wahid Hasjim’s personal secretary during 
the early 1950s. Both also served as Wahid’s teachers and mentors during the 
time of his pesantren education during the late 1950s and early 1960s (Kadir, 
1999, pp. 97 & 197; van Bruinessen, 1994, pp. 130-131).  It was Siddiq who 
managed to convince the other NU ulama to accept Wahid as the new NU 
chairman and to endorse his idea to declare the compatibility between Islam and 
state ideology Pancasila (Ramage, 1996, p. 246).  
The two ulama lent their support for Wahid by invoking his theological 
expertise that combines classical Islamic thought and Western social theory. They 
also invoked his family lineage and argued that these attributes serve as the 
primary justification for other NU members to accept Wahid’s leadership over the 
NU (Kadir, 1999, p. 197). This was combined with their own well-reputed status 
within the NU community as senior ulama with strong influence among other NU 
ulama (van Bruinessen, 1994, pp. 109-110).  In promoting Wahid’s reforms 
among other ulama, they frequently made references to Wahid’s family genealogy 
by invoking the memories of Wahid’s grandfather and father.48 Their support 
enabled Wahid to protect himself from the criticisms of other NU ulama whom 
had opposed Wahid and his reform ideas, such as As’ad Syamsul Arifin, Idham 
Chalid, and Yusuf Hasjim (Bush, 2009, pp. 82-83).  In addition to the support of 
senior ulama such as Siddiq and Ma’shum, Wahid also received support from 
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 At one point, Siddiq made a statement that he was “visited” by Wahid’s father, 
the late Wahid Hasjim, in his dream, in which the latter urged the NU ulama to 
support his son’s candidacy as the new NU chairman (Kadir, 1999, p. 197, fn. 96). 
114 
junior reform-minded ulama such as Sahal Mahfudz (b. 1937) and Mustofa Bisri 
(b. 1944), both of whom have authored books that further promoted the discourses 
of the theological reform advocated by Wahid to the NU community (Van 
Bruinessen, 1994, pp. 118-119).
49
  
The support from these influential ulama helped the acceptance of Wahid 
and his ideas within the NU community. The discourses of these ulama and their 
influence within the NU were also crucial to convince many grassroots NU 
members to support his reforms, as they consistently invoked Wahid’s theological 
expertise and family genealogy as their justification to support his reform efforts. 
Initially, many NU ulama had serious reservations and objections regarding 
Wahid’s theological reforms, since it was a major reconstruction of NU’s 
traditionalist frames and offered different theological visions relative to those that 
had long been accepted by these ulama (Barton, 2002, p. 159; Bush, 2009, p. 82). 
However, as more senior ulama within the NU lent support to Wahid’s 
theological reforms in their own discourses and narratives, reform supporters 
gained significant support from these ulama. Accordingly, it became increasingly 
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 For instance, Sahal Mahfudz authored a book entitled “Principles of Social 
Fiqh” (Nuansa Fikih Sosial), in which he argues that the interpretation of fiqh 
must change from a literalist approach that either allow or prohibit a given course 
of action into a dynamic interpretation that takes into account contemporary 
socio-cultural contexts surrounding that action (Mahfudz, 1994, pp. 19-22, cited 
in Effendi, 2010, pp. 164-166).  Mahfudz was elected as NU’s spiritual leader 
(rais aam) in 1999 and still holds the position today. Mustofa Bisri was a frequent 
participant of halaqah discussion groups that were sponsored under Wahid’s 
patronage and have made arguments calling for the ulama to consult lay experts 
such as scientists, doctors, and economists before issuing religious edicts (fatwa) 
that addressed complex issues facing the modern society (Van Bruinessen, 1994, 
p. 194).  
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difficult for reform opponents to offer alternative discourses to challenge the 
reforms within the NU, as doing so became commonly interpreted by other NU 
ulama as a challenge not only against Wahid’s moral authority within the NU, but 
also against his family lineage as the grandson of NU’s founding ulama.50  
In addition through the support of senior NU ulama, Wahid also enhanced 
his moral authority status through his strong communication skills, which 
managed to win over the support of grassroots NU members. This was exercised 
during his frequent travels to visit NU pesantren schools throughout Indonesia. In 
these visits, he regularly held extensive conversations about the reforms with the 
local ulama who led these schools. During these conversations, Wahid usually 
presented his reforms as a continuation of the long-standing tradition within the 
NU in order to maintain the organization’s relevance among contemporary 
Indonesian Muslims. At the same time, he also listened to their concerns, 
grievances, and criticisms against the reforms. Wahid’s frequent visits, meetings, 
and consultations with these ulama were credited as important factors that enabled 
him to win the support of these ulama over his reforms (Barton, 2002, p. 171).  He 
even impressed many of the ulama who opposed his reforms during these visits. 
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 During the 1989 NU congress, reform opponents were widely anticipated to 
nominate a candidate to challenge Wahid as he sought re-election to his NU 
chairmanship. The candidate was Yusuf Hasjim (1929-2006), another senior NU 
ulama who was also Wahid’s uncle. Thus, Hasjim arguably had similar moral 
authority and genealogical claims vis-à-vis Wahid, as the last surviving son of 
NU’s founder imam Asj’ari. However, despite having these claims, Hasjim was 
not able to find enough support among NU members for his candidacy, as Wahid 
managed to retain popular support from the majority of NU ulama and activists 
who attended the congress, primarily from younger NU members (Barton, 2002, 
p. 176, Bush, 2009, pp. 82-83).  
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Even when they remained opposed to his ideas, they were impressed by Wahid’s 
willingness to frequently visit local pesantren schools and held conversations with 
the ulama who ran them.
51
  
During the visit to these pesantrens, Wahid frequently did not just meet 
with these ulama. In addition, he also met with their students and followers as 
well. In these meetings, Wahid made speeches to strengthe his moral authority 
status among these followers and to build publuc supports for his reforms. 
Because they were so impressed by Wahid’s knowledge and charismatic attributes 
expressed in his speeches, many NU followers considered him as a living saint 
(wali). They frequently attended gatherings where Wahid and the local ulama held 
their meetings in large numbers in order to seek his personal blessing (barokah).
52
 
Most importantly, because these followers considered Wahid as a charismatic 
leader with ideas that was often perceived to be innovative and unorthodox, his 
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  For instance, a Central Javanese ulama named Kyai Muntaha stated that while 
he disagreed with Wahid’s liberal reformist ideas, he maintained a deep respect 
for Wahid and considered him as a leader who serves as the NU’s “bridge to a 
brighter future” (Ramage, 1995, p. 50).  Many local ulama also expressed their 
admiration of Wahid for enhancing the national and international reputation of the 
NU and for changing the reputation of the organization as a “conservative and 
traditional organization with no interest in the temporal realm” (Kadir, 1999, p. 
229, fn. 29).  
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 An example of the strong enthusiasm of local NU followers to see Wahid was 
recorded in Suzanna Abdul Kadir’s field notes while she followed Wahid’s visits 
to the East Java towns of Jombang and Pasuruan in August 1996. She writes:  
“…each time Wahid steps out of [his] car, hundreds of NU members, young and 
old, rush forward to seek [his blessing] by kissing his hand or just touching him.... 
Thousands of NU masses wait patiently in the scorching heat in Pasuruan to hear 
Wahid speak or even just to see him” (Kadir, 1999, p. 229, fn. 28).  
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visits helped to solidify the support for the reform ideas he has promoted within 
his supporters.  
Using a mixture of Indonesian and Javanese languages,
53
 Wahid was able 
to convince these lay followers to support his reforms through the simple 
languages that they would have understood, as illustrated in these quotes: 
One of the special talents Wahid possessed was his ability to [articulate his 
ideas] using story-telling narratives that [most poor and uneducated folks] 
would have simply understood. This was an ability that few other 
Indonesian leaders have had.  This ability worked in Wahid’s favor 
because he was able to portray himself [and his ideas] not just as an elitist 
leader, but as a leader who understood the concerns of the common folks. 
This story-telling ability could generate [the popular support] for his 
cultural reforms….Wahid’s ability to utilize this “cultural resources,” such 
as folk traditions or stories, [as mechanisms to promote his ideas] was the 
key that enabled him to achieve social transformation within the 
traditionalist [NU] community (Gusdur.net, 07/18/2011).  
Wahid has a unique ability to [communicate], among the intellectual and 
government elites of Jakarta, New York, and Tokyo, and….among 
Indonesia’s ordinary persons (‘orang awam’) and low-income grassroots 
Muslims (‘orang Muslim kaki lima’) (Ramage 1995, p. 51).  
Wahid’s ability to promote the reform ideas, discourses, and implications 
by utilizing a simple language that rank-and-file NU members could easily 
understood has helped to enhance his moral authority status among them. Due to 
Wahid’s popularity among the rank-and-file NU members, over time it became 
more difficult for the other NU ulama to publicly oppose the reforms he promoted 
and propagated.  
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 The use of Javanese language was still common among Indonesians who live in 
rural communities in Java island, a population that is still relatively poor, 
uneducated, and illiterate, thus have few fluent speakers of the Indonesian 
language. Typical NU rank-and-file members tend to be poor farmers or small-
town traders who lived in these rural Javanese villages.  
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Most crucially for the reformers, Wahid’s ideas and moral authority status 
attracted the support of a new generation of NU activists who came of age during 
the 1980s and 1990s. They admired him because of his advocacy of progressive 
values such as democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance/pluralism at a 
time when the ruling Suharto regime actively tried to repress the propagation of 
these ideas within the Indonesian society. They admired Wahid’s willingness to 
proceed with the propagation of these ideas despite facing numerous threats and 
reprisals from the regime during the 1990s (Barton, 2002, p. 158).  
These young activists were disenchanted with the views of conservative 
NU ulama who used to run the organization before Wahid took charge in 1984. 
These older ulama promoted a strict and literalist interpretation of classical 
Islamic texts that held little relevance to the rapidly changing Indonesian society 
during the 1980s and 1990s. They supported Wahid’s efforts to construct a new 
interpretation of classical Islamic texts and to reconstruct them in order to better 
reflect the historical and sociopolitical contexts of modern Indonesian society, 
especially to the need to promote greater democracy and human rights within the 
Indonesian society. Lastly, they wanted the NU ulama to directly discuss 
contemporary sociopolitical issues in their teachings and preachings, rather than 
avoiding these issues for fear of potential reprisals from the Suharto regime (Van 
Bruinessen, 1994, pp.198-199). Wahid’s reform ideas, and his willingness to 
openly question and criticize the regime during the early and mid-1990s, helped 
to increase the support of his ideas from young NU activists. This was why many 
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young NU activists became interested in Wahid’s ideas and were inspired by 
them. Some of the commentaries from these young activits are presented below: 
In my opinion, Wahid acted as a “window” to the outside world for the 
NU community….His greatest accomplishment rests on how he inspired 
so many young [NU] pesantren students. It was through his actions they 
learned how to think and write critically, using their own words and ideas 
(Islamlib.com, 03/10/2006).  
Wahid’s intellectual contributions to the development of a civil society 
discourse [within the NU], in concert with his more overt political 
maneuvers, have led many observers to conclude that from the start he 
intended [his reform ideas] to be an oppositional force [against the Suharto 
regime] (Bush 2009, p. 91).  
There was a mutually constituting relationship between Wahid and young 
NU activists whom supported his reforms. As Wahid continued to promote his 
reform ideas within the NU, he relied on the support of young activists these as 
his primary supporters for the NU chairmanship in 1989 and 1994. Young 
activists’ overwhelming support for Wahid has been credited with helping him 
win re-election in both terms (Kadir, 1999, p. 226-228, Van Bruinessen, 1994, p. 
169). In return, Wahid served as the primary defender of these young activists 
against attacks and criticisms from conservative ulama within the NU as well as 
from the Suharto regime apparatus who often intervened and intimidated the 
works of these activists (Barton, 2002, p. 158).
54
 A young NU ulama described 
Wahid’s role to protect the young activists in these words: 
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 Examples of Wahid’s defense of “second-generation” NU activists was his 
support for the efforts of P3M activists to host critical readings and discussions of 
classical Islamic texts that came under strong criticisms from older, more 
conservative ulama, as well as his support for NU activists who protested against 
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Wahid served as a window [of ideas] and a protector for young NU 
activists [who are inspired by his ideas]. When these young folks were 
criticized by other NU ulama, he talked to them and explained their 
actions using the narratives commonly used by the ulama. He also 
protected them using other means as well (Islamlib.com, 03/10/2006).  
In time, through the works of the NGOs that they have established, the 
activists were able to promote and institutionalize Wahid’s reforms within the 
NU. Thus, the alliance between Wahid and the young NU activists had produced 
mutual benefits for both parties. Nevertheless, Wahid’s relationship with the 
young activists was more an ideational level with them rather than institutional. 
He engaged in regular meetings and discussions with these activists and through 
his ideas, activities, and moral authority status within the NU he helped to inspire 
their thoughts. However, for the most part he did not directly guide their actions 
and did not give any specific directives on how they could reconstruct the 
theological framework of the NU and institutionalize his ideas both within the NU 
community as well as within the Indonesian society (Barton, 2002, p. 160). In the 
words of a young activist: 
Wahid has never been interested to develop a core group of followers or 
cadres. He never considered himself as the absolute leader [of an Islamic 
social movement]. What he was interested in developing was enlightened 
ideas, which inspired his close associates so that they became motivated to 
follow and continue his struggles (Gusdur.net, 07/18/2011).  
The motivation of the young activists to promote and implement Wahid’s 
ideas was clearly seen in the establishment of numerous NGOs that were founded 
both within and outside of the NU community during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the construction of the Kedung Ombo Dam that had displaced villagers living in 
Central Java in  the late 1980s (Barton, 2002, pp. 158-159 & 165-166).  
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goal of these NGOs was to promote and socialize Wahid’s ideas and put them into 
action both within the NU as well as within the Indonesian society as a whole. 
However, these NGOs were not directly founded by Wahid or by the NU 
leadership board. Instead, they were founded by the NU activists who were 
inspired by his ideas on democracy, human rights, and religious pluralism and 
wanted to promote them further within the NU community (Barton, 2002, p. 161; 
Bush, 2009, p. 94).
55
 This shows how Wahid’s status as a leader and moral 
authority figure within the NU inspired a new generation of young NU activists 
who were influenced by his ideas and in their own way were assisting him to 
promote and implement them within the NU.  
Over the long run, the NGOs established by these activists served as a 
venue to recruit a new generation of pro-reform leaders who share Wahid’s 
commitment to fully transform the NU to become a progressive-leaning Islamic 
organization through their own innovative theological ideas. Prominent members 
of the “next generation” NU reformers include Masdar Masudi (b. 1954), former 
director of P3M whom have articulated his own theological interpretation of the 
compatibility between the Islamic system of religious alms and tithes (zakat) with 
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 NGOs founded by these activists to further promote his ideas within the NU 
community include the Association for the Development of Pesantren and Society 
(Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat - P3M), the Institute 
for the Study and Development of Human Resouces (Lembaga Kajian dan 
Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia – Lakpesdam) and the Institute for the 
Study of Islam and Society (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Social – LKiS) (Bush, 
2009, pp. 87-88). 
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modern income tax system (Barton, 2002, p. 161),  Ulil Abshar-Abdalla (b. 1967), 
who helped founded the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal – JIL) in 
2001, an NGO that promoted a liberal interpretation of Islam “which is 
compatible with democracy, human rights, neoliberal economics, secularism, and 
religious freedom” (Bush, 2009, pp. 179-181),56 and Imam Aziz, founder and 
former director of LKiS, who was recently appointed as a member of NU central 
leadership board  (Bush, 2009, p. 88). In turn, the innovative thought and support 
from this new generation of NU leaders, as well as from tens of thousands of 
other NU activists, for Wahid reforms, has helped to further consolidate and 
institutionalize of the reform ideas he had promoted within the organization.  
By the 2000s, Wahid’s ideas were firmly institutionalized within the NU. 
The organization has actively promoted his concepts of democracy, human rights, 
and religious tolerance and pluralism through both words and deeds. We could 
see evidence of this institutionalization for instance, in 2002, when there was a 
new series of amendment introduced to the the 1945 Indonesian constitution, the 
Jakarta Charter amendment, which would have required the establishment of 
shari’a law in Indonesia was reintroduced by a small number of revivalist Muslim 
parties in the parliament. However, NU representatives in the Indonesian 
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 JIL was an Islamic movement founded by a group of second-generation 
traditionalist and modernist reformers in 2001. The group wishes to cross the 
theological divisions that have long divided their respective groups to promote a 
“liberal Islam” which is compatible with democracy, human rights, neoliberal 
economics, secularism, and religious freedom (Bush, 2009, pp. 179-181). For in-
depth accounts on the foundation of JIL, the theological and political ideas it has 
advocated, and reactions from revivalist Muslims against JIL, see for instance Ali 
(2005) and Harjanto (2003). 
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parliament rejected it outright, unlike their counterparts during the 1950s and 
1960s. The NU representatives worked together with representatives of 
Muhammadiyah, secular-nationalist, and Christian parties in the Indonesian 
parliament to defeat the Jakarta Chater amendment in a landslide margin (Howell, 
2005, p. 474).  
The NU also retains its commitment to promote religious freedom, 
tolerance, and pluralism. During his NU chairmanship, Wahid initiated frequent 
meetings and dialogues with the leaders of religious minority groups in Indonesia 
(e.g., Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism) as part of his agenda 
to promote religious tolerance and pluralism among the NU community. His 
successors as NU chairmen – Hasyim Muzadi (1999-2010), and Said Agiel Siradj 
(2010-present), continued this tradition and hosted regular meetings with their 
non-Muslim counterparts. The purpose of these meetings was to show the NU’s 
commitment to promote religious tolerance and pluralism, as well as to show its 
opposition against the agenda promoted by its revivalist counterparts that 
encouraged the formalization of shari’a law, Islamic fundamentalism, and 
religious violence/terrorism (Badri, 07/20/2011).  
Inter-religious dialogue was Hasyim Muzadi’s special concern during his 
NU chairmanship, in which he helped to found the International Conference of 
Islamic Scholars (ICIS), an international NGO with a mission “to promote Islam 
as blessing for universe (Islam rahmatan lil alamin) and “to promote world peace 
on the basis of universal values of Islam” (ICIS, 2011,”Background” ). The 
organization was also established as “the main capital of the NU to promote Islam 
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as rahmatan lil alamin more widely in both national and international levels” 
(ICIS, 2011, “Background”). Siradj, the current NU chairman, states that the NU 
will continue to promote religious dialogue with non-Muslim religions as part of 
its promotion of Islam as rahmatan lil alamin which is “tolerant, opposes 
religious exclusivism and separatism, and recognizes the religious plurality and 
diversity within the Indonesian society” (Cathnewsindonesia.com, 07/18/2011). 
He condemned recent attacks against minority Islamic sects at the hand of 
revivalist-leaning organizations, such as the Ahmadiyah and Shiite minority sects, 
and has pledged that his organization will continue to condemn violent acts 
against religious minorities (Wahid Institute, 03/22/2011, Tempo, 01/27/2012). 
He credits Wahid’s decision to initiate regular dialogues with religious minorities 
as contributing to develop good relations between the NU and non-Muslim 
religions in Indonesia (Cathnewsindonesia.com, 05/10/2010). The actions of the 
recent NU leadership shows how far the NU has progressed from an organization 
that in the past supported the implementation of shari’a law and did not have 
good relations with non-Muslim religious groups to become one that currently 
opposes the implementation of the shari’a and works hard to improve its relations 
with religious minorities in order to promote religious tolerance and pluralism.  
In sum, Wahid’s moral authority leadership has transformed the NU in 
significant ways. The following quote best captures the fundamental 
transformation of the NU under Wahid’s leadership with this observation: 
Before the 1980s, the NU was commonly perceived as a traditionalist 
Islamic organization which resisted reform and freedom of thought within 
its ranks, and was very negative in its views of modernity.  It was 
stereotyped as a backward, conservative, and anti-progress organization.  
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However, NU’s reputation improved significantly since the mid-1980s, 
after Abdurrahman Wahid begun to lead this organization….He has 
successfully changed the NU from an organization that was 
“conservative” and “backward-thinking” into one that promotes dynamic 
and progressive [Islamic] thought today….In the process, Wahid became a 
symbol for democracy, human rights, freedom of thought, and religious 
pluralism. He has transformed NU’s image to become a modern [Islamic] 
movement that is religiously pluralist, tolerant, and embraces progress and 
modernity (Assyaukanie, 01/11/2010).  
Without an innovative, theologically ecletic, politically savvy, and 
charismatic moral authority leader such as Wahid at the helm of the NU, it would 
have been difficult to foresee the organization’s transformation within a short 
period of time (less than three decades). While there were pro-reform activists 
within the NU who had started to propose progressive Islamic ideas within the 
organization as early as the early 1970s (e.g., the late Subchan, Z.E), they were 
not successful in promoting these ideas because they lacked the theological 
expertise, charismatic attributes, and family genealogy with the founding fathers 
of the NU. Only someone with an ulama background who is proficient in both 
Islamic and Western political thought, has perceived charismatic attributes, and is 
a direct descendant of NU’s founding father, could be successful in the daunting 
task of reframing and reconstituting the theological frames and political identities, 
and preferences of a traditionalist-leaning Islamic organization such as the NU.  
While there are instrumentalist reasons to promote these reforms within the NU as 
well, it is difficult to explain NU’s theological transformation over the past three 
decades without also taking into account the role of progressive theological ideas, 
how they were articulated by a leader with moral authority characteristics, and 
how the leader then inspires thousands of young activists to work together to 
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implement these ideas within the organization. This is why social constructivism, 
which emphasizes the role of ideas and how they help to promote sociopolitical 
change within an organization through the combination of conducive institutional 
structure and innovative and entrepreneurial human agents, could better explain 
the NU transformation than the culturalists, who deny the possibility of 
ideological change and innovation within the NU and could complement the 
instrumentalist explanations about the reform offered by rational choice theories.  
Tolerant institutional culture within the NU. While Wahid’s exercise of 
moral authority leadership and his charismatic attributes were very crucial to 
explain the transformation of the organization over the past three decades, his 
success was also greatly assisted by the institutional culture of the NU which 
acted as an incubator for new and sometimes unorthodox theological ideas to 
grow within the organization.
57
 This tolerant institutional culture helped Wahid 
and his followers to promote and institutionalize his theological ideas within the 
organization and prevented the emergence of a strong counter-reformist 
movement from within the NU that would have stopped the reform before it has 
taken roots within the organization.   
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 The “institutional culture” discusses in this section complements the theoretical 
explanation of rational choice institutionalists. My analysis accepts the rationalist 
argument that changing historical and sociopolitical contexts would change the 
calculations of different factions within a religious group – in this case the NU – 
so that a proposed reform might either be more or less costly to be implemented 
by the group (e.g., Gill, 2008, Warner, 2000). I believe my approach could enrich 
this argument further by clarifying the process in which a relatively coherent 
constantly changing institutional culture of a religious group could help or hinder 
theological reforms within a particular religious organization.  
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Among the NU ulama, it was a widely accepted belief that they should 
actively propagate Islam within their respective communities while at the same 
time respect the pre-existing local religious customs and traditions that pre-dated 
the arrival of Islam in Indonesia, including those originated from Hinduism and 
Buddhism. In addition, many NU ulama and their followers practiced rituals 
commonly associated with Islamic mysticism (Sufism) that historically tolerates 
doctrines and rituals originated from Hindu and Buddhist traditions, even 
syncretic animistic religions (Pringle, 2010, pp. 33-34).
58
 As a result of this Sufi 
influence, NU ulama usually do not seek to eliminate these local customs and 
traditions, but instead sought to incorporate them within the rituals of their 
organization. They justify this practice by stating that the NU should “conserve 
the old traditions that are good, while adapting to the new ones that are better” 
(al-muhafadzoh alal qodimisshalih wal akhdzu bil jadid al-ashlah) (Badri, 
07/20/2011). According to the late Achmad Siddiq, former NU’s spiritual leader 
(rais aam) and a Wahid supporter, the NU’s theology of “the middle path” 
(tawassuth) means that NU members should “avoid fanaticism” and promotes 
“the balanced use of reason and tradition based on revelation” (Kadir, 1999, p. 
93). Thus, in accordance to the tawassuth principle, NU members must “tolerate 
                                                             
58
 Examples include the practice of prayers/visitations to the graves of deceased 
loved ones (ziarah kubur), visitation to the graves of notable NU ulama (wali - 
saints), and communal prayers to celebrate the lives of deceased relatives (haul). 
Many of the rituals and traditions practiced by the NU, including the hereditary 
succession of ulama who ran pesantren schools by their first-born sons, and the 
reverence/devotions toward notable NU ulama whom have deceased, could be 
traced to the practices within Sufism as well (Pringle, 2010, p. 34).  
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other religions and cultures as long as they do not explicitly reject the basic 
teachings of Islam” (Kadir, 1999, p. 93).  The tawassuth principle becomes the 
basis for the NU reformers to develop a culture of tolerance and syncretism within 
the organization.  
Reformers within the NU used the culture of tolerance within the 
organization as a justification for the organization to adopt the theological reforms 
they are advocating. They argued that new ideas such as democracy and religious 
tolerance would not threaten the long-standing traditions of NU community, 
because the organization had long-standing tradition of adopting and 
institutionalizing other customs and traditions. Thus, they argue that the NU has 
an institutional culture which adapts to new theological ideas and rituals by 
reinterpreting and reconstructing the existing ones in order to meet contemporary 
sociopolitical challenges (Qomar, 2002, p. 99).  
For instance, Wahid frequently asserted that the idea of democracy had 
existed within the Islamic tradition since the formation of the first Islamic 
community in Medina. This in his view justifies “an inclusive form of political 
Islam which focuses on the Islamic substantive values such as justice, equality, 
freedom, and democracy (shura)” (Wahid, 2011). Wahid believes that democracy 
is well ingrained within the NU’s practices and rituals and should not be 
considered as an alien idea imported from the West. He also argues that “the 
concept of religious tolerance is not an alien concept for the NU because the 
organization was founded on the principles of tasamuth (tolerance), tawassuth 
(moderation), and tawazun (seeking a balance) with other religious customs and 
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traditions” (Badri, 07/20/2010). These are the principles that the organization 
always followed when it institutionalized new customs and traditions. Thus, they 
should be the ones that it should follow when it faced with new theological ideas 
that are promoted by Wahid and the other reformers.  
Using these assertions, Wahid and his supporters argue that because the 
institutional culture of the NU had historically tolerated the presence of non-
Islamic customs and traditions and successfully incorporated them within the 
organization, it should not be a problem for the organization to accept new ideas 
derived from Western sociopolitical theory such as democracy, human rights, and 
religious tolerance/pluralism. In addition, the adoption of these ideas also 
facilitated a pro-reformist political identity during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
as the NU faced challenges from the Suharto regime. By reconstructing the NU 
from its conservative Islamist image prior to the 1980s and reframing it as an 
advocate of democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance, the organization 
made significant gains in public popularity, because it was perceived as the 
champion of these ideas. In contrast, the Suharto regime often paid lip services to 
these ideas. However, in practice it suppressed any expression of opposition 
against its rule, violated the human rights of its own citizens, and imposed “divide 
and conquer” policies to make different religious groups in Indonesia in constant 
conflict with each other, so that they would not be able to form a lasting alliance 
against the regime. 
Because the reformers were making these arguments, they were able to 
find significant support both within the ulama as well as the rank-and-file NU 
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members. The tolerant institutional culture of the NU is one that is shared among 
its members, regardless whether one supports or opposes the proposals 
propagated by the reformers. Within the NU there were few proponents of the 
strict and literalist interpretation of Islam that were commonly associated with 
fundamentalist Islamic groups. Reform supporters and opponents were clearly 
divided over issues such as how far and how fast the reform should have taken 
place, the appropriate balance between classical Islamic texts and contemporary 
socio-cultural contexts related to the reforms, and the appropriate role of the 
ulama under a new and reformed NU. Nevertheless, they generally have an 
agreement on the NU’s main theological premises and sources, which solidifies 
the organization’s institutional culture.   
In sum, the tolerant institutional culture of the NU has been very 
conducive to the successful efforts of Abdurrahman Wahid and his supporters to 
promote their theological reforms. By invoking NU’s Sufi roots and its history of 
toleration toward non-Islamic, even syncretic, religious ideas, Wahid and his 
supporters were able to convince most members of the organization to adopt the 
theological reforms they had advocated within their organization.  
NU’s relations with the Indonesian state. Rationalist scholars as well as 
others who emphasize the instrumental consequences of Wahid’s reforms were 
correct to point out that some NU members did support Wahid’s theological 
reforms for opportunistic reasons to seek accommodation and to seek patronage 
opportunities from the Suharto regime (Feillard 1994, p. 40-42, Kadir 1999, pp. 
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202-209, Leong, 2008, pp. 358-361).
59
 However, while these accounts help to 
explain the instrumental rationales as well as benefits to Wahid and his supporters 
within the NU, they only formed a partial explanation of the complex reality of 
this alliance. In order to fully explain the rationales and implications of the NU 
alliance with the Suharto regime, we would need to analyze the normative 
rationales behind this alliance. It is to safeguard the reforms from potential state 
intervention that could have strangulated it before it was able to take roots within 
the NU.  In this section, I present evidence showing Wahid and the other 
reformers did not form the alliance to collaborate with or to legitimize the Suharto 
regime. Instead, I argue that the alliance was conducted to create an opportunity 
for the reformers to successfully implement their reforms within the NU.  
When Wahid and the reformers first took over the NU in 1984 and 
introduced the reforms soon afterwards, they also created a positive by-product 
for the organization in the form of a temporary truce between the NU and the 
Suharto regime, which lasted until the late 1980s. Through this alliance, the 
reformers were able to promote and implement their reforms within the NU while 
facing little intervention from the Suharto regime. By the time this truce ended 
around 1990, Wahid and his supporters were firmly in control of the NU. It 
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 The most significant example of an NU leader who made this move was Slamet 
Effendy Yusuf, a major leader of the young reformers who was promoted as the 
head of the Jakarta branch of Golkar’s youth wing immediately after Wahids 
reforms were adopted by NU (Bush, 2009, p. 81). Wahid and other reform 
activists recognized that one of the biggest obstacle facing their reform efforts 
came from NU ulama who preferred to maintain long-standing “patron-client” 
relations with national and local government officials rather than defending their 
constituencies from potential government reprisals (Kadir, 1999, p. 252).  
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became impossible for the regime to remove Wahid and his associates from the 
NU leadership board, because doing so would have incurred a significant cost to 
the regime, by risking the wrath of millions of NU followers whom had became 
strong supporters of Wahid and his reforms during this period. As a result, the 
regime allowed the reform to take hold within the NU with few direct 
interventions from within the organization.  
The NU and the Suharto regime had been at loggerheads with each other 
for over a decade by the time Abdurrahman Wahid took over the NU and begun 
to institute his reforms in 1984. The rise of Wahid to the top of NU’s leadership 
created a positive externality for the regime, because it temporarily removed the 
NU as a major opposition force against the regime. Since Wahid’s advocacy of 
progressive theological ideas also included an opposition against a shari’a-based 
Islamic state and the acceptance of the secular nationalist ideology Pancasila, 
which the regime sought to promote during the 1980s, Wahid’s arrival at the helm 
of the NU was perceived as a development that would have benefited the regime 
significantly and ensured its ability to hold on to power in Indonesia.  
The regime granted several benefits for the NU and its members. These 
included increased subsidies to the NU pesantren schools and other forms of 
patronage for NU ulama and activists who were willing to support the regime and 
become members of its political arm, the Golkar Party. Rational choice scholars 
were correct to point out that some NU ulama and activists did take the financial 
incentives from the regime for their own personal benefits. However, I argue that 
the most significant benefit the regime offered to Wahid and his supporters was 
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not material in nature. Instead, it was in the form of guarantees from the regime 
not to intervene in the institutional affairs of the NU and assurances that it would 
not arrest Wahid and other key reform activists for advocating the reforms they 
were instituting within the organization. This ‘temporary truce’ enabled Wahid 
and his supporters to consolidate their power within the NU and implement their 
reforms without facing any significant intervention from the Suharto regime and 
its institutions, such as the Indonesian military.  
During the late 1980s, Wahid developed a close relationship with Suharto 
and his then army Chief-of-Staff, General L.B. Moerdani. By cultivating these 
relationships, he received assurances from the two that the regime would not 
intervene against the reforms that he and his supporters were implementing within 
the NU. Both men were even willing to tolerate some criticisms from Wahid, 
provided that they were done within certain limitations (Barton, 2002, p. 154). 
Wahid used this ‘limited tolerance’ to criticize some of the regime’s policies 
during the late 1980s. For instance, its decision to build the Kedung Ombo dam in 
Central Java, which displaced tens of thousands rural villagers, many of whom 
were NU followers (Barton, 2002, pp. 158-159). However, Wahid was also very 
careful not to overstep his boundaries and at least publicly, affirmed his desire to 
continue “inter-dependent relations” with the Suharto regime that would not be 
based on active opposition against the Indonesian state (Kadir, 1999, p. 260).  
On the other hand, Suharto was willing to tolerate Wahid’s reforms and 
his criticisms against the regime because he was aware that Wahid was a Muslim 
leader with moderate to progressive political outlook, committed to a secular 
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nationalist Indonesian state based on the Pancasila ideology, which was heavily 
advocated by the regime during this period. The regime viewed Wahid as a much 
better Islamic leader compared to conservative/revivalist Islamic leaders who 
sought to replace the secularist military-backed regime with an Islamic state 
(Barton, 2002, p.158).  
However, the regime did not anticipate that once Wahid and his supporters 
had firmly instituted their reforms within the NU, they would their reform efforts 
beyond the NU and extended it toward the Indonesian society as a whole. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, Wahid and his supporters within the NU began to 
seek what it called as “autonomy vis-à-vis the state” (Bush, 2009, p. 90) and 
began to openly called for the regime to adopt the ideas advocated by the 
reformed NU theology: democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance (Hikam, 
1998, p. 13, cited in Bush, 2009, p. 91). They also criticized Suharto’s decision in 
1990 to abandon the secular nationalist positions he undertook from the 1970s to 
the mid-1980s and to seek close alliances with conservative and revivalist Islamic 
groups. Wahid criticized this policy change by arguing that it promoted the 
Islamization (Islamisasi) of the Indonesian society and would have threatened the 
political and citizenship rights of non-Muslim minorities in Indonesia (Bush, 
2009, pp. 92-94). By the early 1990s, the truce between the NU and the Suharto 
regime was over and the two entities renewed their oppositional discourses that 
were temporarily ended during the time of their truce during the late-1980s.  
By granting a reprieve for Wahid and his supporters which enabled them 
to enact their reforms without facing any intervention and persecution from the 
135 
regime, the regime indirectly empowered an opposition force that was later 
credited for helping to bring about the regime’s decline and destruction during the 
mid to late-1990s. By the time the regime realized what it had actually done, 
Wahid and his reforms were firmly entrenched within the NU and the regime 
could not simply attempt to remove them without risking the ire of the millions of 
NU members. By the early 1990s most NU ulama and activists had accepted 
Wahid as their leader and accepted his reform agenda as well. In the words of 
Wahid’s biographer Greg Barton: 
With perhaps as many as 35 million members, NU…..possessed the most 
extensive social network outside of the Indonesian state and military. 
Suharto knew that the organization’s sheer size could make it, if 
sufficiently antagonized, impossible to control, even with his considerable 
resources. Consequently, heavy-handed intervention into NU affairs by the 
regime….was risky (Barton, 2002, p. 151).  
With one notable exception,
60
 the Suharto regime did not make much of 
an effort to oust Wahid from his chairmanship position during the 1990s, although 
it did try to weaken the NU using coercive tactics against its rank-and-file 
members and against some of the junior activists who worked under Wahid’s 
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 In 1994, Suharto supported the campaign of Abu Hasan, an NU businessman 
with no ulama background, to replace Wahid as the general chairman of the NU. 
Hasan received substantial financial and logistical support from Suharto and key 
officials within the powerful Indonesian military (Hefner, 2000, pp. 172-173). In 
the end, however, Wahid was able to beat Hasan’s challenge, holding a narrow 
lead of 174 delegate votes over Hasan’s 142 votes (Barton, 2002, p. 205). It 
turned out that Wahid received crucial last-minute support from senior NU ulama, 
who initially backed Hasan’s bid to replace him. They later switched their support 
back to Wahid because they saw the regime’s unprecedented effort to oust Wahid 
as an inappropriate interference in NU’s affairs (Hefner, 2000, p. 173).  
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patronage to promote his theological ideas within the Indonesian society.
61
 
However, knowing how influential Wahid and his reform ideas had become 
during this period, it didn’t make much effort to stop Wahid from promoting his 
theological ideas both to the NU community and to the general public. This has 
significantly helped the successful institutionalization of these ideas within the 
NU and transformed it to become the progressive Islamic organization it is known 
for today.  
Alternative Explanations on the Theological Reforms within the NU 
The two alternative explanations that challenges the moral authority 
leadership theory are political culture (culturalist) approach and rational choice 
(rationalist) theory. The culturalist/modernization theory denies the ability of 
Islamic groups to change from a conservative, fundamentalist interpretation of 
Islam into one that is more progressive and more compatible with modernity. It 
tends to portray all Islamic groups, past and present, as social movements that 
have developed inherently hostile attitudes toward Western-based sociopolitical 
ideas and always reject them in favor of fundamental theological ideas developed 
from Islamic scriptures such as the Qur’an and the Hadith. It also portrays Islamic 
groups and leaders who promote progressive-oriented ideas as insincere in their 
theological beliefs. Alternatively, culturalists portray them as modernizers who 
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 One of the most sinister means initiated by the regime to weaken Wahid’s 
reform efforts was by staging a series of communal riots within the town of 
Situbondo (East Java), a major NU stronghold, in which Christian churches and 
stores owned by Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese minority were looted and destroyed. 
It then arrested and tortured several local NU activists, one of whom later died 
during the detention (Hefner, 2000, pp. 190-192).  
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wish to imitate the West but deny that they these groups/leaders are inspired from 
Islamic ideas.  
The second alternative explanation comes from scholars who follow 
rational choice theory. Rational choice theory is based on assumptions that are 
simple and parsimonious – that all human actors primarily based their political 
preferences on their instrumental and/or material interests. These preferences are 
modified based on the opportunities and constraints faced by these groups. Some 
rationalists (e.g., Shepsle, 1985) even went so far to argue that theological ideas 
only serve as a cover to hide instrumentalist (interest-seeking) or materialist 
preferences and goals of Islamic groups and their leaders. Others (e.g., Gill 2008, 
Kalyvas, 1996, Warner, 2000) have developed more nuanced explanations on 
how these preferences are formed, based on broader and more complex sets of 
assumptions that often incorporate theological ideas into their explanations. 
Nevertheless, often ideas at best only constitute a secondary explanation of these 
groups’ political preferences and actions, after those that are based on 
instrumentalist goals and preferences.  
Since a group of political scientists and other scholars of Indonesian 
politics have written in-depth case study analyses on the NU and its role in 
Indonesian politics for the past three decades,
62
 they have used one of these 
theoretical frameworks to explain the theological and political changes within the 
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 See for instance Bush (2009); Fealy (1998); Jung (2009); Kadir (1999); Leong 
(2008); Liddle (1996b); Ramage (1995); and van Bruinessen (1994).  
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NU. The theoretical arguments of each theories and how they differ from the 
moral authority leadership theory developed in this study are outlined below.  
Culturalist explanation of the NU reform. Works by culturalist and 
modernization theory-oriented scholars
63
 on the NU tend to recognize the 
ideational impact of the theological reforms within the NU and the role of reform 
leaders such as Abdurrahman Wahid in the propagation and institutionalization of 
reform ideas within the organization. However, culturalist explanation of the NU 
reform diverges from social constructivist theoretical explanation in several ways. 
First, culturalists tend to emphasize the role of modern Western sociopolitical 
philosophy of NU leaders such as Wahid as the major source of their reform 
ideas, while downplaying the role of Islam in influencing the formation of these 
ideas. For instance, in his portrayal of progressive-oriented Indonesian Islamic 
intellectuals such as Wahid, Liddle asserts that these intellectuals “did not 
necessarily know about Islam – they were Western school-educated and their 
skills were organizational and political rather than Islamic intellectual” (Liddle, 
1996a, p. 167). He further asserts that many of these intellectuals also have 
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 The label “culturalist” in this study largely refers to the study of culture in 
political science that was based on modernization theory, which tends to hold 
cultural and religious ideas to be largely fixed and constant,with little possibilities 
of change in the near or immediate future. I recognize that this view of culture is 
no longer prevalent both in political science as well as in other disciplines. 
Scholars working from cultural anthropology and post-modernist perspectives 
(e.g.,Wedeen 2002) has developed an alternative definition of culture as a socially 
constructed idea that is more nuanced and amendable to change and I fully agree 
with this definition. However, modernization theory remains an alternative 
theoretical explanation widely used in contemporary study of religion and politics 
(e.g., Kuru 2009), so I believe it is still worthy to include it as an alternative 
explanation of this study.  
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‘cultural’ resources from outside Indonesians – such as former teachers, education 
mentors, and friends who were based in Europe and North America (Liddle, 
1996a, p. 167). Thus, Liddle seems to argue that it is the modern ideas and 
sociopolitical skills gained by these intellectuals that play a role in the formation 
of their ideas rather than Islam.    
Second, while acknowledging that NU reformers such as Wahid do have 
Islamic credentials in addition to their modern sources of knowledge from the 
Western world, culturalists tend to argue that it is the modern ideas and 
viewpoints held by NU reformers such as Wahid and their ability to gain power 
and prominence within the NU that explains why he managed to institutionalize 
the reforms within the NU and develop an alliance with the Suharto regime after 
he took over the organization in 1984 (Liddle, 1996a, p. 167). Even though 
culturalist scholars recognize the Islamic identity of reformist intellectuals within 
the NU, they believe that it is their modern, Western education background and 
that helped to shape the development of their theological ideas to reform the NU. 
They tend to ignore the role of the Islamic political thought and legal 
jurisprudence that also serves as the intellectual sources for these reformers.  
Thus, while culturalists might be able to explain the role of modern 
sociopolitical ideas as a motivation for Wahid and his supporters to carry out their 
reforms within the NU, I argue that this explanation could not fully account for 
why this reform occurred. The reformers would not be successful in their reforms 
within the NU if they were to rely solely on the modern ideas they had brought 
from Western sociopolitical theory. This is because within an Islamic 
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organization, the primary source of theological ideas within the organization is 
Islamic theological and legal jurisprudence. A theological reform that relies 
primarily on modern ideas originated from the West would be quickly rejected as 
a heresy by the conservative ulama whom have traditionally run the NU. Instead, 
Wahid and his supporters had to show their reform was compatible with the 
classical Islamic legal tradition that was widely practiced by members of the NU 
community. They had to invoke the Islamic theology that connects the new 
theology and the classical Islamic jurisprudence. This process of theological 
reconstruction is often ignored by culturalists, who either assumes that Islamic 
and Western ideas are totally incompatible with one another or that Western ideas 
are replacing Islamic (traditionalist) ideas within these organizations.  
Unlike culturalists who tended to emphasize the role of these modern 
ideas to replace traditional Islamic ideas which are incompatible to modern 
Western sociopolitical values, the moral authority leadership theory used in this 
study argues that these ideas were reframed and reconstructed by Wahid and his 
supporters within the NU by emphasizing the compatibility between Islamic 
theological ideas, the tolerant institutional culture of the NU that has historically 
been open to new interpretation of these ideas, and Western sociopolitical values, 
by arguing that they are fully compatible with one another and together would 
form a new theological frame within the NU which supports democracy, religion-
state separation, and religious tolerance/pluralism. Unlike the culturalist’s fixed 
and static assumption of theology, moral authority leadersip theory assumes that 
the NU’s theological frame is subjected to constant reframing, reconstruction, and 
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reinterpretation, in order to take into account the changing sociopolitical contexts 
facing the NU and the Indonesian society.  
Rationalist explanation of NU’s theological reform. The rationalist 
account on the theological reform undertaken by the NU under Abdurrahman 
Wahid’s leadership tend to emphasize the role of instrumental and material 
interests as the two main motivators for the reform rather than ideational and 
theological commitment to promote liberal values. Rationalists offer a simple and 
parsimonious account of the reformers’ rationale: the NU was committed to do 
the reforms not necessarily because there was a need for ideational change among 
NU ulama and activists in order to incorporate changing sociopolitical contexts. 
Instead, the reforms were enacted and implemented so that the NU could develop 
an alliance with the Suharto regime. This alliance resulted in the increase of 
government subsidies for NU pesantren schools, as well as other forms of 
financial patronage for NU ulama and activists after the reforms were enacted in 
1984 (Leong, 2008, pp. 360-361). They enacted these reforms because it 
improved the organization’s access to material resources and because 
conservative ulama within the NU received a ‘side payment’ in the form of higher 
subsidies for their Islamic schools in exchange of them dropping their opposition 
against the reforms (Leong, 2008, p. 358).
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 Of the works on the NU reviewed in this section, only Leong took an explicitly 
rational choice theoretical approach in her comparative study of the NU and the 
Indonesian modernist groups (including the Muhammadiyah) (Leong 2008, pp. 
16-24). However, other works reviewed here (e.g., Bush, 2009, Feillard, 1994, 
Kadir, 1999) also largely explains the theological reforms within the NU to be 
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Rationalist scholars argue that the reforms were introduced as a response 
to the Suharto regime’s policy to suppress the political activities of the NU 
beginning in the 1970s, which cut off state subsidies to NU-affiliated pesantren 
schools. This policy left the NU ulama to have serious political and financial 
difficulties. In the 1970s, the Suharto government begun to cut subsidies for the 
pesantren schools and rural development programs in districts dominated by the 
NU. As they were primarily dependent on government subsidies for running their 
religious schools (pesantren), it was a challenge adequately run these schools and 
provided adequate supplies for their students after the regime had cut off funding 
(Bush, 2009, p. 70). 
As a result of this policy, many NU ulama felt that their authority over 
their pesantren schools and local communities became increasingly threatened by 
the Suharto regime’s policies against them, which were in effect for as long as 
they continued their resistance against the regime (Leong, 2008, p. 345). 
Grassroots-level NU ulama began to demand that their leadership abandon its 
resistance against the regime and develop new alliance with the regime in order to 
restore the lost subsidies and other patronage that was lost during its opposition 
against the regime in the 1970s (Kadir, 1999, p. 191 & 195; Leong, 2008, p. 347). 
As the NU senior leadership under Idham Chalid failed to fulfill this demand, 
many NU ulama turned their support to the reform efforts led by Abdurrahman 
                                                                                                                                                                      
motivated primarily instrumentalist (developing a better relationship with the 
Suharto regime) and materialist (financial patronage for NU ulama) 
considerations, even though they did not formally adopt rational choice 
theoretical framework in their works.  
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Wahid. An alliance was then formed between the NU and the regime just before 
the 1984 NU national congress took place: the ulama then agreed to support 
Wahid for the NU chairmanship and supported his reforms in exchange for a 
promise by the reformers to restore the government subsidies for their pesantren 
schools and other patronage projects (Bush, 2009, p. 71, Leong, 2008, pp. 357-
358). As the result of this alliance, Wahid successfully won his first election as 
NU Chairman in 1984 and managed to successfully enact his reform proposals 
(Kadir, 1999, p. 203).  
To support these claims, rationalists presented evidence that there was a 
substantial increase in government subsidies for the pesantren schools (up to five 
folds for some schools) as well as substantial increase in funding for its other rural 
development and other projects. (Feillard, 2010, p. 40). In addition, some of the 
reform activists also joined Suharto’s sponsored Golkar Party, thereby giving 
them access to potentially lucrative patronage resources (Bush, 2009, p. 81, 
Leong, 2008, p. 364). Numerous government officials were also appointed into 
NU leadership boards, especially at provincial and regional level (Feillard, 1994, 
p. 35). The warm relationship between NU and the regime lasted until the early 
1990s, when Suharto decided to take a more Islamist positions to co-opt 
modernist and revivalist Muslims to join the new modernist-oriented Islamic 
association he had helped founded. Wahid then decided to break the NU’s 
alliance with Suharto and began to show more open criticism against the regime. 
Rationalists argue that Wahid and the NU could afford to do this in the 1990s 
because the NU’s material conditions had improved significantly from their cash-
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strapped situation during the mid-1980s. At this time, the NU was able to survive 
without Suharto’s financial patronage any longer (Leong, 2008, p. 395). Thus, 
rationalists argue that the NU’s theological reform under Wahid’s leadership is 
grounded on instrumentalist and materialist rationale rather than ideational.  
Rationalists do not deny that the reform leader Abdurrahman Wahid has 
moral authority status and that this moral authority status helped Wahid to win 
support from many NU ulama and activists (Leong, 2008, p. 367). However, 
according to rationalists, the NU’s need to reestablish the financial resources that 
were cut off by Suharto regime during its years of opposition against the regime 
during the 1970s was the primary motivator beyond the theological reform. 
Ideational and normative concerns at best only played a secondary role to explain 
why the reform took place in the first place. In her analysis, Leong concludes that: 
The repeated emphases of NU leaders, clerics, and activists on the desire 
for material resources left little doubt that it motivated the NU’s accepted 
of the proposed [reform] agenda. The NU’s developing tolerance… toward 
the [secularist ideology] Pancasila also came about because it provided a 
handy explanation for the organization’s abrupt and self-interested 
departure from formal politics. For those who thought the NU’s surrender 
of its political role was a mistake, material incentives went some way 
towards mollifying [their opposition] (Leong, 2008, p. 358).  
 
The instrumentalist explanation made by rationalist-oriented scholars has 
the merit of showing that the rationales of reform supporters were not grounded in 
ideational and normative rationales alone. It shows how the instrumental and 
material constraints created by the Suharto regime during the 1970s and 1980s 
forced the NU to abandon its conservative theological positions during this period 
and replaced it with new theological positions that were more accommodative 
toward the regime. This occurred especially during the initial first few years of the 
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reform (1984-1990), as the Wahid and his supporters assumed control within the 
organization. The NU adopted an alliance with the Suharto regime in order to end 
the retaliatory actions from the Suharto regime. The alliance was necessary in 
order to enable the reformers from implementing the reforms without any further 
intervention from the state as well as to provide access for the NU ulama for state 
subsidies and other forms of patronage, something they had demanded in 
exchange for their support for the reform ideas propagated by Wahid.
65
  
Thus, I concur with rationalists that instrumental and material 
considerations did play a role in the promotion of the reforms within the NU. 
However, I do not share their assertion that the desire to promote theological 
reforms within the NU at best only played a secondary role to the instrumental 
and material preferences of Abdurrahman Wahid and his supporters. Instead, I 
argue that we need to complement the instrumentalist explanation of the 
rationalists with the constructivist-inspired moral authority leadership theory in 
order to fully explain why progressive theological reform within the NU was 
successful. I also argue that the theory offered by rational choice scholars do not 
adequately explain why the promotion and institutionalization of Wahid’s reform 
ideas continued to persist after Wahid no longer served as NU chairman in 1999. 
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 For instance, senior NU ulama As’ad Syamsul Arifin decided to back Wahid 
and other reformers because he wanted a greater amount of patronage and 
government subsidies for his pesantren in Situbondo. His relationship with Wahid 
later deteriorated Wahid refused As’ad request for more patronage opportunities 
(Van Bruinessen 1994: 165; Bush 2009: 82). In 1989, As’ad opposed Wahid’s bid 
for a second term as NU chairman as the real significance of the reforms (e.g., 
less power and authority for NY ulama) became clear to him and other 
conservative NU ulama (Kadir 1999: 224-225; Van Bruinessen 1996: 144-145).  
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Because rational choice theory privileges instrumentalist rationales over 
ideationalist ones, it has difficulties to predict why the NU maintained its support 
for democracy, religion-state separation, and religious tolerance long after the fall 
of the Suharto regime in 1998. As indicated in the previous section, these 
positions are retained by subsequent chairmen of the organization who succeeded 
Wahid in 1999 after he had stepped down from his position after he was elected 
as Indonesia’s first democratically-elected president. The NU’s refusal to return to 
its previously conservative theological positions and its continued support and 
advocacy for progressive theological values listed above indicates that the 
theological reform within the organization was motivated by ideational rather than 
instrumentalist or materialist concerns and thus, rational choice theory is not 
sufficient to explain this theological change by itself.  
The moral authority leadership theory could complement rationalist 
explanation of the NU reforms by showing that the progressive ideas introduced 
by Wahid were not just adopted merely as pragmatic responses to avoid further 
state repression and to seek financial patronage from the Suharto regime. Instead, 
the constructivist-inspired moral authority leadership theory introduced in this 
study shows that these reforms were promoted by Wahid and his supporters as 
part of a long term systemic changes in the theological frames and political 
identities of the organization in order to position itself as a pro-democratic Islamic 
organization that accepts religion-state separation policy in Indonesia and 
tolerates the numerous religious minorities in the country as well. In short, they 
envisioned the NU to become an Islamic organization that is conducive toward 
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liberal and multi-cultural values in our increasingly globalized world instead of 
one that rejected these values in the past. After the reforms were successfully 
institutionalized by Wahid and his supporters, the organization was transformed 
to become one of the leading pro-democratic social movements in Indonesia 
during the 1990s. Within the next decade, it helped to usher in an Indonesian state 
based on democratic, secularist, and religiously tolerant principles. The reform 
transformed the NU to become known as an organization which embraces liberal 
ideas such as democracy, human rights for all citizens, and religious 
tolerance/pluralism, without compromising its traditionalist Islamic principles 
based on classical Islamic jurisprudence. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the case of Abdurrahman Wahid’s theological 
reform within the NU has provided us with ample evidences to support the 
constructivist-based moral authority leadership theory that I introduce in this 
study. Wahid’s moral authority leadership; combined with an institutional culture 
within the NU  that historically tolerates syncretic religious rituals, and 
theological innovations; and a peaceful state-religion relations that was achieved 
through the temporary truce he negotiated with the Suharto regime; was 
responsible for the successful institutionalization of his reform within the NU.  
The mutual constitution between agency (Wahid’s moral authority 
leadership and structural factors (institutional culture and religion-state relations) 
helps to reconstruct the theological frames of the organization and transform the 
organization from a formerly conservative Islamic organization that was identical 
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to the many revivalist Islamic organizations in the world today into a progressive-
leaning Islamic organization it is widely known for today. This case serves as 
evidence of the successful causal mechanism pathway that was developed as part 
of the moral authority leadership theory that I develop in this study. For review, 
see Figure 3.1 below.  
This is how the successful reform pathway works in the NU case: using 
his expertise of classical Islamic jurisprudence and Western sociopolitical theory, 
Wahid begun to promote his ideas through his sermons and writings during the 
1970s. The promotion of these ideas continued from the time he assumed the NU 
chairmanship in 1984 and lasted until they were fully institutionalized by the time 
he left his NU chairmanship in 1999.  
 
Figure 3.1. Causal mechanism 1: Successful reform pathway  
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Wahid was able to reconstruct the theological frames of his organization from one 
that until the late 1970s were still advocating the establishment of an Islamic state 
that is based on the shari’a law into one which now affirms that a democratic 
Indonesian state should not be based on Islamic principle and endorses the 
principles of human rights, religious tolerance, and pluralism. 
Wahid was able to implement and institutionalize these reforms because 
he was perceived by his followers as both a leading expert of Islamic theology, a 
charismatic moral authority figure with extraordinary abilities and empathies 
toward the rank-and-file NU members, and direct family relations with the 
founding fathers of the organization. Because he was perceived by his supporters 
to have these attributes, he was able to bring together the normally autonomous, 
decentralized, and disorganized ulama within the NU. In addition, he attracted the 
support of a young generation of NU activists who came of age during the 1980s 
and 1990s and was attracted to Wahid’s ideas to promote democracy, human 
rights, and religious tolerance both within the NU and the Indonesian society in 
general. Together, they have assisted Wahid to institutionalize his ideas within the 
organization. They were willing to follow his reforms because they believe Wahid 
has moral authority within the organization, which was signified through his 
expertise on the classical Islamic jurisprudence as well as his status as a direct 
descendant of Hasyim Asj’ari, the famous ulama who was considered by NU 
members as the person who helped founded the organization back in 1926. The 
Wahid’s moral authority leadership was supported by a tolerant institutional 
culture within the NU which historically tolerates new and unorthodox customs 
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and traditions and a temporary truce with the Suharto regime that enabled Wahid 
and his supporters to institute the reforms without facing any reprisal or 
persecution at the hand of the state. In the end Wahid was able to institutionalize 
his progressive theological ideas within the NU within a period of less than three 
decades. In the process, he transformed the organization from a conservative and 
traditional Islamic organization into one that has a progressive Islamic 
organization that it is known for today.  
 The case of the NU illustrated the successful reform pathway. It shows 
how the moral authority leadership theory can better explain the process of 
theological change within Islamic organizations.  I assert this theory can better 
explain the theological transformation of the organization compared to the two 
alternative hypotheses considered in this study: political culture and rational 
choice theories. Culturalist scholars tend to view Wahid’s reforms as a mere 
exercise to “modernize” and “Westernize” the NU in order to make it more liberal 
and secular, so that it escaped further repressions from the Suharto regime. 
However, they failed to consider the possibility that it was as a genuine 
theological change for democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance within 
their organization. They also failed to take into account the fact that Wahid and 
his supporters primarily relied on Islamic theological resources in addition to the 
Western sociopolitical thought. In doing so, they did not primarily rely on the 
standard justification to adopt democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance 
that could be found in the Western political thought. Instead, they were 
constructing a theological synthesis from both Islamic and Western sociopolitical 
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ideas to advocate for these values. Through this synthesis, Wahid and his 
supporters were able to make a convincing argument that enable the 
institutionalization of these ideas within the NU.  
Rational choice scholars tend to interpret the reforms within the NU from 
an instrumentalist perspective, although some might also incorporate theological 
ideas into their arguments as well. In their explanation, Wahid and other reform 
supporters chose to promote and implement his progressive theology because they 
were either seeking to gain political power from the Suharto regime or to gain 
state subsidies and material benefits for themselves and other members of their 
organization. They argued that the primary rationale for Wahid to advocate the 
reforms is to improve the organization’s access to state power and material 
resources by striking an alliance with the Suharto regime.  For rationalists, the 
real purpose of the reform was to ensure that the NU could have survived the 
persecution from the Suharto regime and that it would continue to have access to 
the instrumental and material resources needed to retain its influence within the 
Indonesian Muslim community, not necessarily to promote and cultivate new 
theological ideas and visions that would have transformed the organization from a 
conservative to a progressive-leaning Islamic organization.  
Rational choice scholars may be correct to argue that some NU ulama and 
activists did support the reforms for instrumentalist and patronage-seeking 
reasons and that the NU did try to seek a temporary alliance with the Suharto 
regime during the 1980s. However, a closer look at the desire of Wahid and his 
supporters to institute their theological ideas and reconstruct the theological 
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frames of the NU provide a better explanation for the institutionalization of 
progressive theological reforms within the NU. I argue from a constructivist 
perspective that a desire to promote theological change from conservative to 
progressive Islam was at the heart of Wahid and his supporters’ efforts to develop 
a new theological frame and political identity for the NU. They wanted to 
promote the ideas of democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance through 
the NU so that they could change the theological frame of the organization that 
used to support the shari’a law and wish to exclude non-Muslims from 
Indonesia’s public sphere. In lieu of this conservative frame, they wanted to 
construct a new theological frame and political identity for the NU, which takes 
into account democratic ideas and institutions, supremacy of secular over Islamic 
principles in politics, and the religious diversity of the Indonesian society and to 
make the NU as an even stronger oppositional force against Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule. The reformers pushed ahead with their commitment to enact 
the reforms despite the significant opposition from more conservative NU 
members as well as from the Suharto regime. While there were NU ulama and 
activists who supported the reform for instrumentalist and materialist purposes, 
many of the younger NU activists were pursuing the reforms because they 
believed that traditional Islamic principles can be reframed and reconstructed into 
a nuanced understanding of Islam which accepts democracy, human rights, and 
religious tolerance/pluralism. The reforms occurred under the mutual constitution 
principles set up by constructivists, through the combination of human agency 
(Wahid’s moral authority leadership) and structure (the tolerant institutional 
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culture within the NU and the temporary alliance with the Suharto regime which 
prevented the reforms from being repressed prematurely by the regime) 
The successful reform pathway illustrated in this chapter is only one of 
two possible pathways for the moral authority leadership theoretical framework. 
The second pathway is the unsuccessful reform pathway, represented by the case 
of the Muhammadiyah organization from Indonesia (chapter 4), theological 
reform failed to be successfully institutionalized within the organization due to 
the prevalence of an intolerant institutional culture within the organization. In this 
case, the reformers encountered a fierce opposition against the reforms they were 
advocating for. Conservative Islamists within the Muhammadiyah was able to 
block the reforms proposed by the more progressive reformers within their group 
and successfully prevented the reforms from being institutionalized within the 
organization. In addition, neither Madjid nor Ma’arif had the same degree of 
moral authority stature within the Muhammadiyah similar to what their 
counterparts Abdurrahman Wahid from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This is 
because even while they received wide recognition as leading Islamic theological 
experts, they did not have the charismatic authority based on familial or 
intellectual genealogy with previous generation of Muhamadiyah leaders, unlike 
Wahid within the NU. This pathway will be analyzed in more depth in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE UNSUCCESSFUL REFORM PATHWAY: THE CASE OF THE 
MUHAMMADIYAH 
This chapter analyzes the case of the Muhammadiyah, an Indonesian 
Islamic organization with a modernist/revivalist theological orientation. Led by 
two reform-minded religious leaders, Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii Ma’arif, pro-
reform activists had attempted to implement and institutionalize progressive 
Islamic ideas within the organization. However, strong opposition from revivalist 
activists within the Muhammadiyah blocked the implementation of these reforms. 
The case of the Muhammadiyah illustrates the counter-reformation pathway  
outlined in the moral authority leadership theory introduced in the chapter 2 of 
this study. Under this pathway, the proponents of progressive theological reform 
within Islamic groups are encountering strong opposition from other factions who 
opposed the institutionalization the reform on ideological and theological 
grounds. In this scenario, the organization’s institutional culture does not favor 
the reformer’s values and theologial positions and prevents its instutionalization 
within the Muhammadiyah.  
The Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 as a modernist, yet also 
revivalist Islamic organization that wanted to purify Islamic theology, rituals, and 
practices in Indonesia. The group did not approve of syncretic rituals/practices 
that predominated Indonesian Islam in the early twentieth century or the influence 
of the traditionalist Islamic ulama who demanded absolute obedience from their 
followers during this period. The revivalist aspect of the group’s founding mission 
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was strengthened during the 1930s as a new generation of revivalist preachers 
who were educated in the Middle East took over the organization’s leadership. 
After their reign, their ideological descendants retained control of the 
Muhammadiyah for the next five decades.  
Beginning in the 1970s, a new faction within the Muhammadiyah began to 
emerge. Members of this faction advocated a new set of Islamic theological ideas 
that would have reconstructed the conservative theological orientation of the 
organization into a moderate one. Reformists argued that the group should 
incorporate modern sociopolitical ideas such as democracy, human rights, 
religion-state separation, and religious tolerance/pluralism. Originally proposed 
by a reform-minded Indonesian theologian named Nurcolish Madjid, these ideas 
gained the support from a group of young activists within the Muhammadiyah. 
They believed that the revivalist orientation of the organization did not allow it 
unable to response to response to the rapid economic and sociopolitical changes 
facing the modernist Indonesian Muslim community that constituted the majority 
of Muhammadiyah followers.  
Madjid served as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ for these ideas when he founded a 
university which spread his ideas among young modernist intellectuals during the 
1980s and 1990s. While formally he was not part of the Muhammadiyah’s 
leadership structure, these ideas gained the official support of the 
Muhammadiyah’s leadership in 1998, after the election of Syafii Ma’arif, who 
was a colleague of Madjid. As chairman of the organization, Ma’arif attempted to 
promote and institutionalize them within the organization. To accomplish this, 
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Ma’arif used his theological expertise and leadership position to persuade 
supporters within the Indonesian modernist community to promote these reforms. 
In the process, he mobilized his supporters within the Muhammadiyah to 
implement them within the organization.  
However, despite the initial success of the reformers in their efforts, they 
were never able to consolidate and institutionalize their ideas from within the 
organization. This is due to the following reasons. First, neither Madjid nor 
Ma’arif was considered as leaders with moral authority statussimilar to their 
counterparts Abdurrahman Wahid from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) had. This is 
while they were each widely recognized as leading Islamic theological experts, 
they did not have the charismatic authority based on familial or intellectual 
genealogy with previous generation of Muhamadiyah leaders, unlike Wahid 
within the NU. Their legitimacy rested on their reputations as theological experts 
but not on any charismatic attributes that they might have had. On the other hand, 
there were many influential conservative theologians and activists within the 
Muhammadiyah who strongly disagreed with the reform ideas they had proposed. 
They were able to mobilize support against the reforms by invoking the 
historically puritanist institutional culture within the group that rejects new and 
innovative theological ideas that were not compatible with the revivalist’s 
interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadith of the Prophet. By invoking this 
puritanist culture conservative activists within the group were able to develop a 
counter-reformation campaign against the reform and even managed to win the 
support of many grassroots-level activists of the organization.  
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Syafii Ma’arif’s retirement from the Muhammadiyah chairmanship 
position in 2005 resulted in the loss of a reform leader whom used his position to 
promote the reforms and protect other reform supporters.  Eventually, pro-reform 
supporters were and marginalized from within the organization. By the time field 
research for this study was conducted in 2010, progressive Islamic reforms and 
their supporters were sidelined from Muhammadiyah and the organization was in 
the firm control of the conservative/revivalist faction.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized into the following sections.  
The first section is a brief historical background of the theological reform 
movement within the Muhammadiyah, which started in the early 1970s Nurcolish 
Madjid begun to promote his reforms within the Indonesian modernist Muslim 
community. The second section details the evidence to support how the moral 
authority leadership theory provides a more nuanced theoretical explanation for 
the Muhammadiyah case. The third section analyzes alternative theoretical 
explanations given by previous scholars to explain the reform efforts within the 
Muhammadiyah, through culturalist and rationalist theoretical perspectives. It 
explains why these alternative theories are insufficient to explain the political 
behavior of the Muhammadiyah reformers and why the theoretical claims based 
on the moral authority leadership theory developed in this study could best 
explain it. Finally, the final section concludes the chapter with an assessment on 
the moral authority leadership theory’s application to the Muhammadiyah’s case, 
based on the evidences that are presented in this chapter.  
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Historical Overview of Theological Reform within the Muhammadiyah 
The Muhammadiyah was founded on November 18, 1912 by an 
Indonesian ulama named Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923). The 
organization’s original purpose was to eradicate syncretic but popular Islamic 
customs and rituals. These included the cult worship of famous ulama or 
preachers (saint worshipping), prayers before the graves of deceased relatives, 
Sufi-style mystic rituals, superstitious beliefs, and other practices that are not 
specifically prescribed within the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Puritanists within the 
Muhammadiyah called its members to reject syncretic form of Islam and return to 
a pure Islamic faith based on the principle of strict monotheism (tauhid) (Puar, 
1989, pp. 19-21; Peacock, 1978, p. 6). Even though originally the 
Muhammadiyah encouraged the use of independent reasoning (ijtihad) as a 
method to interpret Islamic texts and legal jurisprudences, during the 1930s, the 
Muhammadiyah began to take an even more conservative turn as a new 
generation of leaders who studied in the Middle East began to take leadership 
roles.  
From the 1930s to the 1970s, the organization was known its official 
theology that, which involved the purification of syncretic customs and traditions 
commonly performed by their traditionalist counterparts. It also promoted the 
shari’a law to become both the moral and constitutional foundation of the 
Indonesian state. In his analysis of Muhammadiyah’s theologyical frame during 
this period, Federspiel concluded that: 
The Muhammadiyah philosophy…..maintained that the establishment of 
an Islamic society in Indonesia was the essential features of an Islamic 
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state…Once this ideal society has been instituted, the Islamic state would 
follow automatically as a consequence. The spirit generated by an Islamic 
society would determine that the constitution and the law established in 
the nation would reflect the commands and prohibitions of God, as 
contained in the Islamic scripture. In such a “right-guided society,” all 
laws legislated by the government would then be made on the basis of 
right or wrong according to the principles of Islam as interpreted for the 
contemporary era (Federspiel, 1970, p. 77).  
 
The political implication of the Muhammadiyah’s theological frame is that: 
…the Muhammadiyah still favors the establishment of Islamic law 
(shari’a) in Indonesia, but for practical reasons this goal is regarded as the 
responsibility of the Muslim parties which the Muhammadiyah supports 
and where Muhammadiyah members participate as they wish. At the same 
time, the Muhammadiyah’s activities can continue to be directed toward 
the construction of an Islamic society (Federspiel, 1970, p. 79).  
 
However, during the 1970s, the Muhammadiyah suffered from a new 
round of political repression by the Suharto regime. In 1970, the regime had 
managed to purge Muhammadiyah leaders from a political party that was meant 
to represent its positions in the Indonesian public sphere, in favor of more 
cooperative, pro-regime modernists (Hefner 2000, pp. 98-99). For the next two 
decades (from the 1970s to the first half of the 1990s), Muhammadiyah 
downplayed its role in Indonesian politics. During much of this period the 
organization was led by Kiai Haji A.R. Fachruddin (1916-1995), who believed 
that Muhammadiyah should avoid any potential confrontation with the Suharto 
regime, since doing so would only lead to more political restriction and repression 
against the organization (Suwarno, 2002, p. 73, cited in Fachruddin, 2005, p. 66).  
By the early 1990s, a new generation of activists within the 
Muhammadiyah began to criticize Fachruddin’s leadership. Critics stated that 
under his leadership, the organization had failed to condemn the regime’s 
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repressive policies and its frequent human rights violations against ordinary 
Indonesians (Fachruddin, 2005, pp. 66-67).  There was a growing call from the 
Muhammadiyah’s activists to reverse the organization’s two-decade policy that 
promoted political neutrality and avoidance of controversial political issues. 
These activists were more willing than their predecessors to openly criticize the 
Suharto regime’s lack of political freedom, human rights abuses, corruption, and 
other excesses (Fachruddin, 2005, p. 70; Muzakki, 2004, p. 64).  
These activists further argued that Muhammadiyah needed to become 
responsinve to the demands of an increasingly modern and complex Indonesian 
society, thereby it could have showed itself as a credible alternative to Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule. They believed that the organization should promote the 
compatibility of Islam with modern sociopolitical values as democracy, religion - 
state separation, and tolerance for non-Muslim minorities. They began to take a 
closer look at the ideas of Nurcolish Madjid (1939-2005), a modernist Islamic 
social philosopher and theologian. Madjid received training in classical Islamic 
jurisprudence as well as in contemporary Islamic thought from traditionalist 
pesantren schools. Like his reformer counterparts, Abdurrahman Wahid from the 
NU, he was versed in Islamic thought but also in Western socio-political theory, 
and has fluency in English, French, and Arabic, as well as in Indonesian (Barton, 
1997, p. 49; Hefner, 2000, p. 115). From 1978 to 1984, Madjid pursued his 
doctoral study in Islamic philosophy at the University of Chicago, under the 
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supervision of Pakistani-born American Islamic philosopher Fazlur Rahman 
(1919-1988).
66
  
Madjid was convinced that the future of Islam in Indonesia was nor reliant 
on the promise of revivalist Islamic theology and the establishment of a shari’a-
based Islamic state. Instead, he believed that to remain relevant in the modern 
Indonesian world, the Muhammadiyah should adopt and promote the synthesis of 
Islamic theological ideas and Western socio-political theory in order to resolve 
the numerous socio-economic and political problems facing contemporary 
Indonesian society. He became a norm entrepreneur within the Muhammadiyah, 
who attempted to reconstruct the theological frames and political identities of the 
organization through the teaching and propagation of his ideas.  
Madjid asserted that the Muhammadiyah “has become more interested in 
promoting the literal and rigid interpretation of Islamic theology to their followers 
rather than constantly reinterprets Islam to take into account of new socio-
economic and political conditions facing an increasingly modern society” 
(Madjid, 1998 [1970], p. 285). He was very critical against the organization, 
asserting that while the Muhammadiyah was originally founded to promote 
theological reform through the use of independent reasoning (ijtihad), by the late 
1960s, it had ceased to promote new theological innovations. Instead, it was 
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 Rahman was a leading Islamic theological reformer in his own right, who 
introduced a new Islamic theology called neo-modernism, which is based on an 
extensive study of classical Islamic jurisprudence, the use of ijtihad to apply the 
classical teachings to resolve problems of the contemporary world, as well as the 
acceptance of new knowledge derived from Western intellectual tradition, 
especially from the social science and humanities (Barton, 1997, p. 67). 
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promoting a puritanist version of Islam that was theologically rigid (Madjid, 1998 
[1970], p. 288).  
 Madjid developed a new theological interpretation which in his view 
would have to reconstruct the prevailing revivalist theology within the 
Muhammadiyah, by accepting democratic political ideas and the separation 
between religion and politics, which was not accepted by most revivalist-oriented 
Muslim thinkers.
67
 He argues that “secularization,” as opposed to “secularism,”68 
has a foundation within the Islamic tradition. In his interpretation of the Qur’an, 
God left no specific instructions for mankind on how to deal with purely worldly 
issues, such as how to run a state/government. Instead, Madjid believes that:  
God leaves ‘worldly’ problems for humans to resolve on their own, by  
using their God-given ability to think and make independent judgment 
based on the ijtihad (Madjid, 1998 [1970], pp. 288-289; Hefner, 2000, p. 
118).  
 
Through this interpretation, Madjid constructs a new theological 
justification for religion-state separation within the Islamic tradition, something 
conservative and revivalist-leaning Muslims do not recognize in their 
interpretation of classical Islamic jurisprudence.  
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 Madjid’s defense of secularization process was a provocative idea that helped 
to secure his reputation as a leading progressive Islamic “norm entrepreneur” and 
theologian in Indonesia. It also explains why his theological ideas become very 
controversial, especially among revivalist Muslims even today, four decades after 
he gave his landmark speech (Kurzman, 1998, p. 284).  
68
 Madjid argues that while secularism is an ideology that seeks to replace and 
substitute religious faith, something that he completely rejects, ‘secularization’ is 
acceptable within the Islamic tradition, since it serves as “the ‘normalization’ of 
human actions that deal with worldly affairs and make it distinguishable from 
those that are purely religious in nature” (Madjid, 1998 [1970], pp. 286, 288-289). 
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Madjid believed that there was no need for Muslims to declare an Islamic 
state in Indonesia (Madjid, 1998 [1972], pp. 294-295). He argues that:  
…it is impossible for the state to manage and regulate the religious affairs  
of their citizens, and it is also equally impossible for any religious  
institutions to manage and regulate the temporal affairs of the state  
(Madjid, 1998 [1972], pp. 296-297).  
 
Thus, Madjid rejected the view of many revivalist Muslims that the Indonesian 
state has to be based on Islamic law (shari’a) in order to be considered as 
legitimate by them. Instead, he believed that Indonesian Muslims should actively 
promote democracy within their society, since he believes that Islam is fully 
compatible with democracy. He argued that contemporary Muslims should make 
decisions about political and state matters through a process of consultation and 
deliberation (mushawarah) modeled after the deliberative council created by 
Prophet Muhammad in Medina during the early period of Islam. He argued that: 
….any ruler who does not honor the right of Muslims to practice their 
right to participate in public consultation and deliberation should be 
considered as a dictator and be treated as an enemy of society (Madjid, 
1995, p. 195).  
 
In 1985, Madjid solidified his status as a norm entrepreneur of progressive 
Islamic thought in Indonesia when he founded Paramadina University, a new 
Islamic higher education institution.
69
 This institution became the primary vehicle 
for Madjid to advocate and promote his progressive Islamic theology. Paramadina 
                                                             
69
 The name Paramadina refers to the ancient Medina Charter that set up the 
governance of the city of Medina that was governed jointly by Muslim forces 
under the command of Prophet Muhammad and the city’s Jewish, Christian and 
pagan minorities (Pringle, 2010, p. 102). It highlights Madjid’s commitment to 
promote his modernist, democratic, and religiously plural, theological principles.  
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offered courses in Qur’anic and Hadith interpretations, Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), Islamic theology (kalam), Islamic philosophy (falsafa), Sufi meditation 
(tasawuf), and modern Islamic thought (Kull, 2005, p. 171). The most popular 
course offered by Paramadina was a monthly seminar taught by Madjid himself 
on current issues in contemporary Islamic thought and its relations to modern 
values, ranging from democracy, human rights, and economic justice. It was held 
regularly from the first time class instructions at the university began in October 
1986 until his death in August 2005 (Barton, 1997, p. 52).
70
   
During the early 1990s, Madjid served as a member and senior adviser to 
the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
Indonesia – ICMI). The Suharto regime created ICMI after he made his “Islamist 
turn” in 1990 to win support from modernist and revivalist Indonesian Islamic 
groups. It promoted public policies that accommodate the concerns of revivalist 
Muslims (e.g., the appointment of revivalists in key government agencies, the 
wearing of headscarves in public schools and public institutions, etc.). Some 
critics of the Suharto regime, including former NU chairman Abdurrahman 
Wahid, considered ICMI as no more than a tool of the Suharto regime and refused 
the regime’s invitation to join it. They criticized modernist intellectuals like 
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 The monthly seminar taught by Madjid was the most on-demand course offered 
by Paramadina, attracting up to 400 attendees for any given session. Prominent 
guest speakers were also invited to give lectures at the seminar. In its latter years, 
as Madjid became more interested in the issue of religious tolerance and 
pluralism, it also included speakers from non-Islamic religious traditions as well 
as unorthodox Islamic preachers such as those representing various Sufi tarekats 
(Kull, 2005, pp. 175-176).  
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Madjid for joining the group. However, Madjid argued that his involvement with 
ICMI as an effort to promote reform and democracy “from the inside” rather than 
fighting the regime as an opposition leader, as pursued by his fellow reform 
counterpart Abdurrahman Wahid from the NU. He believed Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule should be challenged through persuasion and cooperation rather 
than through coercion and intimidation (Hefner, 2000, pp. 114-115).  
By the early-1990s, the theological ideas propagated Nurcolish Madjid 
and his supporters, such as separation between religion and temporal (including 
political) affairs, rejection of a shari’a-based Islamic state, and the compatibility 
between Islam and democracy, had generated much discussion among the 
Indonesian Islamic community, particularly among a new generation of modernist 
Muslim intellectuals and activists. While they attracted much criticisms and 
condemnations from conservative/revivalist-leaning groups,
71
 they also gained 
support from modernist-leaning intellectuals, academics, and government 
officials. Numerous upper and middle class Muslim professionals were also 
attracted by Madjid’s theological attempt to reconcile Islam, democracy and other 
liberal sociopolitical values.  
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 Numerous books and pamphlets had been written by various revivalist authors 
during the 1970s and early 1980s to criticize, challenge, and condemn Madjid’s 
ideas. Chief among them were written by Hassan (1982) and Rasjidi (1972).  
Muhammadiyah intellectuals who adhered to revivalist theology also challenge 
Madjid’s argument that secularization is a separate process that is different from 
secularism. For instance, former Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais argues 
that there is no difference between secularism and secularization.While 
secularization might not necessarily try to make religion irrelevant in public life at 
first, as the process continues, it will require the removal of religion from the 
public sphere (Rais, 1998a, p. 77, cited in Muzakki, 2004, p. 148).  
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Nevertheless, by 1994 it was clear that despite his previous promises, 
Suharto was not going to move Indonesia into a more democratic political 
trajectory. Instead, the regime was adopting more restrictions and repressive 
tactics against any movements that tried to challenge it. Consequently, Madjid 
became more assertive in publicly criticizing the regime. For instance, he made a 
speech in 1994 stating that a healthy political regime would not just benefit from 
regular practices of public consultation and consensus, but would also benefit 
from the formation of a “principled political opposition” (Hefner, 2000, p. 144). 
Madjid also criticized ICMI’s campaign to remove members of Indonesia’s 
religious minorities (especially Christians) from their positions as cabinet 
ministers and high-ranking civil servants (Hefner, 2000, pp. 143-144). Instead, he 
wrote a landmark article that argued  Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and even the 
“Eastern” religious traditions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and 
Shintoism) share a common ground with Muslims by recognizing the existence of 
a single monotheistic God (tauhid). As a result, Madjid argues that “it is 
unacceptable for Muslims to promote exclusion and discrimination against non-
Muslims. Instead, they should tolerate the existence of these minority religions 
and work together with their adherents to promote the common good” (Madjid, 
1994, pp. 74-76).  As the Suharto regime fell in May 1998, Madjid played a major 
role in Indonesia’s transition into democracy as a member of a committee of a 
leading Islamic intellectuals (along with Abdurrahman Wahid) who met with 
Suharto to seek his “controlled and dignified” resignation from the office of the 
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presidency during the final days of his rule in May 1998 (Eklof, 1999, pp. 202-
214, cited in Kull, 2005, p. 83).  
Madjid’s closest counterpart within the Muhammadiyah was the life-long 
Muhammadiyah activist and scholar Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif (b. 1935). A historian 
by training, he was Madjid’s classmate at the University of Chicago, who 
obtained a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies in 1985, also under Fazlur Rahman’s 
supervision. Unlike Madjid, who was always committed to promote progressive 
Islamic thought since his youth, Maarif started out as a believer in 
revivalist/puritanist Islamic theology. Earlier in his life, he supported a shari’a-
based Islamic state, as prescribed by revivalist theologians such as Abu Ala 
Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb (Ma’arif, 2006, pp. 209 & 225). 
However, Ma’arif’s theological views changed dramatically while he studied at 
the University of Chicago. His mentor Fazlur Rahman believes that the shari’a 
was largely a set of ethical principles rather than a set of formal rules and 
regulations. He also believes the shari’a was constructed under the authoritarian 
rule of numerous Islamic Caliphates and monarchs during the medieval period. It 
should be reinterpreted to reflect the experiences of contemporary Muslims living 
in modern nation-states that are largely run based on liberal democratic principles 
(Ma’arif, 2006, pp. 228-229).  
Influenced by Rahman’s interpretation of the shari’a, Ma’arif made a 
radical shift in his political and theological outlook. Ma’arif believes that 
Indonesian Muslims should not develop their society based on an “idealized” 
conception of past Islamic societies that had serious flaws and shortcomings. 
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Instead, they should build them according to the realities of modern lives in 
Indonesia (Ma’arif, 2006, pp. 229-230). He believes that the Islamic principle of 
mutual consensus (shura) is fully compatible with modern democratic principles, 
since both grant equality for all participants to have a voice the decision-making 
process that affects society. This is denied to citizens of the so-called “Islamic 
state” because in these societies it is the ruler, not the people, who makes all 
political decisions in the name of God, without any public consultation or 
deliberation (Ma’arif, 2006, p. 235). Ma’arif believes that none of the Islamic 
states established during the 20th century (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Sudan) 
could serve as models on how modern Islamic societies ought to be run, because 
they were established by individuals and groups who used Islam to justify their 
authoritarian and repressive rule over their own peoples (Ma’arif, 2006, p. 231).  
Unlike revivalist-oriented scholars and activists within the 
Muhammadiyah, Ma’arif believes in the equality of all citizens of a Muslim-
majority society, including non-Muslims. He believes that as long as all citizens 
agreed to respect each other’s religious beliefs and to work together to promote 
the common good, they all should have equal citizenship rights (Ma’arif, 2006, 
pp. 232-233). Finally, Ma’arif developed deep skepticism against the expressions 
of Islamic political activism advocated by his revivalist counterparts. He prefers 
Islamic intellectuals to focus their energy on promoting Islam through their 
writings and teachings rather than through the establishment of political parties 
and active public advocacy of the shari’a law (Ma’arif, 2006, pp. 232-233).  
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Upon his return to Indonesia in 1985, Ma’arif resumed his activity within 
the Muhammadiyah and gradually rose through its leadership rank. In 1998, he 
was finally elected as the chairman of the organization by its central leadership 
board. Upon his election, Ma’arif embarked on an ambitious reform transform the 
theological frames and political identity of his organization, from a conservative 
and ideologically rigid Islamic organization it has been known for several decades 
to one that would have embraced the progressive Islamic theology. Encouraged 
by Ma’arif’s leadership, many young activists saw him as a leader who could 
finally turn Muhammadiyah away from its conservative and puritanist theological 
outlook into a more progressive and inclusive direction. During Ma’arif’s seven-
year term as Muhammadiyah chairman (1998-2005), he and his supporters 
worked tirelessly to promote the progressive Islamic theology within the 
organization.  
Ma’arif’s theological reforms contentrated on efforts to change the 
institutions within the Muhammadiyah that was responsible to issue theological 
interpretations to other members of the organization. This included the Doctrinal 
Opinion Council (Majelis Tarjih), which issued theological rulings (fatwa) and 
determines whether unorthodox Islamic customs, rituals, and traditions are either 
considered to be compatible with fundamental Islamic teachings or should be 
treated as heresies (bid’ah) by other members of the organization. Ma’arif 
appointed Amin Abdullah, a professor of Islamic classical philosophy, as the 
chairman of the council, with the hope that he would move the council away from  
the long domination of conservative clerics and activists who supported a strictly 
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literalist interpretation of Islamic scriptures. Abdullah also supported the usage of 
hermeneutics, a methodology to interpret religious texts contextually, that has 
become the standard practices in religious studies departments of most Western 
universities. He also believed the use of hermeneutics would bring a more 
nuanced approach to the interpretation of classical Islamic texts and would 
develop new interpretations of these texts that are more flexible toward modern 
sociopolitical contexts (Boy, 2009, hp. 86). Hermeneutics was more in tune with 
the reformers’ project to reconstruct Muhamamadiyah’s theological frames and 
political identity.  
Under Abdullah’s leadership, Majelis Tarjih issued an innovative legal 
ruling (fatwa) that encouraged inter-religious dialogue between Muslims and non-
Muslims. This interpretation was noteworthy for its approach that calls for 
religious inclusion, tolerance, and pluralism rather than the standard interpretation 
that tended to view non-Muslims to be religiously inferior compared to Muslims 
(Asyari, 2007, p. 23).
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 In 2000, Ma’arif promoted Abdullah as a member of 
Muhammadiyah central leadership board. In addition, Ma’arif also promoted two 
other progressive reformers, Dawam Rahardjo and Abdul Munir Mulkan 
(Ma’arif, 2006, p. 327).73 These promotions signaled Ma’arif commitment to 
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 The theological justification of this fatwa was the propagation of the Medina 
Constitution by Prophet Muhammad was an early act of Muslims to recognize 
religious pluralism since it gave equal citizenship status to Muslims and People of 
the Book (Jews and Christians) and legitimized marriages between a male Muslim 
and a female Jew or Christian (Biyanto, 2009, pp. 115-116).  
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 Dawam Rahardjo (b. 1942) was a member of a study group which became the 
precursor of many of the neo-modernist Islamic thought propagated by Nurcolish 
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transform the Muhammadiyah to become a more progressive-oriented 
theologically through the promotion of fellow activists whom shared his 
modernist theological outlook.  
Ma’arif also encouraged the establishment of new institutions to 
accommodate the interests of progressive-minded activists within 
Muhammadiyah. He encouraged reform activists to found their own organization, 
which was finally established in 2003. It was called the Young Muhammadiyah 
Intellectuals Network (Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah – JIMM). Its 
purpose is to help the Muhammadiyah’s leadership to reconstruct the Islamic 
theological frame within the organization and to defend these activists from 
criticisms from conservative/revivalist-leaning activists within the organization. It 
also aims to challenge the organization’s preference for “ritualism, formalism, and 
structuralism” in favor of progressive ideas that would have rejuvenated the 
organization’s theological frame (Boy, 2009, pp. 83-84). JIMM was formed by 
activists who frequently used hermeneutics and critical social theory in their 
work. These theories served as the intellectual resources for the pro-reform to 
challenge and deconstruct conservative theological teachings within the 
Muhammadiyah. They were supposed to integrate Islamic theology and Western 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Madjid and his colleagues during the 1970s and 1980s. He was a close associate 
of Madjid and was active in the promotion of progressive Islamic thought himself, 
mainly by establishing Ulumul Qur’an, a peer-reviewed journal with regular 
articles promoting progressive Islamic thought and their relevance to 
contemporary sociopolitical problems of Indonesian Muslims (Liddle, 1996b. p. 
161). Abdul Munir Mulkhan (b. 1945) is a sociologist who studied the roots of 
Muhammadiyah in traditionalist Javanese Muslim communities and argues that 
local Javanese customs and traditions should not be considered as heretical 
innovations (bid’ah) that should be cast out by Muhammadiyah. 
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social theory and connect Muhammadiyah with the socio-economic problems 
facing contemporary Indonesian society (Abdurrahman, 2003b, p. 196). JIMM’s 
willingness to challenge the predominantly revivalist theology in the 
Muhammadiyah was evident its first publication, a volume edited by reform 
activist Moeslim Abdurrahman entitled “Muhammadiyah as a Cultural Tent” 
[Muhammadiyah Sebagai Tenda Kultural] (Abdurrahman 2003). The volume was 
noted for its frank criticisms of revivalist Islamic theology within the 
Muhammadiah, the organization propagation method (da’wah), which they 
considered to be exclusivist and were promoting forced conversion into revivalist 
Islam, and the revivalist’s prolonged hegemony within the organization. Instead, 
the book advocated that Muhammadiyah should start promoting religious 
tolerance/pluralism and democratic political norms (Abdurrahman, 2003a; Asyari, 
2007, p. 24, fn. 8).  
However, Ma’arif’s attempt to engage in theological reform activities 
within the Muhammadiyah to adopt their reformist theology encountered fierce 
resistance from puritanist/revivalist opponents from within the organization.  
Revivalist activists, led by Muhammadiyah Deputy Chairman Din Syamsuddin 
(b. 1958), argued that the reform activists and their organizations under their 
umbrella (e.g., JIMM) are promoting ideas not compatible with Muhammadiyah’s 
long-standing theological principles. They did not share the positions taken by the 
reformers, which argue for ideas such as equal citizenship rights for all 
Indonesians, human rights, religious tolerance, and pluralism. Instead, they argue 
these ideas were derivations from liberal secularist principles, which sought to 
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separate religion from the realms of the state; something revivalists believe is 
rejected by Islam, which taught that there is no separation between the two 
realms.  
Revivalist Muslims also reject the concept of religious pluralism. They 
argue that it advocates for the validity of truth for all religions. This is something 
many revivalists considered as a heresy (bid’ah), because for revivalists, there is 
only one religion that represents God’s ultimate truth for all humans, and it is 
Islam (Budiyanto, 2009, pp. 122-123, Boy, 2009, pp. 168-169). In their view, 
pluralist supporters only weaken the faith of young Muslims (Asyari, 2007, p. 33). 
Revivalists believe that local cultures and traditions could not be integrated into 
the Muhammadiyah, because they contained so many heretical and superstitious 
(tahyul) elements that would only weakened the faith of pious Muslims (Asyari, 
2007, p. 28, fn. 16). Lastly, they criticize progressive reformers for receiving 
financial assistance from international donors such as the Asian Foundation and 
the Ford Foundation, which for the revivalists, proved that their agendas are part 
of the Westerners’ effort to weaken Islam in Indonesia. In their mind, progressive 
Islam is nothing more than a Western-sponsored plot to advance Christianity, 
Western capitalism, and Orientalist scholarship, which would threaten the unity 
and cohesion of the Indonesian Islamic umma (Asyari, 2007, p. 29 & 33).  
Revivalists within the Muhammadiyah had dominated the organization’s 
leadership and rank-and-file activists for decades. Their numbers swelled 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as their ranks were strengthened from activists 
who formerly belonged to other revivalist organizations such as the Indonesian 
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Council for Islamic Propagation (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia – DDII).74 
These organizations considered progressive Islamic theology propagated by 
Nurcolish Madjid, Syafii Ma’arif and their supporters as a heresy, that strayed far 
from the basic teachings of Islam contained in the Qur’an, the Hadith, and the 
shari’a (Hefner, 2000, p. 113; Liddle, 1996b, pp. 270-271). They rejected the 
reforms propagated by these progressive thinkers in favor of “clear and simple” 
revivalist theology articulated in the Qur’an and the Sunnah (Liddle, 1996b, p. 
281). The increasing popularity of revivalist teachings articulated by the DDII 
among the rank-and-file members of the Muhammadiyah creates a major obstacle 
for progressive Islamic activists to promote their ideas within Muhammadiyah. 
Ma’arif’s decision in 2005 to retire from his Muhammadiyah 
chairmanship created a power vacuum within the organization. The revivalist 
faction used it to seize control of the organization and expel progressive activists 
from their leadership positions within the organization. A large number of 
regional Muhammadiyah branches were controlled by revivalist activists opposed 
to the reforms advocated by the progressive activists (Asyari, 2007, pp. 37-
38).Thanks to the support of activists in regional branches, Din Syamsuddin was 
won an overwhelming support and was elected as the new Muhammadiyah 
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 Founded in 1967, the DDII spreaded its message through direct proselytization 
(da’wa) activities conducted throughout Indonesia, the recruitment and trainings 
of revivalist preachers, the publication of the Media Dakwah magazine, which 
content is full of revivalist theological ideas and criticisms and polemical attacks 
against groups that are perceived to be its opponents (i.e., the Suharto regime, 
Western governments, Christian missionaries, and progressive Islamic thinkers) 
(Liddle, 1996a). The majority of its funding came from Middle Eastern donors 
from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Kuwait (Hefner, 2000, p. 109). 
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Chairman to succeed Ma’arif (Asyari, 2007, pp. 36-37). Revivalist activists also 
took over the selection committee for the central leadership board. After they 
seized control, Muhammadiyah’s board members who represented the pro-reform 
faction within the organization, such as Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, 
and Dawam Rahardjo, were removed from the board and were replaced by 
activists representing the revivalist faction (Burhani, 2005, p. 186).  
With the removal of these progressive-leaning board members, reform 
activists lost the support of sympathetic board members, including former 
chairman Ma’arif. As a result, the progressive activists’ attempt to reform the 
Muhammadiyah was vanguished. Today, progressive activists within the 
organization still persist in their reform causes and their supporters remain active 
in promoting their agenda bysponsoring lectures and writing opinion articles in 
newspapers and magazines. Nevertheless, they are now marginalized within the 
Muhammadiyah. The dominance of revivalist activists on the organization’s 
leadership board has left little chance for reform to stand little chance from being 
adopted by the organization.  
What factors help to make the efforts to introduce progressive theological 
ideas within the Muhammadiyah to be unsuccessful? What halted the process of 
reform within the organization? In the following section, I trace the reasons why 
theological reforms within the Muhammadiyah are not successful and why the 
organization’s structure seems to have prevented the agency of the reformers 
within the organization from successfully implement their reforms. I argue that 
the mutual constitution process within the Muhammadiyah did not occur, unlike 
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in the NU case, due to the following factors: 1) The lack of presence of any strong 
moral authority leaders within the Muhammadiyah, and 2) The institutional 
culture of the organization which was more conducive toward the 
puritanist/revivialist Islamic theology.  
Analysis of the Theological Reform within the Muhammadiyah 
Religious leadership of Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii Ma’arif. 
According to the moral authority leadership theory introduced in this study, 
religious leaders are considered to have a moral authority by their supporters if 
they are considered as leading theological experts within their own religious 
group as well as perceived charismatic attributes perceived extraordinary or 
supernatural powers by among their supporters. Both Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii 
Ma’arif were widely recognized as leading Islamic theological experts within the 
Muhammadiyah. This served as basis of their credibility among their supporters 
and potential followers. Their closest supporters portrayed them as intellectuals 
with in-depth knowledge about both classical Islamic and Western sociopolitical 
thought. By the virtue of their theological expertise, they had acquired in-depth 
understanding of Islamic theology that few others within the Muhammadiyah 
community have managed to acquire.
75
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 For instance, Fachry Ali, one of Madjid’s first students who later served as his 
long-time personal assistant at Paramadina University, argues that Madjid should 
be considered as a spiritual leader (resi) whom have mastered Islamic religious 
knowledge that are highly important for the contemporary Muslim society in 
Indonesia (Kull, 2005, p. 212). Ali asserts that Madjid could be considered as a 
“teacher of the Indonesian nation” (Guru Bangsa Indonesia). 
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However, because their credibility as religious leaders rest largely on their 
theological expertise, but not necessarily based on any charismatic appeals or 
having intellectual genealogies with the previous generation of Muhammadiyah 
leaders, they are not considered as moral authority leaders. As a result, their 
ability to influence and persuade other members of the organization (especially 
those with different theological or educational background from their own) were 
also limited as well. In the case of Madjid, he was more comfortable speaking 
among fellow Islamic scholars and intellectuals rather than  activists and rank-
and-file Muhammadiyah members who did not necessarily have the same 
theological outlook and intellectual curiosity with him (Kull, 2005, p. 215).
76
  
Madjid’s theological promotion strategy was not like Abdurrahman Wahid 
within the NU. The latter regularly held public meetings, speeches, sermons for 
rank-and-file ulama and followers. In these speeches, Wahid’s popular speaking 
style and charismatic persona served as important assets than enabled him to 
convert his audiences to support the ideas he promoted. Instead, his preferred 
strategy to promote his ideas was largely centered around small-scale seminars 
and lectures for a group of upper and middle-class Indonesian Muslims. In turn, 
                                                             
76 Due to his lack of leadership position within the Muhammadiyah, Madjid was 
widely perceived as an independent thinker who through his ideas, managed to 
win the support of many progressive-minded activists who “gather around him 
voluntarily, not because he is the leader of a large [Islamic] organization or party, 
but instead just [to listen] to his ideas” (Kull, 2005, p. 214).  
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he hoped that these cadres would find ways to spread his ideas on Islam which is 
democratic, inclusive, and pluralist to the Indonesian society (Kull 2005, p. 266).  
However, some Madjid’s supporters have questioned the effectiveness and 
the viability of this strategy, noting that while it successfully won over a large 
number of upper-middle-class intellectuals, these ideas did not attract much 
support among the average Muhammadiyah members. Azyumardi Azra, a former 
student of Madjid, asserts that Madjid was not able to articulate these ideas 
through mediums that were easily accessible for the general Indonesian Muslim 
population. Thus, he missed the opportunity to attract more supporters into his 
cause (Azra, 1993, pp. 152-153, cited in Kull, 2005, p. 220). Another reformist 
intellectual, Moeslim Abdurrahman, believes that Madjid’s movement was based 
on abstract ideas that lacked solid grounding in the ‘real’ world. This made it 
difficult for Muhammadiyah members outside of Madjid’s core supporters to 
relate his theological ideas to their own life experiences. As a result, they were 
reluctant to adopt and accept them (Kull, 2005, p. 223).  
Furthermore, Madjid’s lack of formal leadership position within the 
Muhammadiyah served as another liability that worked against the effective 
propagation of his ideas within the organization. Because he was not part of the 
Muhammadiyah’s formal leadership structure, he had difficulty finding support 
among members of the organization’s leadership, who came from revivalist 
theological background. Only after his colleague Syafii Ma’arif was elected to the 
Muhammadiyah’s leadership board in 1992, then became its chairman in 1998, 
did Madjid’s reform find a strong supporter from within the organization. Finally, 
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Madjid spent little time to directly engage Muhammadiyah’s leaders on the 
necessity of the organization to adopt his theological ideas, which would have 
attracted the support of a new generation of Muhammadiyah members. Instead, he 
preferred to propagate his theological ideas through his own university, 
Paramadina, which limits itself primarily to Islamic higher education activities. 
Even within Paramadina, he surrounded himself with a small-group of like-
minded activists who shared his theological ideas and beliefs, which left him 
vulnerable to the charges of being an elitist (Kull, 2005, pp. 222-223).  
Syafii Ma’arif also largely relied on his theological expertise to support 
his leadership claims within the Muhammadidyah. Despite his popularity among 
the progressive activists circle within the organization, he was not perceived by 
most Muhammadiyah members as a charismatic leader.
77
 Muhammadiyah 
historically based the leadership authority of the organization on the talents and 
accomplishments of its members not by having familial or intellectual genealogy 
with previous generations of leaders. Thus, Muhammadiyah leaders could only 
persuade other activists based on the merits of their arguments, not through their 
charismatic appeal, family genealogy, or personalities. This applies to Ma’arif as 
well as to other leaders of the organization.  
Since neither Madjid nor Ma’arif had charismatic leadership attributes 
within the Muhammadiyah, the reforms within the organization attracted a limited 
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 Observers have noted how Ma’arif’s public speeches and sermons contain no 
charismatic appeals at all, unlike the appearances of charismatic leaders such as 
Abdurrahman Wahid of the NU.  
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amount of support in comparison to the reform efforts of their counterparts within 
the NU.  Most of the supports toward the reform ideas were concentrated in major 
urban cities such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta, where there was a large number of 
upper-middle class Muhammadiyah members with high intellectual capabilities to 
comprehend and understand the implications of the reform for the organization. 
These ideas have gained little attraction from the majority grassroots 
Muhammadiyah activists elsewhere in Indonesia, who lacked advanced education 
in classical Islamic thought and Western social theory that these reformers had. In 
addition, despite Ma’arif’s popularity within the progressive activists circle, he 
was not perceived by other Muhammadiyah members as a charismatic leader that 
could persuade rank-and-file members to adopt the reforms he advocated simply 
by his charismatic appeal and attributes alone.
78
 Due to these drawbacks, 
progressive reformers had difficulties consolidating their reforms within 
Muhammadiyah and to keep the momentum of their reforms going beyond their 
circle of intellectual supporters.  
In conclusion, because the key leaders and key norm entrepreneurs who 
promoted the reforms from within the Muhammadiyah did not have similar level 
of moral authority status compared to their counterpart, Abdurrahman Wahid 
from the NU, they had problems articulating and promoting their ideas beyond the 
small number of core supporters within the organization. As a result, reform 
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 Observers have noted how Ma’arif’s speech and public appearances contains no 
charismatic appeals at all, unlike the appearances of reform leaders in other 
organizations like Abdurrahman Wahid from the NU.  
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supporters had more difficulties explaining how the social reconstruction of 
Muhammadiyah’s theological frames and political identities resulted from the 
reforms would have affected the rank-and-file members of the organization. As a 
result, it became more difficult for the reformers to institutionalize their reforms 
within the Muhammadiyah and to keep the level of support for their reforms 
going beyond the immediate circle of supporters within the organization. Lastly, 
they preferred to focus their propagation activities among members of Indonesia’s 
upper-middle class elite. This has severely limits the spread of progressive Islamic 
ideas to the majority of Indonesian Muslims, most of them are coming from 
lower-class background.  
The impacts of puritanist/revivalist institutional culture.  The struggle 
to implement progressive theological reform within the Muhammadiyah was 
basically a struggle over different theological interpretations of classical Islamic 
teachings and over the political identities of the organization which are closely 
related to the prevailing theological frames that are institutionalized within the 
organization, be it puritanist/revivalist-oriented or liberal/progressive oriented. 
The leading hurdle facing the progressive reformers within the Muhammadiyah 
was the strong opposition from more conservative, revivalist-oriented ulama, 
clerics, and activists from within the organization. Conservative/revivalist Islam 
have stronger theological roots within the organization, which can be traced to the 
time it was founded in 1912. Originally, the Muhammadiyah was established 
because its founders wished to purify Islamic rituals, customs, and practices 
followed by their traditionalist counterparts, who often mixed elements of Islamic 
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beliefs with local animistic customs and traditions. For Muhammadiyah members, 
such practices are against the fundamental beliefs of Islamic faith as prescribed in 
the Qur’an and the Hadith. Thus, they should be considered as heresies (bid’ah). 
To deal against these syncretic and unorthodox practices, Muhammadiyah 
adopted a theological platform that sought the eradication of superstitions 
(tah’yul), heresies (bid’ah), and myths (khu’rafah) (Puar, 1989, pp. 19-21)79.  
This conservative theological platform underscored the preferences of 
many of its members to the interpretation of Islam that promotes literal reading of 
the Qur’an and the Hadith, as well as the rejection of any theological 
interpretations they perceived as contradictory to this literalist interpretation.  This 
revivalist theological preference was strengthened during the late 1920 and early 
1930s, after a new generation of Muhammadiyah activists who received 
theological training from the Middle East began to assume leadership positions 
within the organization.
80
 Under their leadership, the Muhammadiyah began to 
take more assertive stand to defend Islam against those it considered as either 
opponents or enemies of the Islamic faith. These included traditionalist Muslims 
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 As part of a strategy to eradicate tahyul, bid’ah, and khu’rafah (commonly 
nicknamed “TBC”), revivalists believe that the Muhammadiyah should eradicate 
syncretic but popular Islamic practices such as worship of  the cult of famous 
ulama or preachers (saint worshipping), worship of statues and icons, prayers 
before the graves of deceased relatives, Sufi-style mystic rituals, superstitious 
beliefs, and other practices that are not specifically prescribed within the Koran 
and the Hadith (Puar, 1989, pp. 19-21). 
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 These activists include figures such as former Muhammadiyah Kyai Haji Mas 
Mansur (1896-1946), Muhammadiyah chairman from 1935 to 1942, Ki Bagus 
Hadikusumo (1890-1954), Muhammadiyah chairman from 1942 to 1953, and 
A.R. Sutan Mansur, Muhammadiyah chairman from 1953 to 1959.  
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as well as Christian minorities (Alfian, 1989, p. 205). Under their leadership, new 
institutions such as the Doctrinal Opinions Council (Majelis Tarjih) were founded 
to promote the “correct” theological interpretations and eliminate heretical rituals 
and practices within the Indonesian Muslim community. Progressive-leaning 
activists within the Muhammadiyah had long complained that institutions such as 
Majelis Tarjih tend to emphasize a narrow and more rigid interpretation of 
Islamic theology and rituals rather than interpretations based on independent 
reasoning (ijtihad) that takes into account new sociopolitical realities, local 
customs, and practices that do not contradict fundamental Islamic beliefs. 
Consquently, the Muhammadiyah discourages its members from promoting new 
theological innovations that do not have roots within the Qur’an and the Hadith 
(Burhani, 2006, pp.10-11).  
In addition to institutions such as Majelis Tarjih, the leadership 
recruitment and selection process within the Muhammadiyah tends to favor 
activists with revivalist theological leanings rather than those who favor 
progressive theological leanings. Candidates for top leadership positions within 
the organization were not directly elected (unlike the NU), but are instead chosen 
by a selection committee, which was tasked to select members of the central 
leadership board as well as heads of numerous autonomous boards and 
institutions within the organization. This committee helps to eliminate many 
prospective candidates who do not share the revivalist theology that prevails 
within the organization (Asyari, 2007, p. 36). As a result, it tends to promote the 
selection of conservative, revivalist-leaning candidates into Muhammadiyah’s 
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leadership, rather than those who are more inclined to promote progressive 
theological reforms within the organization.  
As a new wave of Islamic revivalism spread to Indonesia during the 1970s 
and 1980s, the revivalist theology within the organization was strengthened 
significantly through the activities of Muhammadiyah activists who were also 
affiliated with revivalist propagation organizations such as the DDII. Long-time 
Muhammadiyah activist Lukman Harun (1934-2001) who served in the 
Muhammadiyah leadership board during the 1980s and 1990s, started his career 
in the DDII as a revivalist activist during the 1960s. The DDII was known for its 
numerous causes that condemned and attacked other groups who were opposed to 
the revivalist’s goals to make Indonesian society more Islamic. These include 
secularist politicians, Christians and other non-Muslim minorities, and 
progressive-oriented Muslims (Liddle, 1996b, pp. 271-272). As a Muhamadiyah 
leader, Harun helped to promote many of these causes as well. For instance, he 
helped to found the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World 
(Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam – KISDI), a group that 
highlights the plight of Muslims in numerous troubled hotspots in the world, in 
order to recruit young Muslims to support revivalist and potentially radical, 
revivalist causes (Hefner, 2000, pp. 109-110).
81
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 Both KISDI and its parent organization, DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia) were alleged to have collaborative relationship with the Suharto 
regime in the 1990s and was used by the regime as a vehicle to threaten potential 
opposition representing secular nationalists, progressive-minded Muslims, and 
non-Muslims (Hefner, 2000, pp. 179-180).  
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Due to the long prevalence of revivalist institutional culture within the 
Muhammadiyah, it was not surprising that when progressive activists led by 
Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii Ma’arif began to introduce their progressive 
theological interpretations within the Muhammadiyah and sought to 
institutionalize them through the reform of the Majelis Tarjih, establishment of 
JIMM, and other reform initiatives, a counter-reformation movement immediately 
rose up to challenge them. The counter-reformation campaign against the reforms 
was widely believed to be lead by Din Syamsuddin, deputy chairman of the 
Muhammadiyah during Syafii Ma’arif’s term as chairman of the organization. A 
protégé of Lukman Harun, Syamsuddin was considered to be close to hard-line 
revivalist organizations such as the DDII (Hefner, 2000, p. 260, fn. 30; Asyari, 
2007, p. 37).  He was also connected with radical Islamic organizations such as 
Laskar Jihad, which was fighting a violent conflict with Christian minorities 
living in the island of Maluku from 1999 to 2001 (Asyari, 2007, p. 37). Lastly, 
Syamsuddin was perceived to be responsible for the issuance of a legal opinion 
(fatwa) issued by the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia – 
MUI)
82
, of which he served as its General Secretary, that considered religious 
tolerance/pluralism, secularism, and liberalism, as forbidden heresies within Islam 
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 The Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia - MUI) was the 
official state-sponsored Islamic organization that issues fatwas and other legal 
advice that are related to Islam as well as other contemporary social problems, in 
the name of the entire Indonesian Islamic community. The council was staffed by 
ulama from Muhammadiyah, NU, and other smaller Islamic organizations. 
However, its rulings are not considered as binding/mandatory by these 
organizations, which are concerned about losing their authorities to a state-
sponsored institution such as MUI. For further details on MUI, see Hosen (2004).  
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(Asyari, 2007, p. 38). This fatwa was directed against the progressive faction 
within the Muhammadiyah in order to reduce the popular support for the reform 
initiatives they had advocated within the organization.  
In addition to Syamsuddin, other revivalist activists such as Adian Husaini 
also participated in numerous public discourses to discredit the proposals of the 
progressive faction. Husaini criticized the progressives’ call to promote religious 
tolerance and pluralism as an effort to “equalize Islam’ with all other religious 
faiths in the world and reject the exclusive ‘truth’ of Islam as propagated by the 
Qur’an and the Hadith.” (Biyanto, 2009, pp. 167-169). He believed that the MUI 
fatwa against the propagation of these ideas was appropriate in order to prevent 
other Muslims, especially Muhammadiyah members, to follow these ‘heretical’ 
teachings. Lastly, senior Muhammadiyah leaders such as former Muhammadiyah 
chairman Amien Rais (b. 1945), also lent their support for the counter-
reformation movement.
83
 As Muhammadiyah’s chairman from 1995 to 1998, Rais 
was widely known for his political activism as one of the leader of the opposition 
movement against Suharto (along with Abdurrahman Wahid). However, he was 
also firmly committed to retaining the revivalist theology that had long prevailed 
within the Muhammadiyah.
84
 Unlike progressive reform leaders such as Madjid 
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 For instance, Rais wrote the foreword of several publications written by 
revivalist activists that condemn the reformers efforts to promote ‘secularism’ and 
‘liberalism’ within the Muhammadiyah (e.g., Rais, 2010). 
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 Like most revivalists, Rais believes that Islam constitutes a complete way of 
life for Muslims in both the spiritual and the temporal realm, so it does not 
recognize any form of separation between religion and the state. Due to this 
fundamental difference between Islam and secularism, he believes that the two are 
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and Ma’arif who preferred elite-level theological discourses with a small group of 
reform supporters instead of giving popular speeches for the rank-and-file 
Muhammadiyah members, Din Syamsuddin and Amien Rais were known within 
the organization for their popular sermons and speches in which they were able to 
convince their audience to support their ideas. These clearly helped revivalist 
activists to counter the reforms among rank-and-file members of the 
Muhammadiyah as well.  
In the end, the efforts of reformers to reconstruct the conservative 
theological frames and political identities of the Muhammadiyah was inhibited the 
revivalist-oriented institutional culture within the Muhammadiyah. It was much 
stronger than the progressive theological ideas that sought to replace rigid and 
literalist theology within the organization with one that is more democratic, 
inclusive, and tolerant against syncretic Muslims and non-Muslims. Revivalist 
Islamic theology has been an integral part of Muhammadiyah’s institutional 
culture over the past century of its existence. Since it frames the theological ideas 
and norms of most Muhammadiyah activists, the revivalist faction has far more 
ideological and instrumental resources within the organization to counter the 
efforts of the progressives to implement their reforms in the Muhammadiyah. As 
shown in this empirical analysis, the revivalists were able to marginalize the 
reformers by excluding them from the organization’s leadership positions and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
irreconcilable (Rais, 1995, pp. xxi-xxii, cited in Muzakki, 2004, p. 149). Rais also 
believes that Muslims should have received a special status in Indonesian politics 
by occupying high political offices such as the presidency and key government 
ministries, while non-Muslims are not entitled to occupy these positions 
(Abdillah, 1997, pp. 102-106, cited in Hefner, 2000, p. 259, fn. 21). 
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denying the legitimacy of their reforms by issuing fatwa and other legal rulings 
that enable the counter-reformers to push the reformers to become marginalized 
from within the organization at this point.  
Relations between the Muhammadiyah and the Indonesian State  
Despite the revivalist theological positions it has historically been known 
for, Muhammadiyah is also known for its political pragmatism. It has historically 
been willing to develop cooperative relations and alliances with the Indonesian 
state, including under the Suharto regime. Thanks to the decision made by its 
former chairman A. R. Fachruddin during the early 1970s to become politically 
neutral and adopt apolitical positions, the organization retained its importance as 
one of leading Islamic group in Indonesia throughout the 1970s to the 1990s. It 
was frequently consulted by the Suharto regime to give its feedback on various 
policies related to the Indonesian Islamic community.
85
 Thus, despite the political 
limitations imposed by the Suharto regime, Muhammadiyah still has significant 
political influence that could not be ignored by the regime. In addition, 
Muhammadiyah members tend to be middle class professionals who worked both 
in the Indonesian civil service, many Muhammadiyah activists ended up as senior 
staffs of various government ministries within the Suharto regime, including 
within key ministries such as finance, development planning, and trade and 
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 For instance, it had played an important role in shaping the Suharto 
government’s legislations on marriage (1973), registration of civil society 
organizations (1985), national education policy (1988), and Islamic court (1989) 
(Syamsuddin, 1995, p. 48). 
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industry (Effendy, 2003, pp. 84-85).
86
 Many members of Muhammadiyah’s 
central leadership board also served as officials of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs or as faculty members within the Islamic state universities system 
(Fachruddin, 2005, p. 67).
87
 As a result, the organization has developed a close 
network within the Indonesian state, which served it well especially during the 
Suharto regime, as the organization potentially benefited both instrumentally and 
materially from its relationship, for instance, in getting subsidies for its extensive 
network of primary and secondary schools throughout Indonesia.  
Through their da’wa activities, Muhammadiyah activists who worked for 
the Indonesian government gradually shifted the perception of other top officials 
within the Suharto regime, from more hostile and less tolerant attitudes against 
Islamic organizations such as the Muhammadiyah during the 1970s, to one that 
was largely receptive and accommodative toward Islamic groups by the 1990s. In 
the long run, they contributed to the 180-degree turnaround in Suharto’s policy 
toward Islam and Islamic organizations. It changed from a policy of repression 
and restriction against Islamic activists in the 1970s and 1980s to one that largely 
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 Muhammadiyah cadres who became top-ranking officials under the Suharto 
regime during the 1970s and 1980s included Mari’e Muhammad (former Minister 
of Finance), Saadilah Moersid (former Cabinet Secretary/Chief of Staff to 
President Suharto, Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo (former top official at the Ministry of 
Development Planning (Bappenas)), and Barli Halim (former Director of the 
National State Oil Company (Pertamina)) (Effendy, 2003, p. 85).  
87
 This includes Syafii Ma’arif, who served as a professor of history at 
Yogyakarta State University (Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta - UNY) and Amien 
Rais, who was a professor of political science at state-run Gajah Mada University 
(Universitas Gajah Mada – UGM).  
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accommodated conservative and sometimes revivalist Islam during the 1990s 
(Liddle, 1996c).  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Nurcolish Madjid had originally 
initiated his theological reform proposals as part of his strategy to promote 
democratic change within the Suharto regime. Madjid and many of his colleagues 
were skeptical of the ability of mass-based Islamic groups to promote change 
within the Suharto regime using protests and other confrontational means. Unlike 
Abdurrahman Wahid from the NU who led his organization to directly confront 
the regime during the-1990s, Madjid and his colleagues within the 
Muhammadiyah preferred the less confrontational strategy of dialogue and 
cooperation with the Suharto regime. Their goal was to gradually persuade the 
regime to adopt more tolerant attitudes toward Islamic activists and social 
movements as well as a more open and democratic politics for Indonesian citizens 
in general (Hefner, 2000, pp. 114-115).  
Reformers like Madjid developed alliances with the Minister of Religious 
Affairs and other officials and acquired some influence on how the ministry’s 
policies on Islamic groups in Indonesia. Their cooperation ensures that the 
reforms would not run into opposition from the ministry officials as well as from 
the Suharto regime. During the mid-1980s Madjid worked together with then-
Religious Affairs Minister Munawir Syadzali  (1924-2003) to implement policies 
that reflected the progressives thought on Islam and modernity within the state’s 
Islamic higher education (Institute Agama Islam Nasional - IAIN) system.  The 
reforms initiated by Madjid and Syadzali during the 1980s tried to integrate 
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Islamic studies in IAIN with Western-based sciences and institute a new 
curriculum that promotes the critical study of Islamic theology and philosophy, 
using ijtihad-based methodology reformers (Feener, 1999, pp. 164-165, cited in 
Kull, 2005, p. 180). Many current faculty members within the IAIN system are 
influenced by the thought of Nurcolish Madjid and his fellow reformers and tend 
to be the proponents of their reform initiatives (Barton, 1997, p. 55; Kull, 2005, 
pp. 180-181).  
Rational choice scholars (e.g., Leong, 2008) are interpreting 
Muhammadiyah’s politically neutral and cooperative position during the 1970s 
and 1980, as well as Madjid’s collaboration with the Suharto regime through 
ICMI and IAIN initiatives as evidence that they were trying to seek greater 
influence and/or material benefits by maintaining cooperation with a regime that 
has repressed many Indonesian citizens. Muhammadiyah’s moderate and 
cooperative strategies during the 1970s and 1980s were clearly motivated by the 
desire of at least some Muhammadiyah leaders and activists to seek instrumental 
and material benefits for the organization. They also sought to have some 
influence in the regime’s policies toward Islam during this period.  
However, this explanation needs to be complemented with an analysis on 
the ideational rationale in order to fully taking into account the relationship 
between Muhammadiyah and the Suharto regime during this period. The 
reformers within the Muhammadiyah pursued cooperative relationship with the 
Suharto regime to show that first, they did not intend to challenge the regime 
through either violent or confrontational means, unlike the strategies of other 
192 
Islamic groups such as the revivalist DDII or even the NU, which by the 1990s 
had taken a more confrontational stance against the regime under Abdurrahman 
Wahid’s leadership. They sought cooperative relationships to win allies with 
officials from within the Suharto regime to ensure that the regime would be less 
likely to suppress their reform efforts.  Madjid himself believed that it was 
important for his reform movement to develop a relationship with other 
government officials and Islamic intellectuals within the ICMI, as they might 
have a separate interests and goals apart from that of Suharto, the chief patron of 
the organization (Hefner, 2000, p. 143).  
I argue that even when collaborating with the Suharto regime, the 
reformers maintained their commitment to promote democratic and more 
progressive Islam in Indonesia over the long run. Madjid used his position at 
ICMI to protect young reform activists that were threatened with repression and 
retaliatory actions at the hand of the Suharto regime. He also insisted that the 
involvement of pro-reform activists within the ICMI was a strategy to promote 
their reform ideas to other Muhammadiyah members and to sympathetic officials 
within the Suharto regime (Hefner 2000, p. 143). This does not indicate that they 
are being co-operated or co-opted by the Suharto regime.  
In the end, the cooperative relationship between the reformers and 
officials from the Suharto regime period managed to cultivate a relatively 
peaceful relationship between reform proponents and the regime, which resulted 
in the lack of any state-led’s efforts to impose restrictions against reform 
proponents in their efforts to reform the Muhammadiyah during the 1990s. The 
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relationship developed by Nurcolish Madjid and other reform leaders with 
officials from key government agencies such as  the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
and the IAIN system has diminished the government’s efforts to repress the 
reforms before they could gain popular support. Based on these, we could assume 
that the reform activists and the state managed to develop peaceful relationship 
between one another that helps to assure that the Suharto regime did not suppress 
the reforms prematurely. Of course, in the end the reform efforts failed due to the 
counter-reformation efforts done by revivalist faction within the organization. 
However, the reformers did not have to encounter repressive campaigns against 
the reform from the state during the time they were trying to implement them 
during the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Alternative Explanations on the Theological Reform within the 
Muhammadiyah 
There are two alternative approaches that explain why the Muhammadiyah 
reformers failed to successfully implement their reform: political culture 
(culturalist) approach and rational choice (rationalist) approach. This section 
elaborates on these competing theoretical approaches, then analyzed their 
strengths and weaknesses. Lastly, the section explains why the moral authority 
leadership theory introduced in this study could provide us with a better 
theoretical framework than the two alternative theories discussed in this section.  
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Culturalist explanation. Scholars who use culturalist approach based 
from modernization theory (e.g., Huntington, 1996)
88
 tend to portray Islamic 
groups as social movements with inherently hostile attitudes toward modern 
Western sociopolitical ideas. This is because they are perceived to be 
incompatible with Islamic ideas based on the literal reading the Qur’an and the 
Hadith, and their interpretation which promotes an authoritarian form of 
governance based on the strict application of Islamic (shari’a law). Unlike social 
constructivist scholars, culturalists argue that it is nearly impossible for Islamic 
groups to transform themselves from a conservative, revivalist-oriented 
theological position into one that accepts the compatibility of Islamic theology 
with modern sociopolitical ideas, while managing to maintain their groups’ 
commitment toward the Islamic faith at the same time.  
In the case of the Muhammadiyah, culturalist theorists would have 
explained the failure of the reformers to implement their reforms within the 
organization by highlighting that the Muhammadiyah has a rigid puritanist 
ideology which favors revivalist interpretation of Islamic theology (e.g., Noer, 
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 The label “culturalist” in this study largely refers to the study of culture in 
political science that was based on modernization theory, which tends to hold 
cultural and religious ideas to be largely fixed and constant, with little 
possibilities of change in the near or immediate future. I recognize that this view 
of culture is no longer prevalent both in political science as well as in other 
disciplines. Scholars working from cultural anthropology and post-modernist 
perspectives (e.g., Wedeen, 2002) has developed an alternative definition of 
culture as a socially constructed idea that is more nuanced and amendable to 
change and I fully agree with this definition. However, modernization theory 
remains an alternative theoretical explanation widely used in contemporary study 
of religion and politics (e.g., Kuru, 2009), so I believe it is still worthy to include 
it as an alternative explanation of this study.  
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1973; Peacock, 1978; etc). This ideology is incompatible with the effort of the 
reformers to develop a synthesis between the Islamic faith and modern 
sociopolitical values and norms. This explanation in some ways is identical to the 
theoretical explanation offered by the constructivist-based moral authority 
leadership theory that I had developed. This is because culturalists also argue that 
it is the rigid theological frame of the Muhammadiyah that contributed to the 
failure of the progressive reformers to successfully institutionalize their 
alternative Islamic theology within the Muhammadiyah.  
However, this is the only similarity between the culturalist and social 
constructivist theoretical explanations. Culturalist scholars assume that Islamic 
theology within the Muhammadiyah is conservative and backward, with little 
possibility of being adapted or reconstructed to adapt to modern sociopolitical 
ideas (e.g., Peacock, 1978). In their interpretation, members of the 
Muhammadiyah have “become mere traditionalists and cannot come to grips with 
the demands of current and future social change” (Liddle, 1996a, p. 150). As a 
result, reformers within the Muhammadiyah are not able to find much supports 
for the reforms they are propagating if they were primarily to rely on the textual 
sources and discourses from Islamic scriptures. Instead, culturalists argue that in 
order to increase their credibility, the reformers should have bolstered their 
modern Western sources and credentials over those that are based on Islamic 
sources (Liddle, 1996a, p. 167).  
In response to the alternative explanation offered by the culturalist 
approach, I argue that there is little evidence to support the theoretical claim of 
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culturalist scholars that Islam and modern political values are incompatible with 
one another. Instead, as we could see in the following section, Muhammadiyah 
reformers frequently asserted the compatibility between Islamic and liberal 
democratic values. Both Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii Ma’arif have frequently 
invoked the compatibility between concepts that are frequently found within the 
Islamic tradition such as shura (consensus) and mushawarah (deliberation) with 
liberal democratic practices (e.g., Kull, 2005, p. 140; Ma’arif, 2006, p. 235). They 
have also frequently cited the Qur’anic recognition for the rights of Jewish and 
Christian minorities (People of the Book) within the Islamic tradition as 
precedence for their argument that the Muhammadiyah should respect and 
promote religious tolerance of non-Muslim minorities in Indonesia. These 
examples show that the claims of culturalist scholars regarding the incompatibility 
between Islamic and Western sociopolitical ideas and the inability of 
Muhammadiyah reformers to connect them together are dubious.  
This is compatible with social constructivist explanation offered in this 
study, which argues that progressive Islamic theology is developed through the 
synthesis of Islamic and Western sociopolitical thought, which is then used by 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ to reconstruct the theological frames, political identities, and 
preferences of their group.  For instance, the ‘norm entrepreneur’ behind the 
Muhammadiyah reforms, Nurcolish Madjid, was well-versed in Western social 
theory and  had publicly stated his admiration toward American democracy and 
political institutions and he believed they can serve as a positive model for 
countries undergoing democratic transition like Indonesia (Kull, 2005, pp. 141-
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142). However, he also stated that his conception of democracy is primarily based 
on the principle of consultative deliberation (mushawarah) originated from within 
the Islamic tradition, as well as from the practices developed by the Prophet and 
his first four successors during the early Islamic period (Kull, 2005, p. 140). 
Lastly, Madjid did not shy away from openly criticizing United States’ foreign 
policy in the Middle East that in his view has caused a great harm against the 
global Islamic community. He was a leading opponent of the United States 
invasion in Iraq in 2003 (Kull, 2005, p. 192). These evidences show that the 
culturalist argument that the reformers were just trying to imitate Western ideas at 
face value in their reforms of the Muhammadiyah is false. Instead, they combine 
Islamic and Western political ideas in their attempt to reconstruct the 
organization’s theological frames and political identities, in order to convince 
their counterparts within the organization that Islam, democracy, and liberal 
sociopolitical ideas could be adopted within the organization. 
In sum, culturalist explanation offered by scholars such as Peacock and 
Liddle fails to explain the attempt at theological reform within the 
Muhammadiyah, due to its simplistic assumptions which presumed the 
incompatibility between Islam and Western liberal democratic ideas. In contrast, 
moral authority leadership theory, which is based on social constructivist 
theoretical framework, offers a better theoretical explanation to explain the failure 
of the reformists to institute their reforms within the Muhammadiyah. This is 
because it does not assume the incompatibility of these two ideas but instead 
assume that both of them are socially constructed norms that could be reframed 
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and reconstructed by reform proponents so that the two ideas could be made 
compatible.  
Rationalist explanation. Scholars who employ rational choice theoretical 
explanation usually emphasize the instrumental preferences of human actors, 
although some also try to develop a more nuanced theoretical explanation by 
combining instrumental and ideational preferences that these actors might have 
held. Nevertheless, their accounts often prioritize the instrumental preferences, 
strategies, and actions of these actors, while the status of normative and ideational 
goals and preferences in rational choice explanations remain ambiguous. 
However, some scholars (e.g., Gill, 2008; Warner, 2000) do incorporate ideational 
preferences into their analyses. While scholars who incorporate ideational and 
instrumental preferences are able to form a more nuanced explanation of religious 
group’s political strategies than those who do not, more work needs to be done to 
further clarify the role of theological ideas in motivating the political behavior of 
religious groups and actors.  
Rationalist scholars such as Leong argue that the reforms promoted by 
reformers within the Muhammadiyah is directed toward generating instrumental 
and material benefits for the movement as well as for the reforms supporters. 
They argue that while the Muhammadiyah  had supported an Islamic state in the 
past, the reformers were willing to compromise this primary preference if the 
Indonesian state agrees to “privilege Islamic authority and implement expansive 
social reforms reflecting Islamic mores” (Leong 2009, p. 297). Some reformers, 
such as members of the Muhammadiyah- affiliated Indonesian Muslim University 
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Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia – HMI), which 
Madjid used to chair during the late 1960s and early 1970s, even compromised 
these secondary preferences in order to promote their instrumentalist goal to gain 
economic and political benefits by developing alliances with Suharto and other 
regime officials (Leong, 2009, p. 297).  
  To support this argument, rationalists noted Madjid’s involvement with 
Suharto-linked institutions such as the State Islamic State Universities (Institut 
Agama Islam Negeri - IAIN) system as further evidence to support their claims 
(Kull, 2005, p. 172). They also cited his university’s major supporters who were 
either high-ranking officials or wealthy businessmen closely connected to the 
Suharto regime as evidence for their theoretical explanation. For instance, the 
presence of four high-level Suharto government officials in the opening of the 
university in 1986 and the presence of eight government ministers in its inaugural 
board of advisors indicated that the major donors of the university were not just 
“the middle class, but especially the elite class” (Hefner, 2000, p. 125).89 As a 
result, rationalists argue that the primary motive for Nurcolish Madjid to propose 
these reforms is to gain influence among the Suharto regime and members of the 
political elites as well as to seek state patronage. On the other hand, his ideational 
goals such as promoting democracy and religious tolerance at best only take a 
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 As a matter of fact, this argument is not just made by rationalist scholars. Many 
of Madjid’s critics, especially those from the revivalist Islamic background, have 
long accused him and his colleagues with political and financial opportunism 
(e.g., Hassan, 1982, pp. 121-123, cited in Hefner, 2000, p. 255, fn. 51).  
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secondary priority after the more instrumental preferences such as gaining 
political influence and material benefits. 
Rational choice scholars correctly pointed out that reform leaders such as 
Nurcolish Madjid did develop a close relationship with the Suharto regime during 
the 1980s and early 1990s. While this relationship might have resulted in some 
material gains and patronage opportunities for Madjid and other reform 
supporters, I argue that this explanation can only partially account for the 
rationale for introducing and promoting the reforms in the first place. In order to 
fully explain the motivations of the Muhammadiyah reformers, we need to look at 
them through the moral authority leadership theory. Under this theoretical 
framework, the reformers were pursuing alliance and cooperation with the 
Suharto regime not primarily because of the desire to seek political power or 
material benefits. Instead, these alliances and partnerships were done in order to 
prevent Suharto from repressing the reform activists before they were able to 
generate adequate support for their reform within the Muhammadiyah.  
Evidence to support the claim of the moral authority leadership theory 
could be found from the fact that although Madjid and other reform supporters 
developed a close relationship with the Suharto regime, they were not hesitant to 
condemn and criticize the regime when it violated the reform principles they 
advocated. For instance, in an interview conducted in October 1998, Madjid 
revealed his disdain for Suharto and stated that he always remembered Suharto’s 
harsh repression against his mentors such as the revivalist Islamic scholar and 
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politician Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993)
90
 after he had assumed power in 1966. 
Since then, he had considered Suharto as a ruthless dictator since then (Friend, 
2003, pp. 1-4, cited in Kull, 2005, p. 83). This interview clearly indicates that 
while Madjid did work together with some officials from the Suharto regime 
during the time he began to promote his reforms, he had never held Suharto in 
high regard from the time Suharto assumed power in 1966 until he stepped down 
in 1998.  
Another example that demonstrates Madjid’s commitment to the  his 
reform was his consistency to promote his thought on democracy, human rights, 
and religious pluralism, while he was active as a leading member of Suharto’s 
sponsored Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Indonesia – ICMI) in the 1990s. If Madjid were to join this Suharto-
linked organization with the goal of seeking to increase his influence within the 
regime, as many of his revivalist critics had long pointed out, he would have 
toned down his criticism against Suharto and his regime as he developed closer 
alliances with regime officials. However, Madjid continued to speak up and write 
on the subjects of Islam and democracy, human rights, and religious pluralism 
throughout the early and mid-1990s.
91
 Madjid did not tone down his promotion of 
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 Natsir had mentored Madjid when he was a young student activist in the 1960s, 
although they parted company as Madjid started to promote his “progressive 
Islamic ideas in the 1970s.  
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 As a matter of fact, many of the landmark books Madjid had written on these 
subjects were published in the 1990s, during the time he was also active within 
the ICMI. These include: Islam, Doctrine, and Civilization: A Critical Study of 
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progressive Islam, in spite of the fact that some of his ICMI colleagues actively 
supported revivalist form of Islam to lend legitimacy to Suharto’s authoritarian 
rule (e.g., Hefner, 2000, pp. 140-141, 149-152).
92
  
Lastly, while there were key Suharto-era government officials whom have 
made significant financial contribution to the university he had founded, 
Paramadina University, it received no financial support from the Indonesian 
government. The university prides itself on the fact that its independent status 
(both legally and financially) means that it is not affiliated or dependent on any 
sociopolitical groups within the Indonesian society (Kull, 2005, p. 264). In the 
process, Madjid acquired a reputation as a person who lives simply with a strict 
moral conduct, unlike that of many Indonesian government officials, politicians, 
and even prominent NGO activists whom have acquired enormous material 
wealth from dubious sources (Kull, 2005, pp. 213, 269-270).  
To complement the explanation offered by rational choice theory, I argue 
that the struggle within the Muhammadiyah between the progressive reformers 
and their revivalist opponents primarily are based on two different theological 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Faith, Humanism and Modernity (Madjid 1992), Islam, Democracy, and 
Indonesianness: The Thought of ‘Young’ Nurcolish Madjid (Madjid 1993), and 
Islam, The Religion of Humanity: Building A New Tradition and Vision for 
Indonesian Islam (Madjid 1995).  
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 In response to the agenda of revivalist activists within ICMI, Madjid made a 
speech in October 1992 in which he argues that Muslims should promote 
tolerance toward non-Muslims, especially Christians and Jews, because God’s 
revelations in the Qur’an do not abrogate previous revelations and the revealed 
truth within these religious traditions but instead affirms and confirms their 
validity. He made the speech knowing well that he would be condemned and 
threatened by some members of the revivalist community for promoting these 
ideas (Hefner, 2000, p. 144).  . 
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frames about the role of Islam in the Indonesian society, one is based on puritanist 
and more conservative interpretation of Islam, while the other is based on the 
synthesis of Islamic and Western sociopolitical thought. Moral authority 
leadership theory can offer a more nuanced theoretical explanation than rational 
choice theory because it takes into account the role of Islamic theological ideas 
and how they were used by reform supporters to reframe and reconstruct their 
political goals and preferences within the Muhammadiyah. Unfortunately, they 
encountered a strong opposition from the revivalist faction within the 
organization, which in the end were able to successfully block the reforms from 
being implemented within the organization.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the progressive theological reform efforts 
within the Muhammadiyah through the lenses of the moral authority leadership 
theory and explains why it failed to be institutionalized in this case. Unlike the 
theological reforms within the NU, the reform in Muhammadiyah failed because 
it was not able to overcome the counter-reformation campaign initiated by the 
revivalist opposition against the reform. The reformers efforts were successfully 
blocked by the revivalist faction who believes that these reforms were 
undermining the puritanist Islamic theology that has long dominated the 
theological discourse within the Muhammadiyah. 
204 
The Muhammadiyah case serves as a negative case to test the moral 
authority leadership theory introduced in this study. It shows how progressive 
theological reformers fail to materialize, when the ideas promoted by the religious 
leader faces an institutional barrier in the form of intolerant institutional culture 
and/or conflictual relationship with the state. For our review, this causal 
mechanism works as follows: 
Figure 4.1. Causal mechanism 2: Unsuccessful reform pathway  
Specifically, the counter-reformation pathway works like the following in 
the Muhammadiyah case: the ideas originally propagated by Nurcolish Madjid 
starting in the 1970s began to gain popular following from within the 
Muhammadiyah during the 1980s and 1990s. A new generation of pro-reform 
activists was interested in changing the theological trajectory of their 
organization. They sought to change it from one that historically promotes the 
revivalist interpretation of Islamic theological texts and the eradication of 
syncretic and unorthodox Islamic customs and traditions; to one that promotes 
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democratic political practices and institutions, human rights for all citizens 
irrespective of their religious beliefs, religion-state separation, and religious 
tolerance between Muslims and non-Muslims.  
Their predecessors within the Muhammadiyah had wanted to establish an 
Indonesian state that would have been influenced by the formal rules of Islamic 
law (shari’a), with potentially negative repercussions for groups who did not wish 
to follow the shari’a, such as syncretic Muslims and non-Muslim minorities. In 
lieu of this theological frame, Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii Ma’arif, two reform 
leaders within the Muhammadiyah, decided to promote a different set of 
theological frames and political identities from one that was articulated by their 
predecessors within the organization. They believed that the Muhammadiyah 
should abandon their theological ideas and political identities to seek a state based 
on Islamic principles in favor of a state that followed the principle of religion-
state separation. Under such a state, all Indonesians, irrespective of their religious 
beliefs would have an equal citizenship status, as well as equal political rights. 
Lastly, the Muhammadiyah should recognize and respect the religious beliefs of 
all Indonesians, irrespective of whether they are Muslims or not.   
However, despite the efforts of the progressive activists, they failed to 
achieve their ultimate goal to reform Muhammadiyah, the main modernist Islamic 
group in Indonesia. I argue that the negative outcome of reform within the 
Muhammadiyah occured due to the following reasons. First, despite their widely 
recognized theological expertise, Madjid and Ma’arif did not possess the 
necessary charismatic attributes that would have inspired rank-and-file 
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Muhammadiyah members to change their theological positions and political 
preferences. The revivalist theological interpretations within the organization and 
the dominance of revivalist-oriented leaders in the organization’s leadership board 
serve as counterweight to the voice of progressive reformers within the 
Muhammadiyah. In addition,  the lack of a charismatic moral authority figure who 
could have overcome revivalist’s resistance against the reform proposals, serve as 
another stumbling block for progressive reformers to successfully implement and 
institutionalize their reforms within the organization.  
There are two potential alternative explanations for the motivation of 
progressive Islamic reformers within the Muhammadiyah. On the one hand, 
scholars from the culturalist perspective could argue that reformers were only 
trying to imitate Western liberal ideas. Along this line of thinking, they would not 
be truly successful in their reforms as long as they were still embracing Islamic 
ideas as justifications for their reforms instead of fully embracing secularist ideas. 
As I have shown in this study, since Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii Ma’arif, the two 
norm entrepreneurs who introduce progressive theological ideas within the 
Muhammadiyah, used a synthesis from both classical Islamic principles as well as 
Western social theory as they promoted their ideas to the prospective supporters, 
this culturalist explanation, which ignores the possible compatibility between 
Islamic and Western political thought, could be safely rejected and dismissed.   
On the other hand, rational choice scholars argue that the reformers’ 
promotion of these progressive ideas were part of an attempt to seek 
accommodation with the Suharto regime, in order to gain instrumental and/or 
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material benefits. For instance, since reform leaders such as Nurcolish Madjid 
were also members of Suharto-sponsored Islamic association such as ICMI, the 
theological reforms he had promoted were primarily done to seek political 
accommodation as well as financial support/patronage from the regime. However, 
the ideational and normative components of this alliance that were not 
appropriately accounted by adopting a rationalist theoretical approach. Instead, I 
argue that in order to fully account the failure of progressive theological reform 
within the Muhammadiyah, we need to combine both rationalist and constructivist 
theoretical explanations, which are incorporated in my moral authority leadership 
theory.  
This combination is reflected in the moral authority leadership theory 
introduced in this study. I argue that progressive reform leaders such as Madjid 
and Ma’arif are trying to promote a new theological frame for the 
Muhammadiyah that would have installed modern socio-political ideas such as 
democracy, religion-state separation, and tolerance toward religious minorities. If 
adopted, this new frame would have reconstructed the political identity of the 
organization from a conservative, puritanist Islamic organization to a progressive-
oriented one. The primary goal of these leaders was to promote and 
institutionalize these ideas from within the Muhammadiyah. To pursue this goal, 
these leaders and their supporters utilized both instrumentalist strategies (e.g., 
developing alliances with officials from the Suharto regime) as well as normative 
ones (e.g., using their leadership status to promote the reconstruction of the 
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Muhammadiyah’s theological frames and political identities to reflect their 
progressive theological orientation).  
This normative goal was the primary goal of their efforts to change the 
theological frame of their organization. The moral authority leadership theory 
suggests that the failure of these reforms to take hold within the Muhammadiyah 
was due to the counter-reformation movement within the organization generated 
by the revivalist-oriented leaders and activists from within the organization. Their 
opposition was bolstered by the long-standing institutional culture of the 
organization which stresses a literal interpretation of Islam. This interpretation 
does not tolerate any other forms of interpretations, customs, and traditions within 
the organization. Since the number of revivalist activists within the 
Muhammadiyah were much larger than the pro-reform activists and their leaders 
managed to organize a stronger counter-reformation campaign with more 
supporters and resources than the progressive reformers were able to mobilize, 
they were able to defeat the reform proposals introduced by these progressive 
activists. Here, the process of mutual constitution predicted by social 
constructivist theory works to block the reform efforts, since they did not have 
moral authority status that would have enabled them to overcome the opposition 
against the reforms (an agency-based variable) and that they were facing a 
revivalist institutional culture that opposes the reforms they were proposing (a 
structural-based variable).  
In the concluding chapter (chapter 5), I will summarize the findings of my 
study and assess their theoretical implications for the moral authority leadership 
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theory I have developed in this study. The broader lessons from the different 
causal pathways  theorized in this study and their applications based on the study 
of the two Islamic groups that are studied in this study will also be assessed as 
well. Lastly, the conclusion will assess the main theoretical contributions that 
could be made based on this research as well as the future research agenda that 
would further extend the theoretical framework developed in this study in the 
study of other Islamic social movements elsewhere in the world.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
This study set out to explore the relationship between moral authority 
leadership and the theological, institutional, and political changes within Islamic 
social movements, with an empirical focus on two Islamic movements from 
Indonesia, the NU and the Muhammadiyah. The study focused on whether 
Islamic organizations are able to change their theological frames, political 
identities, and preferences and under which conditions they will be able to do so. I 
suggest that the role of moral authority leadership in influencing such a change is 
further intermediated by institutional culture and the organization’s relations with 
the state. The findings of this study are summarized below. I also discuss the main 
theoretical contributions of this study, highlighting the importance of theological 
ideas, the role of religious leaders in promoting and institutionalizing these ideas, 
and how they use their normative instrumental assets to overcome the cultural as 
well as structural constraints they face while implementing their reforms. Finally, 
I highlight the potential future research agenda that could further extend the 
theoretical framework developed in this study and its application to the study of 
Islamic politics and Islamic social movements. 
Review of Empirical Findings 
The research questions that guided this study are: Why do Islamic 
organizations change their theological frames and political identities from 
conservative/revivalist Islamic theological interpretations to one that supports the 
compatibility between Islamic and modern liberal ideas such as democracy, 
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human rights, and religious tolerance/pluralism? What is the role of religious 
leadership in bringing about this kind of theological change within these groups? 
Under what conditions are religious leaders able to successfully change the 
theological orientations of their religious organization and under what conditions 
they are less likely to successfully accomplish such a change?  
Regarding the first question, the study finds that Islamic groups can and 
do change their theological and political positions, because both are social 
constructions that are amenable to change at the hand of human agents. For this to 
happen requires a leader who is a norm entrepreneur, is able to synthesize existing 
theological ideas with new ones, is willing promote and institutionalize them 
within the group. Such leaders promote the new theological ideas because they 
believe that theological frames and political identities of their respective groups 
need to be changed in order to meet the changing sociopolitical conditions of their 
respective societies. This leader manages to build support for the new theological 
frames s/he proposes from within the group based on the recognition of his/her 
theological expertise as well as from the charismatic attributes s/he might have 
held within the group. S/he serves as the agent of change who synthesizes existing 
ideas from Islamic theological sources and new ones from Western sociopolitical 
theory as a new theological frame that would “reconstruct” existing theological 
frames and political identities within his/her group. In this study, new theological 
frames are promoting the compatibility between Islamic and liberal political 
ideas/norms such as democracy, religion-state separation, and religious tolerance. 
A successful theological reform occurs when the leader manages to persuade and 
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convince the majority of members of his/her organization about the necessity to 
reconstruct their organization’s theological frame and political identity in order to 
answer the contemporary challenges facing the organization. In the process, the 
reformers manage to overcome cultural and institutional constraints against their 
ideas, through the process of mutual constitution, in which both the agent (moral 
authority leader and his/her supporters) and existing cultural and institutional 
structures work together to successfully change the theological frames and 
political identities of their group, creating new sets of identities and political 
goals/preferences for the group in the process, in this study, for conservative and 
literalist Islamic group into one that supports and promotes democracy, religion-
state separation, and religious tolerance for non-Muslims.   
The two Islamic groups studied in this study – the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 
and Muhammadiyah, have had conservative theological frames in the past – and 
in the Muhammadiyah’s case, is still the case today. Both were facing major 
crises that preceded the reform ideas articulated by the moral authority leaders 
from these respective groups. In addition, the two organizations, in varying 
degrees, were also facing the threats of further repression and marginalization 
against at the hand of the Indonesian state. Each of the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
(Abdurrahman Wahid from the NU, and Nurcolish Madjid and Syafii Ma’arif 
from the Muhammadiyah) and new theological ideas they proposed had emerged 
during these crises. They argued that their ideas are potential solutions to the 
crises facing their respective organizations and argued that both the NU and 
Muhammadiyah must reconstruct their theological frames and political identities 
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in order to meet major challenges facing the two organizations during the 1980s 
and 1990s, including from an authoritarian regime which tried to repress any 
political dissents against it, including from the two Islamic groups, with a growing 
number of non-Muslim citizens who wishes to participate equally in the country’s 
public sphere.  However, they were facing numerous cultural and structural 
constraints against the reforms, such as the institutional culture of their respective 
organizations and the potential state repression against the reforms, since they 
imposed a challenge against the legitimacy of the Suharto regime. To deal with 
these constraints, they used different sets of assets ranging from their theological 
expertise, charismatic attributes, and the ability to negotiate alliances and deals 
with officials from the Suharto regime. In the process, the leaders used both 
ideational (e.g., persuasive speeches, familial and intellectual genealogies) and 
instrumental (e.g., building alliances with regime officials and buying off 
potential opponents) strategies in order to ensure that the new theological frames 
and identities they have promoted would be successfully implemented within their 
organizations. The differing assets  (e.g., charismatic attributes) that leaders from 
the two groups have in their efforts to socially reconstruct their organizations and 
promote their ideas within them, as well as the differing constraints (e.g., 
institutional culure) from within each respective organizations help to explain the 
different outcomes of these leaders in their efforts to promote and institutionalize 
their ideas within their respective groups, successful in one case (the NU) and 
unsuccessful in the other (the Muhammadiyah).  
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What exactly is the role of religious leadership in helping to bring about 
theological change within these groups? The answer to this question is that moral 
authority leaders played a very important role in promoting reforms within their 
respective organizations through the ideas they are articulating. The leaders 
studied in this research all saw the need for their organizations to make 
fundamental changes in their groups theological frames, political identities, and 
preferences from conservative Islamic organizations which promoted Islamic 
forms of governance, reject religion-state separation, and exclusion of non-
Muslims in the public life of their societies into more moderate/progressive 
theological frame that supports democracy, religion-state separation, and religious 
tolerance for non-Muslims. Accomplishing these required the social 
reconstruction of pre-existing theological frames and political identities within 
their group, from one that have conservative theological orientations into one 
which accepts the compatibility between Islamic and Western political ideas such 
as democracy, human rights, and religion-state separation. In order to accomplish 
this social reconstruction, they used their status as norm entrepreneurs and 
engaged in persuasive campaigns to promote their ideas within their groups.  In 
the process, they received wide recognition as theological experts by other 
members of groups, by virtue of their extensive training to be an Islamic scholar 
(ulama) in the case of Wahid or someone with doctoral degree in theology or 
religious studies in the case of Madjid and Ma’arif.  In addition Wahid also has 
charismatic attributes through his familial genealogy with his grandfather imam 
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Hasjim Asj’ari, the founding father of the NU. It further enhanced his leadership 
authority within the NU, making him to become a moral authority leader.  
These ‘norm entrepreneurs’ used their leadership status to persuade other 
members of their organizations to accept the theological reforms they were 
advocating. They utilized a wide range of assets and strategies that they have at 
their disposal to promote reform within their respective groups, using both 
ideational (e.g., charismatic attributes, persuasive speaking skills) and 
instrumental (e.g., networking skills, ability to form alliances and compromises, 
and financial resources/patronage). While their goal to promote their theological 
ideas was based on their ideational motivation to promote the new theological 
frame and political identity that they are advocating their own groups, these 
leaders were also behaving instrumentally. They used strategic calculation to 
negotiate and develop alliances with the Suharto regime in order to minimize 
potential state reprisal against their groups. However, the long-term preferences 
and goals of these leaders remained the institutionalization of their ideas, due to 
their normative convictions that these ideas would have changed theological 
frame and political identity of their group so that it supports  democracy and 
democratic political institutions, respect the human rights for all citizens 
irrespective of their religious beliefs, recognize the principle of religion-state 
separation, and promotes toleration for non-Muslims and minority Muslim sects. 
Under which conditions religious leaders are able to successfully change 
the theological orientations of their religious organization and under which 
conditions they are less likely to successfully accomplish such a change? I argue 
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that the main theoretical proposition (hypothesis #1) of my theory is that the 
theological and political changes made by religious organizations are determined 
by the leadership of “moral authority” leaders who use their status as theological 
experts and utilize charismatic leadership style in order to implement and 
institutionalize progressive theological ideas within their organizations. Moral 
authority leaders and their reforms are more likely to be successful in their effort 
to create theological and political changes within their religious groups if they 
could meet most, if not all, of the following conditions: 1) the presence of an 
institutional organizational culture (hypothesis #2) that historically tolerates new 
religious ideas, customs, and traditions, which helps to justify support toward the 
reform among sympathetic members and  helps to discourage the force of 
opposition against the reforms, and 2)  peaceful relations between the religious 
group and the state (hypothesis #3) , which helps to protect moral authority 
leaders and their supporters from any potential reprisal from the state apparatus, 
allowing these reformers to implement their reforms with fewer chances of facing 
persecution or reprisal from the state. 
This study uses comparative historical analysis to study two Indonesian 
Islamic social movements with varying theological orientation: the traditionalist 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and the modernist/revivalist Muhammadiyah. These 
movements are chosen based on their long-time activities in the Indonesian public 
sphere, the large membership-base of these groups, and because the leaders of 
these groups have advocated the social reconstruction of these groups theological 
frames and political identities from conservative/ revivalist theological position 
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(e.g., support for shari’a-based Islamic state and rejection of religion-state 
separation) into what I called progressive Islamic theology - an interpretation of 
Islam which synthesizes basic Islamic theological and legal foundations specified 
in the Qur’an, the Hadith, and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)) with intellectual ideas 
derived from Western social theory (e.g., democracy, human rights, and religious 
liberty/pluralism).  
However, the different cultural and institutional constrains faced by these 
groups and the different sets of assets and strategies that the leaders have used to 
deal with these constraints results in the creation of two causal pathways: the 
successful reform pathway (the NU) and the unsuccessful reform pathway (the 
Muhammadiyah). The theological reforms within the NU was a successful 
outcome due  to the presence of these causal mechanisms: 1) the existence of a 
moral authority leader within the organization who advocated progressive 
theological reforms and used his charismatic appeals to win over the support of 
potential followers (Abdurrahman Wahid), 2) the inclusive institutional culture of 
NU that tolerates the promotion of new theological ideas by the reformers, and 3) 
the relatively peaceful relations between the NU and the Indonesian government 
that contributed to the lack of state reprisal against reform supporters, thereby 
enable them to spread their reforms while encountering little state reprisal against 
them. These mechanisms form the successful reform pathway, in which moral 
authority leadership works together with a tolerant institutional organization 
culture and a peaceful/cooperative state-religious to produce the successful 
institutionalization of progressive theological reform. 
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From the 1950s until the early 1980s, the NU was widely known as a 
conservative Islamic organization that had promoted the eventual enactment of 
shari’a law as the constitutional foundation of the Indonesian state and also 
rejected the separation between religion and the state separation enshrined in 
Indonesia’s secular nationalist ideology Pancasila. This conservatism shrined 
from the NU’s theological frame during the period, which followed the Qur’an, 
the Hadith and classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as interpreted by the ulama 
whom have led the organization from the time it was founded in 1926. However, 
as the organization faced increasing pressures from the Suharto regime, there was 
a growing demand from a younger generation of NU activist for the organization 
to change its theological frames, in order to meet the challenges from the regime 
and to present the NU as a more democratic Islamic organization in tune with the 
changing sociopolitical conditions in Indonesia during this period. To meet the 
demands of these activists, a visionary NU ulama named Abdurrahman Wahid 
decided to run for the position of NU chairman in1984 and was elected, thanks to 
the support of the young reformers. From the time Wahid assumed his NU 
chairmanship in 1984 until he stepped down in 1999, he reconstructed the 
conservative theological frame of the organization with his innovative ideas 
which combined classical Islamic jurisprudence and Western political thought on 
democracy, human rights, religion-state separation, and religious tolerance.  
During his 15-year tenure as NU chairman, Wahid successfully 
transformed the theological frame and political identity of the NU from a 
conservative traditionalist-oriented Islamic organization into one that today 
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embraces progressive Islamic principles conducive toward liberal political ideas. 
He also changed the organization’s political preference from one that during the 
late 1970s advocated the establishment of an Islamic state  based on the shari’a 
law and rejected the state ideology Pancasila as a purely secular ideology into one 
that today affirms the Indonesian state does not to be legally based on the shari’a 
principles and accepts Pancasila as the legitimate foundation of the Indonesian 
state and. Lastly, NU also endorses the principles of religious liberty, tolerance, 
and pluralism, arguing that they all the hallmark of the religious diversity of 
Indonesian citizens that should be respected by all Indonesians.  
Wahid was able to implement and institutionalize these theological 
reforms due to his ideational and instrumental assets. He won the recognition of 
his followers as both a leading expert in classical Islamic jurisprudence and a 
charismatic leader by virtue of his perceived extraordinary powers as a living 
saint (wali) for the NU community and his family genealogy as the grandson of 
the organization’s founding father. Wahid propagated his theological ideas 
through his frequent public sermons, op-ed articles in newspapers and other 
popular media, and his frequent visits to meet with other NU ulama and rank-and-
file members throughout Indonesia. Due to his moral authority status, he was able 
to bring together the normally self-autonomous, highly decentralized NU ulama 
and activists to support the theological reforms he advocated. They were willing 
to follow his reforms because of his moral authority status within the 
organization. It was these supporters who managed to implement and 
institutionalize these reformers from within the NU and managed to maintain it 
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consistently after it has been institutionalized. Through his actions as a norm 
entrepreneur and a moral authority leader, assisted by his supporters, Wahid was 
able to brought liberal ideas such as democracy, human rights, and religious 
tolerance into NU’s theological frames and political discourse and instituted them 
successfully from within the organization. 
In addition to Wahid’s moral authority leadership, theological reform 
within the NU was also assisted through the institutional culture of the 
organization that has historically tolerated and incorporated mystical Islamic 
(Sufi) rituals as well non-Islamic rituals originated from Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and animistic local religious traditions. The NU’s history of blending Islamic 
theology and rituals with these non-Islamic rituals made it easier for Wahid and 
his supporters to advocate their theological ideas within the NU, since they could 
pointed out to this history of incorporating non-Islamic rituals as rationale for the 
organization to incorporate Western political ideas that were introduced in their 
theological reforms. Lastly, the temporary alliance between the NU and the 
Suharto regime during the late 1980s helped to assure that the reformers did not 
face any significant reprisal from the Suharto regime. It also enabled Wahid to 
weaken the opposition against his reforms within the NU by granting reform 
opponents access to state patronage, thereby ensuring that they toned down their 
opposition against the reforms. Thus, while Wahid’s reforms were inspired by 
ideational preferences and he deployed ideational strategies and discourses in his 
reforms, the instrumental alliance between Wahid and Suharto was also beneficial 
in helping him to implement and institutionalize the reforms. Together, these 
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mechanisms worked together to ensure the institutionalization of progressive 
theological reforms within the NU by Wahid and his supporters, This could be 
seen from the organization’s consistent endorsement of democracy and other 
liberal principles such as tolerance toward non-Muslim religions from the time of 
Wahid’s chairmanship in the 1980s and 1990s to this day.   
The case of the Muhammadiyah is the negative case examined in this 
study. Unlike the NU, the reform efforts within the Muhammadiyah were not 
successful in changing the theological and political direction of the movement and 
turned the organization into a progressive Islamic organization. Instead, the 
organization’s theological orientation remains puritanist/revivalist. The negative 
outcome of reform within the Muhammadiyah occurs due to the following causal 
mechanisms: 1) The lack of a charismatic leadership - despite their status as a 
widely respected Islamic scholar, neither Nurcolish Madjid nor Syafii Ma’arif 
possessed any charismatic attributes or genealogical links with influential NU 
ulama, 2) the institutional culture of Muhammadiyah is dominated by 
revivalist/fundamentalist activists who reject alternative interpretations of Islam 
that they think are inconsistent with the Qur’an and the Hadith, which impedes the 
spread of liberal reforms within the organization, and 3) this takes place despite 
the relatively peaceful relationship between Muhammadiyah and the Indonesian 
state during the time the reforms were first propagated by Nurcolish Madjid in the 
1980s and 1990s. These mechanisms constitute the unsuccessful reform pathway, 
in which theological reform is unlikely to be successful due to the intolerant 
institutional culture of the religious organization, which enabled reform opponents 
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to develop a strong unsuccessful reform movement against the reformers, they 
would be able to block the reforms proposed by the reformers and successfully 
prevent the reforms from being institutionalized within the organization, despite 
the presence of moral authority leadership within the group and peaceful relations 
between the state and the religious group 
Norm entrepreneurs within the Muhammadiyah, namely Nurcolish Madjid 
and Syafii Ma’arif, decided to pursue a different set of theological frames from 
the puritanist/revivalist theological premises that has long been articulated by 
their predecessors within the Muhammadiyah.  They believed that the 
organization’s theological frame must take into account the contemporary 
sociopolitical conditions of the Indonesian state in its theological teachings, which 
called for a more democratic political system in response to Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule as well as paying attention to the increasing religious diversity 
of the Indonesian society. To address these concerns, they argued that the 
Muhammadiyah should abandon their ideas for an Islamic state in favor of a 
democratic state which recognizes a distinction between state and religious 
realms. In addition, the Muhammadiyah should respect and tolerate the religious 
beliefs of all Indonesians, including non-Muslims.  
Unfortunately, the reform efforts within the Muhammadiyah were not 
successful due to the following factors. First, the reformers were hampered by 
their lack of moral authority status. While Madjid and Ma’arif received wide 
recognition as leading Islamic theological experts, based on their doctoral degrees 
in Islamic Studies from the University of Chicago, neither one of them have 
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charismatic attributes and authority like their counterpart Abdurrahman Wahid 
from the NU. As a result, they failed to promote their reform message beyond the 
relatively small amount of supporters who support these reforms in the first place. 
In addition, they made few efforts to broaden the appeal of their reform to the 
grassroots level Muhammadiyah members. In contrast, under the leadership of 
Din Syamsuddin, reform opponents had an easier time mobilizing against the 
reforms. They were also aided by Syamsuddin’s popular speaking style that 
enabled him to articulate his counter-reformation discourses easily to grassroots 
Muhammadiyah members. Because the reformers were having problems 
attracting support from rank-and-file members of the organization due to their 
lack of moral authority status, while the revivalist have an easier time to do so, the 
latter was able to consolidate their opposition against the progressives among 
regional Muhammadiyah activists and able to put down the reform efforts of the 
progressive activists.  
In addition, the institutional culture of the Muhammadiyah is more 
receptive toward revivalist Islamic theology and the practice of purifying 
syncretic/non-canonical rituals and traditions. As a result, any deviations from 
what the revivalists saw as fundamental Islamic teachings, such as the integration 
of Islamic and Western sociopolitical ideas, are open to criticisms and counter-
attacks by the revivalist faction within the Muhammadiyah. The revivalist faction 
has dominated the Muhammadiyah leadership since at least the 1930s, controlling 
the leadership board both at national and the regional levels. Their dominance of 
the Muhammadiyah’s leadership board has made it difficult for alternative 
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theologies to successfully emerge within the organization, even when the 
organization is led by a reform-minded chairman like Syafii Ma’arif. Since 
revivalist theological frame dominates the theological outlook of many 
Muhammadiyah’s leaders and activists, they have significant resources to counter 
the efforts of progressive reformers to implement their reforms from within the 
organization. In the end, they were able to isolate and marginalize the reformers 
by expelling and excluding progressive activists from the organization’s 
leadership positions after Syafii Ma’arif had stepped down from his chairmanship 
position in 2005.  
These findings are consistent with the theoretical assumptions of moral 
authority leadership theory, which is based primarily on social constructivist 
theory, and is also influenced by Weberian charismatic leadership theory and the 
rational choice theory, which includes ideas into the formation of instrumental 
and material interests of religiously inspired actors. This theory provides a better 
explanation to the theological reforms within Islamic groups like the NU and 
Muhammadiyah compared to political culture/modernization theory. 
Culturalist/modernization theory is not able to predict these theological and 
political changes, because culturalists tend to assume that all Islamic social 
movements have a fixed theological grounding in revivalist Islamic 
fundamentalist theology, therefore they all would advocate for the imposition of 
shari’a law and for a state based on Islamic principles, regardless of time, space, 
and sociopolitical contexts. This belief separate these culturalists from the more 
nuanced interpretation of cultural and religious changes offered by cultural 
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anthropologists as well as social constructivists, which believed that culture and 
ideas are socially constructed and are subjected to continuous reinvention, 
reinterpretation, and negotiation at the hand of political actors.  
As a theory primarily inspired by social constructivist theory, the moral 
authority leadership theory I introduced here is also an effort to incorporate a 
more nuanced explanation of ideational and theological changes and how the 
process of social construction of new ideas change political groups into the 
analysis of Islamic social movements. Unlike this theoretical approach, 
culturalists would not be able to explain why the Nahdlatul Ulama, which until 
the late 1970s had a platform that called for the establishment of a shari’a-based 
Islamic state in Indonesia, decided to reject this platform and replaced it with one 
that supports the legitimacy of the secular nationalist Indonesian state from the 
mid-1980s onwards, under the leadership of the charismatic Abdurrahman Wahid.  
While recent rational choice scholarship has incorporated ideational 
preferences such as theological ideas in their scholarship on religion and politics, 
other rational choice scholars tend to underestimate or downplay the role of 
ideational preferences and goals of religious groups in favor of instrumental 
preferences that privileged interests or material benefits. First generation rational 
choice scholars tend to dismiss ideational preferences as ex post facto explanation 
made to justify the instrumental preferences of political and religious actors. 
However, the next generation of rational choice scholars is incorporating both 
instrumental and ideational preferences in their theoretical explanations. They 
also detailed the possible constraints facing religious group in their efforts to 
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implement their goals and preferences, such as historical legacy, institutional 
structure, and leadership behavior. These works tend to produce more 
sophisticated and highly contextualized explanation of religious groups’ political 
preferences and strategic calculations and also explain why differ when they are 
facing different historical, cultural, and institutional constraints.  
Rational choice theory can clearly explain the instrumental rationale taken 
by religious actors, such their strategic alliances with friendly state 
actors/politicians in order to win alliances or concessions that had allowed them to 
spread their reforms without facing state repression or the use of financial 
resources/patronage to buy support from members of their organization whom 
might have opposed their reforms otherwise (e.g., as seen through the state 
patronage given by Wahid to the NU ulama. However, without paying more 
attention to ideational preferences, rational choice theory by itself might have 
problems to fully explain the actions of the religious leaders and their supporters, 
who often rely on ideational discourses and theological frames. These cannot be 
fully explained if one relies primarily or solely on instrumental explanations 
alone. For instance, it might have problems explaining the persistence of moral 
authority leaders and their supporters in advocating their reforms in spite of the 
stiff opposition and reprisal against them from their opponents without any 
immediate payoffs or benefits for them in the short or intermediate run.  It might 
also have problems explaining the ability of moral authority leaders to attract the 
support and the loyalty of a large number of followers – many of them are 
following their advices, commands and directives solely by believing in the 
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charismatic attributes (extraordinary powers and abilities, family or intellectual 
genealogies) that these leaders claim to have. Thus, I argue that the ideational 
preferences of moral authority leaders and their supporters, and their strong 
commitment to promote their reforms should be incorporated into the study of 
religion and politics. Scholars need to fully take into account the ideational as 
well as instrumental preferences when studying the political actions of religious 
groups. This approach is illustrated by the ecletic theoretical approaches I develop 
in this study the moral authority leadership theory, which combines social 
constructivist, rational choice, and Weberian charismatic leadership theories), 
rather than relying solely on a single theoretical paradigm.  
In sum, the analysis of two Islamic groups in this study provides support 
for the moral authority leadership theory I had outlined in this study. The presence 
of moral authority leaders with charismatic attributes, along with the tolerant 
institutional culture of the organization, and the peaceful relations between 
religious groups and the state achieved through strategic alliances between the 
two entities serve as positive conduits for the success of progressive reformers to 
change the prevailing theology of their respective religious organizations as well 
as the political orientation of these organizations. In addition to the leadership of 
moral authority leaders within these two groups, an institutional culture that 
tolerates new theological ideas allows reformers more space to promote the 
reforms and convince other members of the organization to join them. It also 
encourages more senior ulama to publicly support the reform causes as well, as 
they fear less reprisal from reform opponents. Lastly, peaceful state-religion 
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relations help the reformers to promote their cause because it creates less 
intervention from the state that might have thwarted the reform efforts before they 
have a chance to grow within the organization. These help to explain the success 
of the reform process within the two organizations. On the other hand, the lack of 
moral authority leadership, and an exclusivist, intolerant institutional culture, 
dominated by unsuccessful reform opponents who opposed the theological reform 
of the reformers within the Muhammadiyah explain the failure of reform 
supporters to successfully institutionalize their ideas within their organization.  
Theoretical Contributions 
I identify five theoretical contributions of the moral authority leadership 
introduced and empirically tested in this study. First, the theory I develop in this 
study shows that theological frame is not fixed social construct that could not be 
amended, reformed, or reinterpreted. Instead, it is subjected to constant effort of 
reconstruction and reframing that occurred through a process of mutual 
constitution between agency (religious/moral authority leaders) and structure 
(institutional culture and the relations between the religious group and the state). 
Through this process, the theological frames, political identities, and preferences 
of religious group can be changed to adapt to new sociopolitical realities. A 
religious group that was guided by a conservative and non-democratic theological 
frame can adopt a new theological and political identity as promoters of 
progressive values such as democracy, religion-state separation, and tolerance 
toward religious minorities.  
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Second, this theory contributes to our understanding of the role of 
changing theological ideas and religious leaders who promote the reconstruction 
of these ideas through their actions as norm entrepreneurs and moral authority 
leaders. It shows how religious leaders could reconstruct the theological frame 
and political identity of their groups, from a theological frame which is more 
conservative and rejects the compatibility between Islam, modernity, and 
democracy, into one which accepts the compatibility between Islamic ideas and 
modern political values, such as democracy, religion-state separation, and 
religious tolerance. It explains how the leaders combined ideational goals, 
persuasion, coercion, and instrumental strategies/material incentives to gain 
supporters from within their religious organizations and allies from the outside of 
the organization (especially from the state) in their efforts to implement and 
institutionalize their ideas within their respective groups. Lastly, the diverging 
causal pathways illustrated in this study show that successful theological reforms 
usually takes place due to the presence of charismatic moral authority leadership, 
supported by inclusive institutional culture which historically tolerates non-
Islamic theologies and rituals, and peaceful relations between religious group and 
state actors in which the two could strike temporary alliances that enabled to 
reduce the level of state intervention against the religious group and minimize 
reprisals against proponents of theological reforms. However, reform is less likely 
to be successful if it lacks the moral authority leaders lack charismatic attributes 
that enable them to win over more supporters from within their organizations, are 
facing an institutional culture that does not tolerate new and unorthodox 
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theological ideas, or is having conflictual relations with the state apparatus that 
seeks to repress the religious group and reform supporters because they were 
perceived as threats to the survival against the state.  
Third, by using the insights from social constructivist theory, the theory 
takes a closer look at the origins of new theological ideas at the hand of religious 
leader who serves as the norm entrepreneurs for these ideas and how these ideas 
reframe and reconstruct Islamic groups’ political identities preferences as well as 
the role of religious leader in promoting the institutionalization of these ideas 
within their respective groups. Reformers within Islamic groups with a history of 
tolerating new theological ideas and have peaceful and co-operative relations with 
the state are more likely to be successful in institutionalizing the reforms that they 
are advocating. Once the reforms have been fully institutionalized, these groups 
are more likely to adapt democratic political strategies, acknowledge separation 
between religion and the state, and respect the rights of religious and sectarian 
minorities than groups which historically has strong revivalist theological 
orientation. Knowing the difference between groups that are theologically 
progressive versus those that are theologically more fundamentalist/revivalist in 
orientation could help scholars and policymakers to determine which Islamic 
groups are more likely to embrace genuine democracy and human rights versus 
those that are genuinely hostile toward these ideas or are adapting them only for 
strategic and opportunistic purposes.  
Fourth, this study makes a new contribution to the literature on Islamic 
politics and social movements by outlining the process in which Islamic 
231 
movements can embrace democratic norms and institutions, religion-state 
separation, and tolerance for non-Muslim minorities. It details the possible 
pathways in which these ideas can be institutionalized within these groups, and 
how reform leaders and activists within these groups could promote this change 
and implement them within their respective organizations. Lastly, the study 
contributes to the literature on political leadership, by outlining how the 
leadership exercised by religious leaders and the variety of ideational and 
instrumental preferences that they have could influence theological and political 
changes within their own organizations.  
Future Research  
There are at least two potential future research projects that could extend 
the theoretical framework I have developed in this study. First, the theoretical 
framework used in this study can be used to study other Islamic movements in 
other Southeast Asian countries. Besides Indonesia, two other Southeast Asian 
countries, Malaysia and Brunei are Muslim majority countries. There is also a 
sizable Muslim minority population in other Southeast Asian countries such as 
Singapore, southern part of Thailand, and southern part of the Philippines. In all 
of these countries and sub-regions, Islamic groups are facing internal debates on 
whether or not Islamic theological ideas is compatible with modern political ideas 
such as democracy, religion-state separation, and religious toleration/pluralism. 
Many of Islamic groups are facing challenges from both authoritarian rule 
(Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore) or are facing hostile state apparatus which often 
represses Islamic political movements because of their tendencies to promote 
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secession from these states (Southern Thailand and Southern Phillippines). By 
extending my theoretical framework to study the Islamic groups in these 
countries, we can gain new insights on whether Islamic groups in these countries 
have the potential to change their theological frames and adopt more progressive 
theological reforms, thereby moderating their political orientations.  
Second, we can extend the theory to study the activities and actions of the 
NU and the Muhammadiyah specifically on the issue of religious tolerance and 
violence against religious minorities in contemporary period, instead of during the 
period in which the events studied in this study largely taken place (the 1980s and 
1990s). Religious tolerance towards non-Muslims and Muslim minority sects has 
become an important political issue in both Indonesia within the last few years. 
Attacks against religious minorities, both violent and non-violent ones have 
become more frequent. While the bulk of the attacks were conducted by small 
revivalist-oriented sects that were unconnected in any way with the Islamic 
groups studied in this study, there has been little research done on whether the 
groups studied here think about recent inter-religious violence in Indonesia. It is 
unclear whether they are actively condemning these acts of violence, condoning 
them, or takes a more ambiguous position. Extending this research to study how 
the NU and the Muhammadiyah deal with the rising incidents of religious conflict 
and violence in Indonesia would give scholars an additional insight on whether 
the progressive theological ideas promoted within these two organizations are 
having any impacts on how these groups deal with the problems of rising inter-
religious conflicts and violence in Indonesia. 
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